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TWO CENTS'
WORTH
Realism finds new
champions
By Henry C K Liu
The Hong Kong
Standard ran an eye-catching headline this week: "Law
puts HK on world map". One would have expected the
report to be another on Hong Kong's tireless mantra
about its alleged rule of law inherited from British
colonial rule. But the report turned out to be about Law
Hiu-fung, who made history by becoming the first Hong
Kong rower to win a world-championship medal.
Under the heading "Britain's odd last gift to
Hong Kong: Bad laws", Keith Bradsher of the New York
Times wrote on Sunday:
Throughout most of 156 years of British rule,
colonial administrators imposed repressive and often
racist regulations. Not only did they block the
development of democratic institutions, but they
censored Chinese-language publications and movies for
many years. Mail was opened and wiretapping was
widespread. Only in the 1980s was the dreaded Public
Order Ordinance revised, after many years of allowing
the police to break up gatherings of as few as three
people, especially public
protests.
The article went on to
quote William Overholt, who was an investment banker in
Hong Kong in the 1980s and now holds the Asia policy
chair at the RAND Corp research institute: "There is a
kind of myth that everything was free and wonderful
under the British, but they had a very tough colonial
administration. It didn't start loosening up until it
was clear it was going back to China."
The
article pointed out that the British discriminated
heavily against the 98 percent of the population that
was Chinese, creating a lasting resentment that still
finds expression in "a fiercely anti-European,
pro-Beijing" segment of the population here.
Why
is the New York Times, the crusader of democracy
worldwide, suddenly exhibiting such a neutral respect
for historical facts about Hong Kong?
The answer
may lie in rapidly changing international geopolitics.
Beginning with the administration of president Ronald
Reagan, a new breed of US policy planners were beginning
to advance the view that geopolitically, China needed
the US more than the US needed China. These planners,
led by Paul Wolfowitz (who now plays a defining role in
George W Bush's Defense Department and its "war on
terrorism" and its invasion and occupation of Iraq),
argued that US policy of the previous decade under
presidents Richard Nixon, Gerald Ford and Jimmy Carter
had exaggerated the significance of China in global
geopolitics and that China's importance was limited to
Asia in the foreseeable future.
Reagan's
military buildup in the early '80s, particularly the
Strategic Defense Initiative, was beginning to bolster
US confidence in facing Soviet threats technologically
without any help from China or Western Europe. This was
the beginning of US unilateralism.
George Shultz
(who introduced George W Bush's first foreign-policy
campaign speech in November 1999), in replacing
Alexander Haig as US secretary of state in 1982,
embraced this new thinking about China with cool
determination. Shultz reversed the Richard Nixon/Henry
Kissinger world view and replaced China with Japan as
the primary focus of US policy in Asia. He saw friction
between the United States and China as inevitable in the
long run, not because of historical conditions relating
to Taiwan, but because of fundamental differences
between the two social systems and their national
interests. Aaron L Friedberg of Princeton University,
who recently joined US Vice President Dick Cheney's
staff as a deputy national-security adviser and director
of policy planning, holds the same view.
In the
Shultz vision, the newly prosperous Asian Tigers,
including Taiwan and Hong Kong, led by a Japan that was
"democratic" (notwithstanding that scholars had pointed
out Japan's one-party rule through the Liberal
Democratic Party), capitalistic (notwithstanding
Japanese state capitalism), and above all docile, should
no longer be treated as US client states in the Cold War
but as important Asian elements in the new US world
order of neo-liberal globalization.
In 1982,
British prime minister Margaret Thatcher's ill-fated
attempt on the heels of victory in the Falkland Islands
to perpetuate British colonial rule over Hong Kong ended
with Deng Xiaoping applying the "one country, two
systems" (OCTS) formula to a Sino-British Joint
Declaration for the return of Hong Kong to Chinese
sovereignty on July 1, 1997. That formula had been
originally fashioned as a solution to the Taiwan problem
as a Chinese internal affair. Subsequently, Deng
directly approached Washington for acceptance of the
same formula for solving the Taiwan problem. The Reagan
administration summarily turned the idea down as a
non-starter. Nevertheless, the OCTS formula became
official Chinese policy for the reunification of Taiwan,
with wholesale Chinese political compromise on Hong Kong
in deference to its implication on Taiwan.
More
ominous, Beijing's overture opened the way for US
interference on the future of Hong Kong. Up to that
point, Washington had been officially neutral in a
bilateral problem between China and Britain involving
the redress of historical colonialism. The issue of Hong
Kong was thus transformed from one of righteous
termination of British colonialism to official Chinese
acceptance of colonial institutions as democracy and
capitalism for 50 more years. Moreover, the issue of
Hong Kong prompted the US Congress to adopt the Hong
Kong Policy Act, which provides a legal basis in US law
for self-righteous US monitoring on Chinese acceptance
of Western democracy and capitalism in Hong Kong and, by
extension, within Chinese territory.
Thus from
1982 onward, the propaganda machine of neo-imperialism
has been running full-throttle in painting colonial Hong
Kong as a fantasy model of capitalistic democracy and
rule of law. A "democracy" movement has been nurtured in
Hong Kong with open US support. The so-called Democratic
Party was advised by Ellen Bork, a deputy director of
the Project for the New American Century, a US
neo-conservative group with an ultra-hawkish posture on
China.
In his first Campaign 2000 speech on
foreign policy, George W Bush declared in November 1999:
"We must show American power and purpose and strong
support for our Asian friends and allies; for democratic
South Korea across the Yellow Sea; for democratic Japan
and the Philippines across the China Seas; for
democratic Thailand and Australia. This means keeping
our pledge to deter aggression against the Republic of
Korea and strengthening security ties with Japan. This
means expanding theater missile defenses among our
allies. And this means honoring our promises to the
people of Taiwan. We do not deny there is one China, but
we deny the right of Beijing to impose their [sic] rule
on a free people. As I have said before, we will help
Taiwan defend itself."
By implication, the
United States would also not tolerate the right of
Beijing to impose its rule on a "free" people in Hong
Kong.
Since the terrorist attacks of September
11, 2001, US attempts to derail rising Chinese national
capabilities through its support for separatist forces
have come under control. Such separatists forces, each
with its own specific characteristics, exist in Tibet,
Xinjiang, Taiwan and Hong Kong. The US "war on
terrorism" requires the cooperation if not support of
China. The United States is also hoping for Chinese help
in defusing the mounting crisis in Korea. When Taiwanese
President Chen Shui-bian tied the July 1 march in Hong
Kong with his plans to hold referendums on the future of
Taiwan, in a not too subtly disguised move toward Taiwan
independence, Washington began to realize that the
political tempest in a teapot in Hong Kong might cause
more trouble for US geopolitical interests than the
quiet satisfaction of putting China through a
public-relations grinder was worth.
Taiwanese
Premier Yu Shyi-kun was quoted by cabinet spokesman Lin
Chia-lung as having said on July 2, one day after the
Hong Kong demonstration: "The protest in Hong Kong
against the special administration's planned
anti-subversion law on Tuesday highlighted that the 'one
country, two systems' policy is unfeasible and that it
is necessary and urgent for Taiwan to enact a referendum
law."
While expressing support for Hong Kong in
"defending its freedoms and fundamental rights",
President Chen, in a written keynote statement delivered
by Presidential Office secretary general Chiou I-jen,
also called on the Taiwanese public to "cherish the
fruits of democracy they now enjoy".
Via a
videoconferencing system, Emily Lau, a member of the
Hong Kong Legislative Council, and Richard Tsoi
Yiu-cheong, spokesman for the Civil Human Rights Front,
expressed their gratitude for Taiwan's support in their
fight against their government's proposed
anti-subversion legislation.
In a Wall Street
Journal interview published on July 18, Chen hit out at
Beijing's moves to impose new security laws in Hong
Kong, which he said violated promises and stood as a
warning against reuniting Taiwan and China.
Chiou was in Washington last week to discuss
with high-ranking US officials "issues of mutual
concern, possibly including referendums". Chiou was
accompanied by Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Michael
Kau, National Security Council deputy secretary general
Ko Cheng-heng and Democratic Progressive Party (DPP)
legislators Hsiao Bi-khim and Chen Chung-hsin. They met
with White House Deputy National Security Adviser
Stephen Hadley, Deputy Secretary of State Richard
Armitage and Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz.
Although the US government has made it clear
that Taiwan has to make the decision on whether to hold
referendums, some officials have reportedly expressed
their reservations about the plan. China has also sent a
high official from the State Council Taiwan Affairs
Office to meet with Armitage to express Beijing's
objection.
On July 11, Zhang Lihong, an
associate professor with the Taiwan Institute of the
China Academy of Social Sciences, wrote in the People's
Daily:
Despite
strong dissent from both inside and outside of the
island, Taiwan is persistent in making the topic a
focal point for international attention. It is not
difficult to see the true intentions of promoting
Taiwanese independence and using it as an election
ploy. On top of the agenda is "gradual independence",
which the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) has
always advocated. Since it came into power, the DPP
has relentlessly played up this policy on all fronts,
and a referendum is a crucial step in the whole
scheme. Referendums as a so-called public policy and
"a constitutional proposition" are only a precursor
for future voting on Taiwan's independence or
unification with the mainland. It can also be used as
an opportunity to make a legal precedent for passing a
"referendum law", whereby "revisions of national
titles, flags or anthems" as well as the vote itself
can be made into provisions. Then, it can be used to
spark cross-Strait tensions, reinforce public enmity
towards the mainland, and sow the seeds of
self-determination surrounding Taiwan's future. And
finally, it can be a means of expressing so-called
"public opinion" to the international community,
creating an impression that both sides of the Taiwan
Straits are independent sovereign
nations.
The article was
titled "Taiwan referendum plays with fire". Playing with
fire means war.
This Monday, speaking at the
launch of his new book, James Lilley, former Central
Intelligence Agency director, former US ambassador to
China under president George Bush Sr, and former
American Institute in Taiwan director, said disputes
between Taiwan and China are better solved through
greater business interactions.
"Make business,
not war," said Lilley, who was born in the seaport town
of Qingdao in northeastern China. Lilley also said there
should be a peaceful resolution between the two sides of
Taiwan Strait. Lilley urged Taiwan to keep a low profile
while focusing on economic development. "Don't go too
far to provoke China. China may provoke you, but don't
get on the wrong side of this one," Lilley said. "What
does the referendum do for you? What does it clarify?
It's very important to examine oneself as to why it's
being done."
Lilley mapped out a future scenario
for East Asia in which three important hubs exist - two
in China and one in Taiwan. Lilley said the Yangtze
Delta and the combination of Hong Kong and Shenzhen
would play an important role in the economic development
of East Asia.
"Half a million Taiwanese
businessmen live in Shanghai now," said Lilley, quoting
John Chang, the illegitimate son of late Taiwanese
president Chiang Ching-kuo. But Lilley also said he was
worried a referendum might prevent Taiwan's economy from
developing further.
"Referendums are not a good
way to do business," said Lilley, when asked how Taiwan
should resolve the Fourth Nuclear Power Plant dispute.
"This is a very complex decision that doesn't lend
itself to a simple answer," he said. "There is a lot of
noise being made [on the nuclear power issue]. It's time
for the pragmatist to come out, not the idealist."
This new view from Lilley is surprising, given
that he has claimed to be the tutor of Lee Teng-hui, who
engineered the election of Chen by splitting the
Kuomintang in the last election. Lilley was also the
brain behind the East-West Germany model for the
reunification of Taiwan with China, with Taiwan as West
Germany. Lilley's hand can also be seen in Lee's fantasy
of splitting China into five minor states. Someone in
Washington has given Lilley the word to sing a new tune.
With the situation in Iraq looking more
precarious by the week, and a new Korean crisis on the
horizon, the United States does not need to take on
China over Taiwan at this moment. Hong Kong is a side
show of a side show. Thus a word is passed down for a
little balance. Of course, the so-called Democrats in
Hong Kong are always the last to get the message, but
they will soon get the message that their bogus
democracy push is not appreciated by their new masters.
Henry C K Liu is chairman of the New
York-based Liu Investment Group.
(Copyright 2003 Asia Times Online
Co, Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact
content@atimes.com for information on our sales and syndication
policies.)
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