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China and Taiwan: Whose status
quo?
By Macabe Keliher
TAIPEI
- Near the middle of his term, Taiwanese President Chen
Shui-bian hosted a dinner for the island's most
prominent businessmen. As they took turns speaking,
their suggestions turned to direct accusations: Chen was
not opening links with mainland China, nor was he making
investment in China easier; he was not fostering better
relations with Beijing. In order to do that, Chen
finally said, he would have to change the status quo and
accept the "one China" principle. "And no one was
willing to change the status quo and accept Beijing's
'one China'," recalled Joseph Wu, deputy secretary to
the president, who was present at the dinner.
While calling for economic policy change,
business leaders are content with the political status
quo; so is more than 80 percent of Taiwan's population,
according to polls. Chen blithely announced last week
that his referendums will not change the status quo
after US President George W Bush said he opposed any
such change, for which Beijing "expresses its
appreciation". Yet the status quo is an ambiguous thing
at best, and better described as a malleable idea,
through which everyone from Taiwanese businessmen to US
presidents are allowed to entertain fantasies on what it
means. And while all parties involved are committed to
"upholding the status quo", referendums and Taiwan
nationalism may make Beijing realize that the real
status quo no longer reflects its idea of status quo,
giving the bellicose giant no other option but military
action against Taiwan.
The cross-Strait status
quo has been in constant flux, to be sure. US decisions
to recognize Beijing officially in the 1970s were a
shock to the status quo, as were Chinese economic
reforms, which have since integrated Taiwan and China
economies. Changes to the status quo have been equally
monumental in Taiwan over the past 15 years. When
military law was lifted and opposition parties were
legalized, the seeds of democracy were planted, which
sprouted and bloomed, making the issue of unification
and independence less the decision of one man or party
and more the will of the island's people. From staunch
"reunificationists" ruling the island and dictating
cross-Strait policy, popular voting has propelled a
populist-independence party into the presidential
palace, which acts as an independent government
representing only the 23 million people of Taiwan.
In the midst of such changes, Taiwanese
nationalism has taken hold. If Kuomintang (KMT)
president Lee Tung-hui's reign in the 1990s set the
table by promoting a pro-Taiwan policy, the ascent to
the presidency of the Democratic Progressive Party
(DPP), and its continuous strong performance in
subsequent elections, has taken up the chopsticks. Not
only have textbooks been rewritten and "reunification"
propaganda posters removed, but the growing will for
"state-to-state relations" or "one country on either
side" has permeated the public. "The Taiwanese are
increasingly moving towards pro-Taiwan, and thus
independence," said Philip Hsu, assistant research
fellow at the Institute of International Relations in
Taipei. Indeed, people identifying themselves as
Taiwanese increased from 16 to 36 percent in the 1990s,
while those identifying themselves as Chinese decreased
from 46 to 12 percent, according to Taiwan's Mainland
Affairs Council polls.
Such changes have
alienated pro-China political parties in Taiwan. The
disintegration of the staunch pro-China New Party and
the relatively poor showing of the KMT in the last
legislative elections has pushed pro-unification parties
to dampen their unification sentiments and emphasize a
"Taiwan first" line - the image of KMT leader Lian Chan
holding a giant beanbag heart above his head and
proclaiming his love for Taiwan comes to mind. But more
than just a change of rhetoric has taken hold in
pro-unification parties: their policies have shifted as
well. From opposing constitutional reforms - which would
move to validate Taiwan as a sovereign country - they
have come forward with their own constitutional
proposals. And most notable is the pro-unification
parties' recent acceptance and passage of a referendum
law, something they were once vehemently opposed to. The
KMT has recently criticized Chen's decision to go ahead
with the "defensive referendum", but with more than 70
percent of the Taiwan public behind him, "the opposition
parties will have to go along otherwise they are going
to get dumped by the public", deputy secretary Wu said.
"The reality that all sides need to adjust to is
that Taiwan is no longer home to a serious debate about
mainland reunification versus independence," said Craig
Meer, post-doctoral fellow at Academia Sinica in Taipei.
"That divide, long in decay, was formally buried on
November 27 when the Legislative Yuan voted to introduce
the new Referendum Law - the legal and administrative
basis for a right that Taiwan's constitution has long
guaranteed."
Beijing's reactions to such changes
in the status quo have been subtle but apparent. Where
Beijing's position used to be that a declaration of
independence would trigger an invasion, "it is clear
that Taiwan is not going to declare independence, so
[Beijing] has had to think up new conditions without the
appearance of new conditions, such as 'creeping moves
towards independence'", said June Teufel Dreyer,
commissioner of the US-China Security Review Commission.
Which raises the question of where might
Beijing's line be drawn. Reactions to the referendum
have been swift and strong, to be sure. Luo Yuan, a
senior colonel with the Chinese Academy of Military
Sciences, cautioned Chen that "he is playing with fire
... If they refuse to come to their senses and continue
to use referenda as an excuse to seek Taiwan
independence, they will push Taiwan compatriots into the
abyss of war," he said early this month after referendum
plans were announced. Although Taipei has made it clear
that the referendum will not put sovereignty up to a
vote, Beijing may be viewing the whole affair as a push
too far away from what it feels is status quo and toward
independence.
It is true that the limits of what
Beijing can accept in the cross-Strait relationship have
been just as pliable as the status quo - who would have
thought 10 years ago that Beijing would have accepted a
pro-independence president in Taipei? But it is a game
with fire, as Luo Yuan said. How far can Taiwan push
before the house burns down? A new constitution? A name
change? A non-binding referendum on sovereignty? Indeed,
at what point will Beijing feel that its back is up
against the wall, giving it no other option but to go to
war?
"China would not hesitate to punish Taiwan
for behavior it deems inappropriate," said Denny Roy,
senior research fellow at the Asia-Pacific Center for
Security Studies and author of Taiwan: A Political
History. "With Hong Kong, Beijing was willing to
sacrifice economic advantages for political gains."
(Copyright 2003 Asia Times Online Co, Ltd. All
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