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The case for missile
defense
By David
Isenberg
"Missile Defense in Asia", a paper
released last month by the Atlantic Council of the
United States, tries to answer the question of whether
deploying such defenses would be a good or bad thing in
Asia. In the view of the panel of experts tasked by the
council, the answer is a cautious, tentative "yes".
To answer the question, the council asked the
former deputy chief of the US Pacific Command, General
Michael Carns (US Air Force, retired); Dr Jacques
Gansler, US under secretary of defense for acquisition,
technology and logistics from 1997-2001; and Walter B
Slocombe, under secretary of defense (policy) in the
administration of president Bill Clinton, to undertake a
visit last November to Asia to have in-depth discussions
with political, military and business leaders on all
aspects of missile defense, including threat
assessments, strategic implications and the likely
consequences of missile defense developments. The panel
held meetings in Beijing, New Delhi, Seoul, Taipei and
Tokyo.
The report finds that "the degree to
which the United States builds defenses for itself and
assists others in the Asia-Pacific region in deploying
such defenses is linked to long-term question of the
role of the United States in Asia-Pacific security, of
its continuing commitment and presence, of the degree to
which missile defense is a central factor in that role,
of the durability of US bilateral alliances, and of the
posture of the United States and China toward each
other". In short, deployment of missile defenses need
not be destabilizing.
That is the overall view.
But deploying missile defenses is very much dependent on
the specifics of the country being considered.
According to the report, of all the countries in
Asia, Japan has perhaps the most focused attention to
missile defense. While Japan has for years had a
low-level program of cooperative research with the
United States on sea-based missile defenses, recent
tensions with North Korea, heightened by that country's
testing of Nodong missiles capable or reaching most, if
not all of Japan, have stimulated new attention to the
prospect of building such defenses.
The report
states that there is a "peculiarly Japanese" logic to
deploying missile defenses, as they are inherently
defensive in character and thus present fewer problems
for Japan's "Peace Constitution". And, given the end of
the Cold War and with the United States supposedly less
inclined to rely on nuclear deterrence for its own
security, many Japanese argue that it is imprudent for
Japan to continue to regard the US nuclear guarantee as
an adequate assurance of Japan's security against
nuclear threats. As the nuclear option is precluded for
Japan by both its constitution and national sentiment,
missile defense is seen as an obvious option.
While US-Japanese missile-defense cooperation
dates back to the administrations of president Ronald
Reagan and prime minister Yasuhiro Nakasone in the
1980s, Japan agreed to participate in technical
cooperation with the United States after North Korea's
test of its Taepodong missile in August 1998.
Japan already has Aegis-equipped destroyers, on
which an initial sea-based missile defense system would
be based. In this cooperation, Japan's contribution has
grown from about US$9 million in the first year to more
than $50 million per year. The work has focused on a
lightweight nose cone, an advanced infra-red seeker, a
kinetic-energy warhead and second-stage rocket
booster.
Japanese Defense Minister Shigeru Ishiba
has advocated moving ahead with development and
deployment as soon as possible. The concepts would
involve working with the United States on completing the
development of a sea-based interceptor system using a
second-generation Standard Missile and an upgraded SPY-1
radar.
South Korea, on the other hand, has an
almost opposite position. This is partly due to recent
US-South Korean strains, as well as the success of North
Korea in framing the issue in terms of US-North Korean
relations. South Koreans view the North's nuclear and
missile programs as primarily an effort to give itself
the means to threaten Japan and the United States, but
not as a serious threat to South Korea itself. South
Korea also fears that the United States exaggerates the
prospect of North Korean military action and discounts
both its costs as well as a policy of cooperation with
the North. For all these reasons, South Korea has shown
practically no interest in missile defenses.
And
even if South Korea were more sympathetic, the
difference in the character of the Northern threat would
argue against missile defenses. North Korea's ability to
attack with its artillery, rocket launchers, and
short-range Scud/Nodong missiles is such to make the
possibility of an effective national defense highly
problematic. Any defense system that attempted to
protect the entire country would likely be defeated by a
simple saturation attack.
India, understandably,
is sympathetic to the idea of missile defenses, if only
because it focuses on the problem of missile
proliferation. Specifically, India has been unable to
deal with the proliferation of Chinese missiles and
technology to Pakistan. Thus, Indians are hopeful that
missile-defense technology will provide a counter.
Furthermore, it may also complicate military planning in
Pakistan and weaken the deterrent effect of Pakistan's
nuclear force.
For Taiwan, missile defense is
inseparably linked to its relationship with mainland
China. China currently has about 400 missiles within
range of Taiwan, with more being added each year, giving
it the ability to threaten the island in a crisis. Thus
it is difficult to see the United States ruling out
providing Taiwan with access to missile defenses.
But to Beijing, deployment would have political
consequences beyond its military implications, because
it would cross a PRC (People's Republic of China) "red
line". Beijing also feels that the nature of missile
defense is such that any system defending Taiwan would
have so many links to US systems, and perhaps to those
of a Japanese system, as to create an integrated
US-Taiwan defense and restore the US-ROC (Republic of
China) alliance whose termination was part of the
normalization of US-PRC relations in 1979.
Currently, Taiwan has been acquiring a
Taiwan-unique upgrade of the anti-aircraft Patriot
system, roughly equivalent to the US Patriot 2 system.
And the United States has agreed to sell Taiwan both a
phased-array radar system and Kidd-class destroyers with
surface-to-air missiles. While these do not constitute
any kind of significant missile defense, it is likely
that in future years the line between sophisticated air
defenses and missile defenses will grow increasingly
blurred.
Currently, the official US position is
that agreement to sell a missile-defense system to
Taiwan has not been decided upon but, as a matter of
policy, such a sale is not ruled out, and the ultimate
decision will depend heavily on PRC actions.
As
for China itself, according to the report, it seems to
have concluded that "the United States will go ahead
with some form of national missile defense and that it
is no longer an option for China to build a strong front
with Russia to extract a heavy political cost from the
United States for doing so, much less to stop the
program".
While China is clearly opposed to
US-Japanese missile-defense cooperation, its real
concern is related to possible US support for a system
that would defend Taiwan. The report says: "Any US
decision to sell Taiwan a missile-defense system, much
less to cooperate in its installation and operation,
would likely set off a major crisis in US-Chinese
relations."
(Copyright 2003 Asia Times Online
Co, Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact content@atimes.com for
information on our sales and syndication policies.)
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