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SPEAKING
FREELY
Why Hong Kong is really in
crisis
By Jamie Miyazaki
Speaking Freely is an Asia
Times Online feature that allows guest writers to have
their say. Please click here if you are interested in
contributing.
Letter from ATol's Chinese website editor
Having read Why Hong Kong is in
crisis by Henry C K Liu on July
4, I feel compelled to reply to what I view as a number
of irregularities or contradictions in his piece.
Liu asserts that "no law-abiding resident in
Hong Kong would be directly affected by the pending
security law". This is an unusual claim considering that
a rally such as last Tuesday's, which attracted hundreds
of thousands of presumably law-abiding citizens, would
be technically illegal under Article 23. Hong Kong's
Catholic Church, a body that I have taken the liberty of
assuming to be generally composed of law-abiding
citizens, has also voiced serious concerns alongside the
"Queer Sisters".
Moreover, some offenses'
definitions, especially the disclosure of "state
secrets", possession of seditious material and
subversion, are loosely worded and are not subject to a
"public interest" defense, raising very real and serious
concerns about the future of freedom of speech and
information in the special administrative region (SAR).
Potentially, anyone writing a contentious article or
expressing a controversial opinion could fall foul of
the law and be charged with sedition.
Worryingly, precedents for heavy-handed
suppression of public debate and dissemination of
information already exist. Take the case of Chung
Ting-yiu, head of Hong Kong University's Journalism and
Media Center's Public Opinion Program, who was pressured
to stop his surveys regarding Chief Executive Tung
Chee-hwa's declining popularity or face funding cuts. Or
perhaps the comments by Wang Fengchao, deputy head of
the central government liaison office in Hong Kong, in
April 2000 to the local media warning them that news
relating to Taiwan was not "ordinary" news and must be
handled with "sensitivity". Wang ominously made it clear
that he saw Article 23 as clearing up such issues -
presumably advocating Taiwanese independence in Hong
Kong would be illegal? Or how about the thinly veiled
warning by He Zheming, another liaison-office official,
to SAR businessmen not to trade with Taiwanese
businessmen advocating independence?
All these
incidents would directly effect law-abiding citizens had
action been taken using Article 23. The last two
incidents especially call into question Liu's claim that
Beijing has "kept its promise of non-interference in the
autonomy of the SAR". To most observers the above
incidents look like mainland interference in Hong Kong's
internal affairs and constitute an erosion of "one
country, two systems".
Yes, livelihood issues
such as unemployment invariably take precedence over
"abstract notions" like civil liberties. However, Hong
Kong has benefited enormously from its civil liberties
and their loss would be highly detrimental economically.
One just has to look at a recent South China Morning
Post to see an article stating that the Hong Kong
Economic Journal might be sold off or liquidated if
Article 23 is passed into law. This is a very tangible
illustration of how "abstract issues" directly affect
livelihoods.
I don't doubt, as Liu points out, a
fair few of last Tuesday's protesters were also venting
frustration at Tung's general track record, but that
does not negate the fact that the protest's primary
motivator was Article 23. Many people at the London
poll-tax protests under then prime minister Margaret
Thatcher were venting frustration with her broader
policies, yet this didn't vindicate the poll tax from
being a fundamentally flawed piece of legislation;
neither do broader misgivings about Tung vindicate
Article 23. Presciently, the poll-tax riots marked the
beginning of the end for Thatcher. It is worth noting
that Wen Jiabao failed to heap praise on Tung during his
recent visit.
Your criticism of Hong Kong's
current emphasis on "neo-liberal market fundamentalism"
fails to acknowledge that Hong Kong has gotten very rich
off this "fundamentalism" and China is in the process of
generating substantial wealth off the very same system.
Moreover, I feel you ignore the fact that historically
the Guangdong region has a long tradition of
mercantilism and entrepreneuralism. Hong Kong, Shenzhen
and Guangzhou would not be so successful economically if
its residents were at least not au fait with this
form of capitalism.
Granted, Hong Kong firms can
dismiss workers remarkably easily, perhaps too easily,
but this is also true across the border for many
workers, and it is precisely this degree of labor-market
flexibility that has ensured Hong Kong's ability to
weather economic downturns. Compare this with
labor-market rigidity in Germany to see my point. In the
right environment and under competent guidance,
labor-market flexibility is a huge asset. Unfortunately
Article 23 won't generate this environment and Tung, I
think Liu and I can both agree, is not providing the
right guidance.
This brings me to another point
of contention. Liu claims that a coterie of foreign
advisors is providing Tung with unsound advice. This
simply is not borne out by reality. A quick check of the
most gaffe-prone members of the current administration
shows that none are foreigners - Secretary for Security
Regina Ip, Financial Secretary Anthony Leung and Tung
himself included. One of the central planks of
post-colonial Hong Kong has been the Sinicization of the
upper echelons of the civil service and administration.
Liu also mentions the government's flawed and unsound
policy of attempting to prop up the real-estate market
done primarily at property magnates' behest - the
majority being Chinese, not foreigners.
I wonder
if these dubious foreign advisors are the same ones
arguing for the continued maintenance of the currency
peg, which Liu blames for condemning the Hong Kong
economy to an undeniably painful period of deflation.
Yet just a few paragraphs later he states that "in a
free market the best way to revive a declining economy
is to allow prices to fall". Deflation is defined as a
sustained fall in the price level, exactly the process
Liu condemns as one of the major structural inadequacies
of the peg.
This "foreign-advised"
administration has then gone on to engage in "public
relations fluff, such as 'Brand Hong Kong' and 'Invest
Hong Kong', as if an economy can be marketed like
toothpaste" as a substitute for economic reform.
Ironically, I think this is one of the few things we can
give Tung credit for. Because of the SAR's geographical
size, services, particularly financial ones, are central
to its very survival. These services need to be
marketed. Geographically small Dubai, Singapore and the
Cayman Islands all market themselves to promote and
raise their profiles as financial and commercial
investment centers.
"Hong Kong must first become
competitive in order to attract" foreign investment,
foreign companies and investment managers, writes Liu.
Hong Kong is already competitive; its competitiveness
stems from its geographical position on the Pearl River
Delta, its importance as a transport hub, its "lax and
simple tax regime" (Liu's words, not mine) and a
world-class legal system. Why do big mainland Chinese
firms choose to list on the Hang Seng and not in
Shanghai? Because Hong Kong's legal framework is so much
more solid. But Article 23 throws this all into
question.
The solution to the post-handover
crisis that plagued Hong Kong's future, Liu suggests,
lies with the "motherland". True, but Hong Kong by
historical and geographical default has also always
looked outward, too. The Pearl River Delta is the
world's biggest manufacturing region, Hong Kong the
busiest port - both industries by their very nature are
export-driven and thus by necessity must look to the
outside world. Hong Kong's attraction, therefore, like
Shanghai's, lies in its positioning as a portal into and
out of China.
Hong Kong's primary attraction
over other cities as a gateway into China is its legal
and accounting systems, both up to international
standards, and the opportunity of redress through its
courts. None of this can be taken for granted in the
mainland. Such attractions are indivisibly wed to the
idea of a free flow of information and protection of
civil liberties. If this one, and very major,
competitive edge was to be eroded by Article 23, then
Hong Kong would in effect become just another Chinese
city - and a very expensive one. There would, from the
perspective of legal protection, be little difference in
being based out of Shanghai rather than Hong Kong.
However, cost savings would be considerable and a lot of
jobs in the SAR would go.
Hong Kong's current
malaise does not stem from a cabal of foreigners wishing
to subvert its relationship with the "motherland" or use
it as a base for anti-Beijing activities. Civil liberty
has been the bedrock for much of Hong Kong's success and
its people's livelihood, and this is now at stake.
British colonialism certainly is not and was not
a path to salvation - it never pretended to be - but
then Article 23 and Tung's efforts at running the SAR
are most definitely not salvationary paths either. Tung
has already had six years in which to prove himself a
"firm, confident and benevolent political leader" and
has made negligible headway. In a lot of other countries
he would have been voted out by now, but in Hong Kong's
case it is reasonable to assume most people are too
preoccupied by "major livelihood issues" to be bothered
by troublesome abstractions such as elections.
Speaking Freely is an Asia
Times Online feature that allows guest writers to have
their say. Please click here if you are interested in
contributing.
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