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Asia's overlooked missile
crisis
By Stephen Blank
For
the past 18 months international attention has been
riveted on the "war on terrorism", Indo-Pakistani
tensions, Iraq, and perhaps intermittently on North
Korea's nuclear program. However, neither these issues
nor even Iran's likely nuclear program exhausts the
crises or challenges that threaten security in Asia. We
should not forget, for example, that before September
11, 2001, US military planners had all but singled out
China as a likely enemy and specifically referred to the
possibility of a clash over Taiwan in major US strategic
pronouncements.
While there have been no
tensions over Taiwan for more than two years now, that
does not mean China's and Taiwan's military buildup has
ceased. Indeed, quite the contrary is taking place, and
this buildup reflects trends that are taking place
across Asia more generally.
China has quietly
continued its steady quantitative and qualitative
buildup of missiles facing Taiwan. Each year, according
to US observers, it adds about 50 more short-range
ballistic missiles (SRBMs) to its arsenal facing Taiwan.
Jane's Intelligence Review reported as well that in
December 2002 China also tested successfully for the
first time a medium-range missile with multiple
warheads, the DF-21, giving it a capability it had
hitherto lacked. Possession of a usable capability for
launching and controlling missiles with multiple
independently targeted re-entry vehicles (MIRVs) whose
target range is about 1,800 kilometers gives China a new
capability with which to threaten not just Taiwan but
also the United States. Meanwhile China's overall
buildup of conventional, nuclear, and space capabilities
is clearly focused on both intimidating Taiwan and
deterring the United States from coming to its defense.
While it is arguable that these recent tests are
a way of countering the forthcoming US theater and
national missile defense systems (TMD and NMD
respectively), these tests and the concurrent
development of a still longer-range missile, the DF-31,
have long been anticipated by observers of China's
military and fit in with the overall pace of Chinese
modernization efforts and strategy. However, China's
missile programs have stimulated Taiwan to reply by
launching its own missile defense program. Tang
Yao-ming, Taiwan's minister of defense, stated in
February that by 2013 Taiwan expects to have usable
missile defense capabilities to defend effectively
against China's ballistic missiles. While it is working
currently on land-based sensors, acquisition of US
Kidd-class submarines will permit it to begin developing
a sea-based capability as well. And present plans call
for ultimately acquiring even an airborne capability as
well. It should also be pointed out that the United
States is encouraging this new program.
These
trends add to the worries generated by North Korea's
nuclear program, which is leading Japan to deepen its
collaboration with the United States on middle defenses.
But beyond that, Japan is also expanding the framework
under which it will be able to undertake military action
either on its own or with the US. For example, planning
has begun on a satellite-based early-warning system that
could allow Japan an independent source of intelligence
on incoming missiles apart from that provided by the
United States. It goes without saying that these
developments have clearly alarmed Beijing and
contributed to its dismay over the North Korean program.
But there is no sign that it is rethinking its own
defense policies that stimulated Taiwan's, America's,
and Japan's efforts at missile defense.
Neither
do these trends stop here. South Korea recently
commissioned the Lockheed-Martin Corp to deliver it an
Aegis ship-warfare system for its navy to enable it to
defend against missiles using sea-based sensors.
Likewise, India, facing Chinese proliferation to
Pakistan, Pakistan's nuclear and conventional missile
capability and China's growing missile capabilities
that, like the DF-21, can target Indian cities, has
begun to work toward its own defense. On the one hand it
is studying what it can do based on its own considerable
indigenous capabilities. On the other hand it has begun
discussions with Israel about a joint Indo-Israeli
program based on the export of the US-Israeli Arrow
missile defense program. Since the Arrow has already
been successfully flight-tested and Israel has
apparently won the right to export it to countries
approved by the United States, there is a real
possibility that this cooperation may deepen. Indeed,
both Turkey and India want the system and efforts are
under way to persuade Washington to permit such joint
programs or exports.
These developments show
that not only is the "war on terrorism" transforming
international security but that Asia's other challenges
are leading to utterly new strategic relationships,
force structures and to the possibility of multiple
races between missiles and missile defenses. The latter
also clearly entail further militarization of space, a
fact that is pointed out here not as criticism but as
fact. No missile defense system currently envisaged for
ballistic missiles can function without having at least
sensors in space relaying intelligence back to stations
on earth either on land or at sea. It also looks as if
these strategic developments are taking place in essence
on a unilateral or bilateral basis with little thought
to the shape of the ensuing overall strategic
environment across Asia. However, as current attention
is focused elsewhere, it seems unlikely that any serious
effort to deal with the repercussions of this trend will
emerge for some time. By then this strategic situation
will have become entrenched and much less flexible
because it will involve multiple players and regions
throughout Asia. Thus it will be more difficult to
achieve meaningful reduction of missiles, defenses and
the interstate tensions that contribute to these
buildups.
The absence of any sense of long-range
thinking should alarm us because all this is happening
almost as if it were a machine proceeding automatically.
And if we have learned anything about international
security, nuclear weapons, and the defenses to them, it
is that putting vital strategic issues on automatic
pilot is never a recipe for good strategy or for good
policy.
Stephen Blank is an analyst of
international security affairs residing in Harrisburg,
Pennsylvania.
(Copyright 2003 Asia Times
Online Co, Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact content@atimes.com for
information on our sales and syndication policies.)
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