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South
China Sea: Pact won't calm waters
By Alan Boyd
SYDNEY - China's decision on the weekend to ratify a key Southeast Asian
security protocol is unlikely to ease tensions in the oil-rich South China Sea
until rival claimants are ready to let economic pragmatism hold sway over
national pride.
The Treaty of Amity, a disputes procedure established by the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 1976, commits Beijing to use peaceful means
to resolve territorial conflicts. In adopting the treaty, China has agreed not
to "participate in any activity which shall constitute a threat to the
political and economic stability, sovereignty, or territorial integrity" of
other signatory states.
By extension, it also endorsed the 1992 ASEAN Declaration on the South China
Sea, which lays down a code of conduct for the area and mandates the Treaty of
Amity as the prime basis for negotiation.
ASEAN confidently predicted that this participation, only the second by a
country from outside the region, would give the 10-member bloc more leverage in
its standoff over dozens of strategic atolls in the South China Sea. However,
some believe it could just as easily have the opposite effect of legitimizing
Chinese dominance of a maritime zone that plays a critical role in global trade
and especially the Asian economy.
"Well, it always helps to talk, and ASEAN has very few options available to it.
[But] in practice, Chinese strategic ambitions will be undiminished, so in
effect ASEAN has given a tacit acknowledgement that China still holds the high
ground over other claimants," said a European diplomat. "Ratifying the treaty
may take some of the heat out of an emotive debate, but equally it will keep
the status quo, and this will predominantly benefit China's long-term
interests."
Compromising for the sake of wider security and economic objectives is a
time-honored objective by Beijing, which has been quietly establishing a
military presence in the contested Spratly and Paracel islands even while it
talks of a diplomatic solution. China's master stroke has been its insistence
on dealing on an individual basis with rival claimants Malaysia, Vietnam, the
Philippines, Brunei and Taiwan, thus undermining ASEAN's delicate unity on the
issue.
It is unlikely the Treaty of Amity will bridge this divide; on the contrary,
ASEAN may find itself in a weakened position, as it will have surrendered the
ultimate weapon of military deterrence. The treaty acts as a
confidence-building doctrine and does not compel signatories to negotiate on
overlapping territorial claims as long as there is no direct threat to the
region's security. Disputes are referred to a "high council" composed of all
treaty signatories that can recommend "an appropriate means of settlement" that
is not binding and has no enforcement power.
"I think it puts China in a strong negotiating position, as diplomatic pressure
cannot really be applied with any effect while Beijing shows a willingness to
negotiate, even though the terms are being dictated by the Chinese," said an
Asian diplomat. "ASEAN may be able to take back control of the agenda if it can
make China submit to mandatory scrutiny of defensive positions in the Spratlys;
however, I doubt that it has the necessary economic leverage."
 With
impeccable timing, Beijing chose to implement a free-trade agreement (FTA) with
ASEAN in the same week as it was acceding to the Treaty of Amity, providing a
powerful reminder of the region's dependence upon Chinese consumers. The FTA,
scheduled to take effect by 2010, will increase China's diplomatic clout in
direct proportion to the degree of economic integration in a potential free
market of 1.5 billion people.
Already there are signs that Malaysia and Brunei, two of the South China Sea
claimants, are adopting a more moderate negotiating stance as a more pragmatic
attitude prevails. Where Kuala Lumpur once wanted sole possession of 16 atolls
and inlets, which it contends are not even part of the Spratlys group, it is
now hinting at some form of shared jurisdiction. This would probably set aside
the issue of sovereignty in favor of the joint economic exploitation of
contested atolls, a formula that would again benefit Beijing because it claims
the entire Spratlys chain.
Yet China would be able to keep sole control of more of its own islets because
they lie outside the localized territorial ambitions of the ASEAN states.
Taiwan has parallel claims, but limited diplomatic pull.
"China has shown the greatest interest in southern tracts that, on the basis of
its own test drills, could conceivably contain the most shallow and easily
recoverable deposits of gas or oil," said the European diplomat. "As much of
this area overlaps with the Malaysian claims, any moderation of the Malaysian
position must be viewed seriously if it establishes a model for joint
exploration that would subsequently influence other areas of territorial
conflict."
At the northernmost tip, the Philippines has limited ability to enforce its
claims against a growing Chinese naval presence, and could be expected to
follow the Malaysians into a bilateral accord. Brunei has almost no defensive
capacity.
Vietnam, which used force to repel Chinese vessels in 1988, with the loss of 72
Vietnamese lives, poses the biggest obstacle to Beijing's ambitions. However,
selective agreements with other states would leave Hanoi isolated and at risk
of losing foreign investment in energy.
The oil and gas resources thought to be present in the reefs are not proven,
and US geological studies have suggested that the Chinese estimates may be
greatly overstated. Nevertheless, China, Malaysia, Brunei, Taiwan and the
Philippines all need to find new energy sources within the next decade to
replace dwindling deposits, while Vietnam could run out in 20 years.
Even existing oil and gas tracts are threatened by the sheer scale of the
Chinese claims, as they do not stop at the accepted boundaries of the Spratlys
and Paracels, and hence might become another bargaining chip in negotiations.
This is partly due to Beijing's recent ratification of the 1982 United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea, which provides for an Exclusive Economic Zone
(EEZ) of up 200 nautical miles beyond and adjacent to a territorial sea.
Malaysia's offshore fields near Sarawak, now the backbone of its energy
supplies, are contested by China. Vietnam's Dai Hung or Big Bear oil field is
at the boundary of waters claimed by Beijing. Even Indonesia's ownership of the
gas-rich Natuna Island group is disputed, though Jakarta has no formal claims
on any part of the Spratlys. And China says it owns the Malampaya and Camago
natural-gas and condensate fields in the Philippines.
"The People's Republic of China will effect, through consultations, the
delimitation of the boundary of the maritime jurisdiction with the states with
coasts opposite or adjacent to China respectively on the basis of international
law and in accordance with the principle of equitability," the official Chinese
position paper states.
ASEAN officials privately acknowledge that they need an economic pact quickly
before China absorbs the atolls by stealth. Even while the talking goes on, its
naval forces have built permanent garrisons on at least nine atolls and taken
effective control of a dozen others.
As many as 2,000 Chinese troops are believed to be based on partly inundated
atolls at Fiery Cross, Johnson South Reef, Cuarteron Reef, Chigua Reef, Gaven
Reef and Mischief Reef. According to a US Defense Department report, they are
equipped with helipads, air-raid shelters, anti-aircraft and naval guns, supply
bases and artificial docks capable of accepting 4,000-tonne ships.
Vietnam has occupied a reputed 20 of the 100 identified islets in the Spratlys
group, and Taiwan, the Philippines and Malaysia control one or more of the
remaining clusters of uninhabited rocks. But none approaches the scale of the
Chinese presence.
"Considering the Chinese hardline position in claiming the whole of the SCS
[South China Sea], and on the basis of past Chinese actions ... there is an
evident attempt to dominate the whole of SCS as part of its objective to be a
regional and eventually a global power," the US report contended.
(Copyright 2003 Asia Times Online Co, Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact
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