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China's
plans for a regional security forum
By Jaewoo Choo
SEOUL - As Asia Times Online has reported, it was not external pressure but its
own calculation of its national interests that induced China to accept a much
more active role than previously in bringing talks on North Korea's nuclear
standoff into a multinational setting (see
China: National interest = foreign policy , August 20). However, China's
efforts on this issue have significant implications outside China itself, in
the context of a future East Asian security layout.
Much uncertainly lies ahead for the security of East Asia. As ATol reported
this week, if the Six-Party Talks on the North Korea issue come up with viable
measures for the solution of that conflict, it could evolve into an effective
international institution, with legally binding authority endorsed by the
participant states (see
The far-reaching potential of the Korea talks , October 16). It would
be the first forum of its kind in Asia, as the ASEAN (Association of Southeast
Asian Nations) Regional Forum (ARF) does not yet have enforcement authority.
There is a strong possibility that the six-party forum that was inaugurated in
Beijing in August and that appears set to reconvene before the end of the year
will expand into an institution with as many as 10 representatives, as US
Secretary of State Colin Powell suggested last February to the South Korean
representative at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland. The
motivation for expansion of the talks, as discussed in Davos, was economic - to
reduce the financial burden for those working to counter North Korea's
brinkmanship tactics. It was concluded, however, that at the initial stage the
priority had to be bringing Pyongyang to the discussion table, and thus to meet
its criteria for the format of the talks. Therefore, a peaceful solution to the
North Korean nuclear crisis would necessitate a long process that would require
the talks not only to adopt a peaceful resolution but also to govern or
supervise its implementation, thereby raising the legitimacy of the idea of
institutionalizing the talks.
If the talks could evolve into a multilateral security regime or system, China
could utilize it in handling the US plan to deploy its missile defense (MD)
systems in at least the eastern part of Asia. A peaceful solution to the North
Korean WMD (weapons of mass destruction) issue would significantly undermine
the United States' grounds for a future missile-defense strategy in East Asia.
This would mitigate in favor of China's opposition to the US attempt to push
forward its plans in the Korean Peninsula and in Taiwan. Whether the
subtraction of North Korea's missile threat would have any direct effect on US
plans for the region remains to be seen. Under the circumstances, however, it
could lead to a different stage of conflict involving different actors, namely
the United States and China.
To date, China's success in bringing North Korea to the Six-Party Talks,
coupled with its consistent commitment and support to the US effort against
terrorism, has greatly amended the Sino-US relationship from what it was
immediately after the inauguration of George W Bush to the US presidency in
2001. Continuous pressure from the United States on its East Asian allies to
move forward with MD, however, is likely to be an increasing source of conflict
between the two nations. Since the deployment of the MD system involves a
multiple number of actors, any solution to this Sino-US conflict would require
a multilateral effort.
From this perspective, it is safe to predict that the current six-party forum
could have meaningful implications for future talks on the MD issue. The idea
of multilateral talks on MD may be persuasive to the potential MD-hosting
states for economic and political reasons. Economically, hosting MD is very
expensive. Politically, because of China's strong opposition to the program, it
could upset the equilibrium in the bilateral relationship between China and
South Korea as well as aggravate the China-Taiwan issue. Such a deterioration
in political relations with Beijing would have serious economic consequences
for Seoul and Taipei because of their ever-deepening economic dependency on
trade with China.
Institutionalization of the six-party forum would mean that regional security
issues would no longer be unduly subject to the influence of a single dominant
state. Nor would it be unduly influenced by any bilateral relationship. Such
relationships might render a certain effect on the course of negotiation and
discussion for peaceful resolution of a dispute, but they would not determine
the outcome, as a multiple set of regional powers would be involved to a great
degree. Under such circumstances, regional security issues would be able to
receive much scrutiny and full review toward peaceful solutions, instead of
relying on exclusive alliance systems and often-discrete bilateral
negotiations.
Open discussion of regional security issues would also mean expansion in the
scope and range of issues. If the six-party forum were to evolve into an
institution, that institution could manage future security concerns in the
region, such as MD deployment and the unification of Korea. As many have
argued, for instance, because of the interwoven nature of surrounding states'
interests, unification of the Korean Peninsula would in reality require a great
deal of cooperation and consensus from these states. In addition, since a
military deployment on a grand scale such as MD would have a significant effect
on the configuration of the region's international relationships, it is of
great concern to all states in the region.
The United States has revealed in both direct and indirect terms its plan to
field MD in East Asia in the near future, beginning in Japan as early as 2005.
To its dismay, however, potential MD-hosting states such as Taiwan and South
Korea have not been explicit in sharing their views and thoughts on the
deployment plan. They may be restrained for similar reasons. One of them could
be the China factor and the other could be the costs, both political and
economic, that they would have to bear. With incessantly rising dependence on
China's market for economic development and the astronomical cost of hosting an
MD system, Taiwan may find itself in a security dilemma. In addition, because
of its geo-strategic location, the political cost of hosting MD would erode its
political relationship with mainland China.
China perceives the United States' pursuit of MD systems as one of the factors
that could have a substantially harmful effect on the current well-being of
their bilateral relationship. This is because the US cannot field MD in
Taiwanese territory without subsequent changes in Taiwan's status as a
quasi-ally in military terms. If the six-party forum becomes a multilateral
cooperative security system, it could offer a discussion table to those who are
greatly concerned about the US pursuit of MD in East Asia.
The rationale behind the US pursuit of MD in East Asia is twofold. One motive
is to protect itself and its allies from the alleged North Korean nuclear
threat. The other is to shield Taiwan from the potential threat of China's WMD.
However, if the Six-Party Talks succeeded in getting rid of the
nuclear-development programs in North Korea, it would undermine US
justification for the need to field MD on the Korean Peninsula. By the same
token, if the six-party forum were to become an institution with a successful
precedent for the peaceful management of WMD, China's threat to Taiwan could be
managed through discussion and negotiation. To be sure, the issue of China's
WMD is not unmanageable, as the United States established many valid precedents
in its handling of a similar issue against the former Soviet Union. China, for
its part, has similar experience in arms-reduction talks and redeployment of
its military forces with the former Soviet Union in the 1980s.
As Chinese leaders have emphasized on numerous occasions, China is in desperate
need of securing a stable and peaceful international environment, particularly
in Northeast Asia, in order to continue its modernization program. In this
light, the motivation and reasoning behind China's aggressive initiative to
arrange the Six-Party Talks on the North Korean nuclear standoff were its
national interests, drawing on its successful experience with founding the
Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), and its pursuit of the "10+1" scheme
with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations since 2002, not to mention its
role in ARF, ASEAN+3, and Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). With ever
rising confidence in multilateral cooperative organization, China may have
perceived the viability and feasibility of such measures in solving the current
North Korean nuclear standoff.
To China, institutionalization of the six-party forum would not only mean a
significant change in the way regional security issues are handled, but it
would also allow regional international relations to undergo a significant
shift in structure, from a very hierarchical one to more of a horizontal one.
Thus, the game would be played on a more equal and open basis.
Jaewoo Choo is a former research fellow at the Trade Research Institute,
Korea International Trade Association, and currently assistant professor at the
School of International Relations and Area Studies, Kyung Hee University, South
Korea.
(Copyright 2003 Asia Times Online Co, Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact
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