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China: National interest = foreign
policy
By Jaewoo Choo
SEOUL -
Since the announcement by China that it would host
six-party talks on the North Korean nuclear problem,
there has been growing speculation on why Beijing has
decided to strengthen its diplomatic efforts on the
Korea issue.
While some would argue that the
motivation behind the Chinese initiative reflect its
broader recent changes in diplomatic behavior, such as
co-founding the Shanghai Cooperation Organization,
joining the World Trade Organization, and cooperating
with the United States in its fight against terrorism,
others have attributed the six-way-talks arrangement to
China's successful manipulation of its status as a
consistent economic supporter of North Korea. The
hypothesis underlying all these explanations is that
China is reluctant to see the situation in neighboring
North Korea deteriorate any further. But China is
looking far beyond the Korean border, to its long-term
status as a regional power and to its relations with the
United States.
Like the US, China as a regional
power does not pursue its overseas national interests
according to the whims of other less powerful states. In
other words, the course of its foreign-policy conduct is
not usually swayed by the influence of other neighboring
states, though that may be taken into consideration. If
we were allowed to make an analogy with the conventional
wisdom in the studies of foreign policy that diplomacy
is an extension of domestic political affairs, China's
decisions and actions should be assessed from China's
national standpoint. To do this, we must first
understand the factors that are critical to China in
terms of its national interest.
At the
conclusion of last year's 16th Chinese Communist Party
(CCP) convention and this year's 11th National People's
Congress (NPC), China presented a blueprint for its
long-term national goal to be fulfilled by 2020. Its
goal is to transform the current Chinese society into
what is known as xiaokang society, where the
general populace would be able to enjoy a much more
abundant and comfortable life. The nation plans to
achieve this end by quadrupling the size of its 2000
gross domestic product by 2020. By doing so, not only
would China become the world's third-largest economy,
but its GDP per capita would be US$3,000. To achieve
this, China is banking on the success of two major
international events. Precedent shows that, especially
for a developing economy, such an international event
acts as a leg up for economic progress.
First,
China is determined to host the 2008 Summer Olympic
Games successfully. Second, China figures that the
successful conclusion of another high-profile
international event, the Shanghai World Expo in 2010,
will provide another big boost to its pursuit of a
xiaokang society. While Beijing will benefit from
the Olympics in upgrading its image as the capital of a
regional power state, if not a global one, Shanghai will
also gain from Expo in promoting itself as the potential
financial and commercial center of the Asia-Pacific
region, if not of the world.
The geo-economic
implication of these two affairs for China is also
noteworthy. Beijing's accelerated effort for development
would have serious repercussions on those areas north of
Shanghai, especially the northeastern part of China,
where the discrepancy in economic and social development
compared with the capital is very wide. Shanghai's
hosting of the Expo would have a similar effect to
China's western region, on which it will need to rely on
natural resources and energy resources in particular,
thereby naturally inducing development in the west.
As it banks on the success of these two events,
China's fourth-generation leadership, headed by Hu
Jintao, will concentrate its foreign policy on
maintaining a stable and peaceful international
environment. Since its decision in 1978 to open its
doors to the outside world and to pursue domestic
reform, China has placed a great priority on sustaining,
if not creating, an international environment amicable
to its national development. Without this policy,
China's leadership has explained in unison ever since,
China would not have achieved what it has. Economic
development in an unstable international setting is
unthinkable. Without economic improvement, China would
not have the international profile it has now, and thus
winning the hosting rights of the 2008 Summer Olympiad
and 2010 Expo would have remained nothing but a dream.
And without these events, the goal to achieve a
xiaokang society would have been put on hold
indefinitely. Therefore, China is now anxious to
maintain an international environment that it sees as
acceptably stable, peaceful, and favorable to the
success of these two international events.
Although the years 2008 and 2010 may not seem
near, they are not too far away, either. This is
particularly so if we consider the domestic political
timetables of China and the United States. It is much
more meaningful if we understand the implications this
may bear in terms of the bilateral relationship between
the two nations and its effect on Northeast Asian
affairs.
First, the leadership timetable for
both China and the US is very congruent. Hu Jintao took
the national presidency and chairmanship of the CCP at
the conclusion of the 11th NPC and 16th CCP conference,
respectively. As with the leadership in the US, he is
allowed to hold these positions for two consecutive
terms. The term for both posts is, however, for five
years, not four as in the US presidency. Since it is
widely speculated that he will reassume the leadership
of the nation and the Party when his first terms are up
in 2008 (the presidency) and 2007 (the Party
chairmanship), he will remain in power until 2013. If
George W Bush is re-elected next year, he will be
president of the United States until 2010. Under this
scenario, the two leaders will have to face each other
for at least another seven years.
Second, Bush's
re-election and his North Korea policy would have a
major effect on the course of China's pursuit of the
grand national plan, achieving xiaokang society
with the help of the success of the two international
events by maintaining a stable and peaceful
international environment. As of now, the growing
speculation that in its second term the Bush
administration might rely on military action to halt
North Korea's nuclear ambitions if diplomatic means fail
draws particularly deep concern from the Chinese
leadership. It is estimated that the appropriate timing
for such action would be the second year in President
Bush's second term, ie, 2006. That is only two years
before China's first major international event, the 2008
Summer Olympics.
The effect of such a scenario,
of course, remains to be seen. Still, the escalating
tension around the Korean Peninsula would not benefit
Chinese national interests because it is so close to the
capital. What we have to bear in mind is that the world
has already had some precedent experiences with
unfavorable international settings. We may recall the
infamous Moscow and Los Angeles Olympics in 1980 and
1984 respectively, when only half of the world
participated. In the summer of 1988, when the student
democratic movement reached its peak in Korea's history,
there was serious discussion around the world of
transferring Seoul's Olympic hosting rights to some
other city. This year in China, the severe acute
respiratory syndrome (SARS) epidemic rang alarm bells
when the hosting rights of the Women's World Cup was
moved from China to the United States.
Third,
with the chairmanship of the Chinese Central Military
Committee (CCMC) currently held by Jiang Zemin, former
Chinese president and chairman of the CCP, Hu cannot
afford to see US military influence growing in the
region around his nation. Because of the September 11,
2001, terrorist attacks and subsequent terrorism in
Southeast Asia, the United States has managed to expand
its influence in military terms into the regions
bordering China, namely a number of the Central Asian
and Southeast Asian states. In addition, the continuing
allegation of North Korea's nuclear ambitions has paved
the way for the US to move forward with its action plan
to field its missile defense program in Northeast Asia,
making the Chinese military establishment much more
vulnerable to the US surveillance system. In order for
China to undermine such ground, if not to halt it, it
needs to remove any sources that may play to the
advantage of the US scheme. And the best possible choice
for China is to solve the North Korean nuclear problem
in peaceful manner.
China is on the verge of its
second takeoff to sustain its miraculous national
development, the first one being the 1978 decision for
an open-door and reform policy. To this end, it must
continue its economic achievements. External variables
may, however, play a detrimental role in its development
course, as is emphasized by its leaders. This is
particularly so when the nation's economic development
is subject to foreign investment and trade. Thus any
causes for instability around China, not to mention
within the country itself, would be intolerable to the
Chinese leadership in the future.
Under the
circumstances, China will take a much more aggressive
posture in its conduct of foreign policy in regional
terms, if not global ones, in the foreseeable future,
not because of external pressure reason but for the sake
of its own national interests.
Jaewoo
Choo, PhD, is a research fellow with the Trade
Research Institute, Seoul. The opinions expressed in
this article are his own.
(Copyright 2003
Asia Times Online Co, Ltd. All rights reserved. Please
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