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Beijing nurtures its regional
influence
By Phar Kim Beng
HONG KONG - With the exception of South Korea,
Japan, the Philippines and Singapore, four countries
that rely on US military support in varying degrees for
their national security, leaders in East Asia have, in
principle, opposed the US war in Iraq. Beijing, however,
has seized the moral high ground in calling for an
immediate cessation of hostility.
In one stroke,
China has become the voice, if not the conscience, of
both the governments and peoples of East Asia, a status
that it is eager to recover, having badly handled the
Iraq problem this past winter, coupled with its equally
poor management of the North Korea crisis recently.
As well, China's latest position stands in deep
contrast to its almost neutral stance during Operation
Desert Storm in 1991. In that war, China abstained from
exercising its right of veto to block the military
campaign. The goal was to garner the goodwill of the
United States in the wake of the Chinese leadership's
brutal crackdown on student activists in Tiananmen
Square in 1989.
For what it is worth, the
motivation of China's current diplomatic strategy on
Iraq carries obvious imprints from the past. First, by
opposing the war, Beijing has reaffirmed its role as the
titular leader of East Asia, if not the developing
world. Such a position is a throwback to 1974 when China
first introduced the concept of the Three Worlds, with
the leadership proudly arguing that China's heart
belonged to the much-oppressed Third World. The First
and Second worlds were the Western and Soviet blocs
respectively.
Although the Three Worlds Theory
no longer registers any discernable policy impact in the
official circles in China - as China is after all an
emerging power that is growing at a rapid rate, thus
separating it from the pack of Third World countries -
the idea, in attenuated form, nevertheless continues to
resonate.
This is because the Three Worlds
Theory, in consonance with the Marxist tradition of
breaking social political realities into different
classes, was first conceived by Mao Zedong and later
articulated by Deng Xiaoping in the United Nations
General Assembly. The timely espousal of the theory also
helped China regain ground in the 1970s lost due to the
excesses of Cultural Revolution a decade before, when
almost all its embassies and consulates were closed,
except for its embassy in Cairo.
By opposing the
current war in Iraq, China has invoked the obvious legal
platitudes to challenge the legality of America's
actions. But its motivation, not unlike the invocation
of the Three Worlds Theory, is to win the hearts and
minds of those countries that are opposed to the war,
starting with the leaders and people in East Asia.
Second, China's adamant, though belated,
opposition is in line with Beijing's broader plans to be
recognized as a morally upright political leader. This
is consistent with China's new security strategy
introduced in 1996 both to seek and provide security
assurances to countries neighboring China, especially
those in Southeast Asia. The message that Beijing wishes
to convey is that China has no malevolent intent despite
its various territorial quarrels with its neighbors.
But within the strategic context of East Asia,
what can one read from China's position on the war in
Iraq? To begin with, China is trying to forge a
diplomatic strategy to prevent other countries from
"uniting" against China by virtue of a perceived fear of
a "China threat", economic or otherwise. Moreover, the
principal focus has been on countering the lengthening
shadow of the United States on East Asia.
Hence,
what China lacks in hard power to challenge America's
influence in the region is countered with the
intelligent use of soft power, resources that are gained
by assiduously cultivating China's image as a
peace-loving leader. This image is employed to project
China as peaceful and the United States as belligerent.
To be sure, China's diplomatic outreach is not
entirely altruistic. It has been worked into its grand
strategic calculation to usher in a multi-polar world
that the US, the current pre-eminent power, would not
dominate. Similarly, China's pacific overtures are an
attempt to preempt member states of the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) from increasing their
bilateral security cooperation with the US (including
joint military exercises).
Indeed, having
observed the relatively pain-free US operations in the
first Gulf War, now being followed up by the current
campaign against Iraq, China is aware that there
currently exist no adversaries nor international
organizations capable of constraining America's
unilateralist tendencies.
By opposing the
current war in Iraq, China has gained the much-needed
diplomatic brownie points to put a check, at least
morally, on the free rein the United States has hitherto
enjoyed.
China's strategy of reassurance is
indeed important, especially in the context of its
economic impact on Southeast Asia. China's accumulated
net foreign direct investments totaled some US$309
billion for 1980-2000, of which 95 percent, or some $284
billion, was attracted in 1993-2000. On the other hand,
ASEAN's accumulated net FDI totaled only $172 billion
for 1980-2000.
Given such figures, coupled with
the possibility that China might soon dominate the
entire manufacturing spectrum, leaves little room for
Southeast Asia to innovate - little wonder that China is
trying its best to ensure good ties with Southeast Asia.
The place to begin is by seeking a common front with
those countries currently opposed to the war in Iraq.
(©2003 Asia Times Online Co, Ltd. All rights
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