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North Korea becomes China's bete
noire
By Marc Erikson
As
little as a year ago, few if any of China's top
policymakers gave more than a passing thought to North
Korea. Today, few if any of them would disagree that
this onetime ally has become China's No 1 headache and
puts several of its essential strategic interests at
risk - no matter what the outcome of the present
standoff over North Korea's nuclear programs. Here are
some of the reasons.
In a worst-case scenario,
full-scale war breaks out on the Korean Peninsula. China
could and probably would stay out of it. But the
collateral damage to Chinese interests would be massive.
The United States, South Korea, and a peripherally
involved Japan lending logistic support would win such a
war, at the expense of possibly hundreds of thousands of
casualties. Regime change in Pyongyang and Korean
unification, unplanned and under chaotic circumstances,
would be inevitable - to the long-term detriment of
China's regional strategic and global economic
interests. South Korean foreign investment, the bulk of
which now flows to China, would be diverted to Korean
reconstruction, as would substantial portions of other
foreign investment now flowing to China. Instead of
having two Korean quasi-allies, China would face a
unified nation of uncertain allegiance. Japan almost
inevitably would emerge as a major new regional military
power. Unification of mainland China with Taiwan would
likely be postponed for generations in the context of
the newly emerging strategic constellation. The United
States, now in the process of long-term thinning out of
its military strategic presence in East Asia, would be
re-ensconced there.
But even short of such a
strategic nightmare, other outcomes are not exactly
palatable for China. Even now, in response to the
nuclear standoff since last October and North Korean
missile tests, Japan has geared up its military posture.
New laws defining the role of Japan's military in case
of attack or clear and present danger of attack have
been passed in parliament. The Defense Agency has
requested US$1.2 billion in next year's budget for
theater missile defense. The public mood in Japan, until
not so long ago staunchly pacifist, is undergoing rapid
change. A nuclear-armed Japan is no longer unthinkable.
Take just one example: A couple of years back, Nisohachi
Hyodo, author of a four-year plan for nuclear armament
of Japan, was considered a nut case. But now he has his
own program on a major Tokyo radio station and is
frequently invited to speak on university campuses or to
address civic associations. That not enough (to China's
taste), Defense Minister Shigeru Ishiba told a
parliamentary committee in March that in case of
imminent missile launch by North Korea, preemption must
be considered and Chief Cabinet Secretary Yasuo Fukuda
said there was nothing in Japan's pacifist constitution
that prevented the country from possessing nuclear
weapons.
Potent Japanese missile defense, China
fears, could also bring Taiwan under a protective
umbrella and nullify any Beijing military threat to the
island. But even nuclear-weapons possession by North
Korea is worry enough. China does not in the least
welcome the prospect of a potentially nuclear-armed
unified Korea in the future. Yet another concern is that
even peaceful resolution of one kind or another of the
current crisis is wrought with danger. If and when
economic and personal contacts between South and North
Korea increase rapidly as the result of peaceful
settlement, it is entirely possible that - much as
happened in the case of Germany - unification could come
much faster than expected or planned for by anyone.
Again, in the economic arena, China would be the initial
loser as investment would be diverted to the newly
unified nation.
It is fair to say that anything
but maintenance of the status quo somehow is to China's
detriment and utter dislike. The question Beijing must
ask itself is how things got to this point and how China
got maneuvered into a lose-lose position.
The
answer, unpleasant as it may be to Beijing policymakers,
is not that difficult to come by. During the previous
North Korea crisis in 1993-94, temporarily resolved by
then US president Bill Clinton and former president
Jimmy Carter, China acted as no more than an interested
bystander, largely sat on its hands, and quietly enjoyed
US discomfort. It was not China's problem. Top Chinese
military leaders like former defense minister Chi
Haotian, a onetime military attache in the Chinese
Embassy in Pyongyang with excellent connections in the
North Korean military, did nothing to help make the
"Agreed Framework" of 1994 a success. Zhang Wantian, a
former vice chairman of the Central Military Commission
and chief political officer of the Jinan military region
that borders North Korea, had equally good connections
and did nothing. Kim Jong-il was considered a loose
cannon, but "our loose cannon" rumbling on someone
else's deck.
But, of course, as things turned
out, reining in North Korea was precisely China's
problem - and foreseeably so. Serious efforts by China
at that time to dissuade North Korea from continuing its
nuclear programs in violation of the Agreed Framework
and diplomatic efforts in any way commensurate with the
major and unprecedented ones China has been making since
the beginning of this year could well have forestalled
the present impasse.
That's hindsight and
history now. But much as - in effect - it was in the
mid-'90s, the ball is firmly in China's court if the
current crisis is to be resolved. The difference between
now and then is that China's clout with Pyongyang may
well be substantially reduced.
(Copyright 2003
Asia Times Online Co, Ltd. All rights reserved. Please
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