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China's bureaucracy: A virus's best
friend
By Francesco Sisci
BEIJING - It is the biggest political earthquake
since the time of Tiananmen in 1989. On Sunday both the
Chinese minister of health, Zhang Wenkang, and the newly
appointed mayor of Beijing, Meng Xuenong, were demoted
and blamed for the mishandling of the severe acute
respiratory syndrome (SARS) crisis, which is tarnishing
the prospects of high economic growth in China this
year.
For a couple of weeks, President Hu
Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao had been preaching
transparency and collaboration with the World Health
Organization (WHO). However, WHO officials did not stop
complaining about a lack of information and cooperation
from their Chinese counterparts. Furthermore, Chinese
authorities had been under-reporting cases of SARS, thus
helping the spread of the disease in the country and
undermining international confidence in China as a
responsible member of the international community.
There
were conflicting messages coming from Beijing: one
preaching collaboration and one opposing it. The two
demotions should now save some face for the government
and, one hopes, signify the beginning of the
long-awaited concerted and transparent effort from
Chinese authorities against the spread of the disease.
The demotions
are an important signal to the medical staff on the
front lines of the battle against SARS. Some doctors
have been refusing to treat patients suspected of
being infected with SARS. Possible SARS cases were being
turned away by hospitals with the excuse that the patients
were unable to pay their fees. In reality, the health
system was not prepared for the crisis and the
medical staff were afraid of being infected. On Sunday
the news conference held by Deputy Health Minister Gao
Qiang seemingly turned over a new leaf. For the first time
since the start of the epidemic last November,
China has been straightforward in its attitude,
promising resolute measures and daily updates of the situation.
However, there is not complete
transparency yet. China's system of classifying SARS cases is not
the same system promoted by WHO. China's system of
prevention has difficulties coping with sick people in
the countryside, where the hospitals and doctors are few
and are ill-prepared for this type of
emergency. Moreover, Chinese health officials have complained
bitterly about the lack of collaboration from
the military institutions, which tried to cover up and
minimize the extent of the disease within the enormous
military sector. Thus there is also the possibility that in
the next hours or days more heads may roll to mollify vocal
international and domestic critics and try to regain
some of the confidence lost in the past months. Drastic
measures appear necessary, such as the closure of all
schools in the capital, a system of quarantine for the
areas suspected of infection and widespread use of
protective masks. More than 700 confirmed and suspected
cases indicate that the situation in Beijing is quite
serious, as the first case was announced on March 1.
Demotions notwithstanding, the crisis continues
and underlines a strong deficiency not of any particular
official but of the government bureaucracy, which has
proved itself again to be unable to cope with
emergencies. It echoes the US spy-plane incident of
April 2001, when the government had serious problems
coming up with a prompt response to the pressing US
requests for a solution.
The Chinese bureaucracy
of today is arranged so as not to give a large amount of
power to one man. This is to avoid the excesses
experienced during the years of Mao Zedong, when Mao
could do and undo whatever he wished without any
government checks. The present system in effect
forestalls any dictatorship but impedes swift reaction
to virtually any emergency. The system is geared for
stability: reaching a large consensus on any given
policy. This makes it cumbersome, although stable and
quasi-democratic, in the sense that any policy has a
very wide support among the hierarchy. However, there
are no clear limits to the power exercised by top
leaders and there is no opposition to any given policy,
as any voice in the one-party system will be accounted
for and included in the decision process. The system
then folds and buckles under sudden threats and
pressures, and thus can't effectively withstand the
challenges of the fast-moving globalized system.
Beijing's evolving attitude toward SARS is a
prime example of the flaws in the Chinese political
system. It was a simple disease for which no politician
could have been reasonably held culpable. But because of
the system, nobody asserted the government's
responsibility to its people and the world with the
initial outbreak in November in Guangdong province. When
it broke out, the first reaction was to hide it. Once
hidden and covered up, it was necessary to keep covering
up, to hide the former miscalculation. The practice had
arguably worked in the past with chicken flu. Only this
time it was more serious and soon got out of hand. A
similar pattern was experienced during the spy-plane
crisis when China had wished to resolve the issue under
the table and was shocked and unable to react when the
US made it open.
China can't
afford this clumsiness, and thus a reform of the
political system has become a priority that can't be postponed
for too long. However, first China will have to recover
some of the face it has lost, by bringing SARS under
control. This will take months, if not years, unless a
miraculous vaccine is found. In the meantime this will be
an opportunity for Hu Jintao to prove his mettle. If
he manages the situation well from here on, he will
become almost invincible and could then implement reform
within the system.
So
far the US seems supportive of the new attitude
taken by China. Despite SARS, the US talks with North
Korea are still scheduled to be held in Beijing this week,
a major sign of support at a time when almost all
foreign delegations have canceled visits to China for fear
of the deadly virus.
(©2003 Asia Times
Online Co, Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact content@atimes.com
for information on our sales and syndication policies.)
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