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China's brazen Myanmar
move
By Alan Boyd
SYDNEY - China has brazenly defied the United
States' latest attempts to isolate the military
leadership in Myanmar, as Beijing moves to reclaim the
talks initiative with its own unique blend of coercion
and economic leverage.
In the latest of a series
of high-level exchanges since January, Beijing is
hosting a visit by 32 top junta leaders this week that
underscores China's unrivaled clout with the reclusive
generals in Yangon. Ramming this message home, Beijing
agreed on Saturday to advance a US$200 million loan for
a power project near Myanmar's second city of Mandalay,
and diplomats said China was discussing further military
cooperation.
Although the visit is said to have
been planned several months ago, there is little
question it will be perceived as a rejoinder to
Washington's decision late last month to impose tighter
economic sanctions on the junta.
Drawing upon
its leverage as Myanmar's leading trading partner, China
has already denounced the sanctions and given a clear
indication that it will not support efforts by the
Western alliance to isolate the junta, economically or
otherwise.
"The people of China are keen to
develop the long-standing friendly neighborly and
cooperative ties with Myanmar in the new century," Guo
Boxiong, vice chairman of the Chinese Central Military
Commission (CMC), said in a statement issued in Beijing
that has been given wide coverage in the official media.
There is a strong military tone to the talks,
with Myanmar sending General Maung Aye, No 2 in the
ruling State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) and
deputy head of the defense forces.
But the
sanctions are undoubtedly the main talking point: Maung
Aye is better known as chairman of the pivotal National
Industrial Development Committee, as well as the
National Agricultural and Economic Development Committee
and the National Trade Committee, the agency responsible
for cross-border trade.
Two other senior SPDC
leaders with economic roles, Lieutenant-General Thura
Shwe Mann and Secretary-Two Lieutenant-General Soe Win,
are also in the delegation, supported by a phalanx of
technocrats.
"I don't think there is any doubt
Muang Aye is there with a very clear mandate of
exploring how the impact of the sanctions can be
softened," said a European diplomat. "However, let us
not forget that China has its own interests, as a close
neighbor and economic ally, in lessening the social
risks one might expect to see once economic deprivation
spreads."
Chinese military detachments along the
border have reportedly been beefed up substantially
since it first became apparent that Washington would
take a harder line with Yangon, reflecting heightened
security fears from a likely influx of economic
migrants. China is already grappling with of a host of
social ailments that were imported from Myanmar, ranging
from trafficking in illicit narcotics to the spread of
the AIDS virus and people-smuggling.
Commerce
has slumped on the Thai and Chinese borders since the
United States imposed an embargo on imports from Myanmar
and froze some of its assets, leaving tens of thousands
of traders with reduced incomes. Food riots have been
reported in some areas. It is these threats, allied with
a desire to undermine the influence of strategic rival
India, that are believed to have largely shaped China's
paradoxical response to the sanctions: while it may not
like Washington's methods, it wants much the same
result.
"Obviously it would be easy to dismiss
the Chinese position as another churlish reaction to
what would probably be termed a containment strategy
directed from Washington. That ignores the bigger
picture," said another diplomat. "Simply put, the
Chinese want to have people in [Yangon] whom they can
deal with, who aren't going to destabilize their
neighborhood and attract lots of unwanted attention from
western Europe and the US.
"So the bottom line
is they will probably support a diplomatic solution like
the one put forward by the Thais, incorporating a change
of leadership if needed - as long as it is on their own
terms," he said.
China has declined to intervene
directly in Myanmar's political turmoil, which it
contends is that country's "internal affair". Yet it has
given qualified backing to a proposal by Thailand for a
"roadmap" to democracy based on a multilateral forum of
regional states and the various factions in Myanmar that
would attempt to broker a durable settlement.
Beijing's policy toward detained opposition
leader Aung San Suu Kyi, who is seen as the most likely
leader of a democratic Myanmar, has been based on a
strong dose of pragmatism. Wary of social instability,
China is believed to have exerted pressure on the junta
for her release, and has sought a more moderate response
to political activism.
However, it might be a
different matter if Suu Kyi were to establish a
democratic government with an assertive foreign policy,
which would probably be more sympathetic to the United
States and its allies. The Chinese leadership will also
be acutely aware of the personal bond that exists
between the Aung Sans and longtime rival India, which
gave the family a sanctuary after it was forced into
exile by the SPDC's predecessors in the early 1960s.
"I don' t know what policies a Burma led by Aung
San Suu Kyi would pursue toward China, but I'm quite
confident she wouldn't choose to pursue a strategic
partnership with an Asian dictatorship," influential US
Senator John McCain said in a congressional address in
June. (Burma is the old name for Myanmar, officially
renamed by the junta in 1989.) "Democratic India would
be a natural ally of a free Burma, and I believe New
Delhi would be wise to help move Burma in that
direction, rather than curry favor with the generals."
India's own posture toward Myanmar has in effect
been dictated by the junta's pandering toward Chinese
strategic interests, especially the access granted to
communist forces at naval bases in the Andaman Sea. With
its traditional trading routes under threat, Delhi has
much to lose from a diplomatic settlement in Myanmar
favoring China. In this sense it has found a ready ally
in Suu Kyi, who would be the central figure in any
negotiations.
Suu Kyi's National League for
Democracy (NLD) has lashed out at the junta's
interdependency with the Chinese military establishment.
Since 1990, Myanmar has spent $3 billion on Chinese
weapons, which have been used for the brutal suppression
of dissent and to consolidate the SPDC's grip on power.
The NLD has also bitterly condemned the Chinese
infiltration into the Andaman Sea as a violation of
Myanmar's sovereignty, and could be expected to move
swiftly to curtail Beijing's sphere of influence if Suu
Kyi formed a government.
"It stands to reason
that the Chinese have much to lose from a political
transition that would cut across their historic
interests and introduce an element of political
uncertainty. This gives them a big stake in any
political settlement," said the European diplomat. "They
know they can't afford to let the terms of the
transition be dictated by the political opposition, the
Western alliance, or indeed the Thais.
"What we
are seeing is China, having accepted that the current
situation is untenable, now beginning to take the lead
in pursuing political talks so it can set the agenda for
change," said the diplomat.
(Copyright 2003 Asia
Times Online Co, Ltd. All rights reserved. Please
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