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Asia
observers failing to see clearly
By
David Isenberg
If the study of international
relations can be compared to an eye exam, then perhaps
Asia specialists in the West need LASIK (laser-assisted
in-situ keratomileusis) surgery. That is a conclusion
one draws from an article in the new issue of the
journal International Security, published by MIT Press.
At a time when most events in the
international-affairs realm seem to be one appalling
disaster or future conflict after another, this is
actually good news. Because the article "Getting Asia
wrong: The need for new analytical frameworks" by David
Kang, an associate professor of government at Dartmouth
College, believes that the current framework for
analyzing international relations - "one that is derived
primarily from the European experience to project onto
and explain Asia" - is at best problematic and, in fact,
have yield several mistaken conclusions and predictions
about conflict and alignment for Asia.
Contrary
to the conventional wisdom proffered by many analysts
who see dire scenarios for Asia, Kang argues that the
pessimistic predictions of Western scholars after the
end of the Cold War that Asia would experience a period
of increasing arms racing and power politics has largely
failed to materialize, a reality that scholars must
confront if they are to develop a better understanding
of Asia relations. The specific predictions that have
failed to materialize, more than a dozen years after the
end of the Cold War, include increased Chinese
adventurism spurred by China's rising power, conflict or
war over the status of Taiwan, terrorist or missile
attacks from a rogue North Korea against South Korea,
Japanese rearmament, and arms racing or conflict in
Southeast Asia, prompted in part by unresolved
territorial disputes. In fact, there has not been a
major war since the 1978-79 Vietnam-Cambodia-China
conflict.
And, contrary to those who operate on
the Kissingerian mode of the primacy of power politics
and realism, Asian states do not appear to be balancing
against rising powers such as China. In fact, despite
fears about a revisionist and destabilizing China, Kang
finds that concern over a strong China may be misplaced.
He writes, "Historically, it has been Chinese weakness
that has led to chaos in Asia. When China has been
strong and stable, order has been preserved." This is
because, as Kang sees it:
East Asia international relations
emphasized formal hierarchy among nations while
allowing considerable informal equality. With China as
the dominant state and surrounding countries as
peripheral or secondary states, as long as hierarchy
was observed there was little need for interstate war.
This contrasts sharply with the Western tradition of
international relations which has consisted on formal
equality between nation-states, informal hierarchy,
and near-constant interstate conflict. If
that is true, then right-wing fears about the
implications of rapid economic growth in China and
corresponding growth in military capabilities are
meaningless.
Kang also finds little evidence to
support the view that China has revisionist or imperial
aims. In fact he finds evidence that China is making a
genuine effort to join the world community. This is best
reflected by China's considerable efforts to join the
World Trade Organization and its active participation in
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and
the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF).
Also, in the
past 20 years China has resolved territorial disputes
with Afghanistan, Myanmar, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
Mongolia, Nepal, Pakistan and Russia. More recently, it
has resolved its disputes with Cambodia and Vietnam,
renounced support of the Khmer Rouge, embraced the Paris
Peace Accords of 1991 that brought elections to Cambodia
and normalized relations and defined its border with
Vietnam.
On maritime issues, all Asian countries
except Cambodia, North Korea and Thailand have signed
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea,
which provides an institutional forum for states to
resolve deputes over fishing rights, trade routes, and
other matters.
While China has some unresolved
territorial disputes with Taiwan and ASEAN over the
potentially oil-rich Spratly Islands, and with Japan
over the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands, it is hardly the only
Asian country to have them. Japan and Russia, for
example, have yet to resolve their dispute over the
Northern Territories, nor have Japan and South Korea
resolved their dispute over Totko Island.
Perhaps the most encouraging news about China is
that other Asian states feel little need to join in a
balancing coalition against it. Even after accounting
for the dominance of US power in the region, Kang finds
that balancing is not occurring in Asia as realist
theories would predict. For example, contrary to
long-standing predictions, Japan has not rearmed. That
is most likely due to the fact that its survival and
economic health are best provided by a stable order.
Since Japan does not see China threatening it
militarily, Japan has not chosen, despite its ability to
build aircraft carriers or nuclear weapons, to rearm
extensively.
Kang's conclusion is that there is
likely to be far more stability in Asia, and more
bandwagoning with China than balancing against it, than
most theorists expect. He also finds that there is
evidence that China is likely to act within bounds
acceptable to the other Asian nations. If so, then US
attempts to form a coalition against China as many
conservatives have advocated would be counterproductive.
As countries in Northeast and Southeast Asia
"increasingly orient their economic and political focus
toward China, Asian nations, if forced to choose between
the United States and China, may not make the choice
that many Westerners assume they will. Historically, it
has been strong Chinese weakness that has led to chaos
in Asia. When China has been strong and stable, order
has been preserved."
(Copyright 2003 Asia Times
Online Co, Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact content@atimes.com
for information on our sales and syndication policies.)
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