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US-Taiwan: Green light turns
amber
By Ralph A Cossa
(Used
by permission of Pacific Forum CSIS)
SINGAPORE - US President George W Bush got it
just about right last week when he publicly criticized
Taiwan's leader during Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao's
visit to Washington. Accusations from "friends of
Taiwan's democracy" notwithstanding, Bush was not
kowtowing to China; he was merely expressing US policy
in clear and plain language. I will gladly match my
"pro-Taiwan democracy" bona fides with anyone, but my
only complaint about the president's comments is that
they may have been too little, too late.
Here's
what Bush said: "We oppose any unilateral decision, by
either China or Taiwan, to change the status quo." In
other words: no use of force by Beijing and no
declaration of independence by Taiwan. Nothing new here;
this is long-standing US policy. But after allowing this
message to be translated, Bush continued: "And the
comments and actions made by the leader of Taiwan
indicate that he may be willing to make decisions
unilaterally that change the status quo, which we
oppose."
This message was equally clear: when
the Bush administration looks at the cross-Strait
situation today, it is Taiwan, not the mainland, that
seems most intent on rocking the boat. While Taiwanese
President Chen Shui-bian's recent talk of referendums
and constitutional revisions may serve his domestic
political agenda, his efforts to disrupt the status quo
do not serve US national-security interests.
Let's be perfectly clear on this point: it was
Chen Shui-bian's campaign tactics, not Chinese demands,
that prompted Bush's remarks. Bush and Wen would have
been perfectly content to make their ritualistic "one
China" comments and then move on; it was Chen's actions,
immediately in advance of the Chinese premier's visit,
that forced Taiwan to the top of the political agenda.
Chen's actions also reinforce the growing suspicion that
Taiwan leaders see US relations with Beijing and Taipei
strictly in zero-sum terms, where gains on one side mean
losses on the other. Bush believes that his
administration can enjoy close relations with both and
has little tolerance for attempts by either Beijing or
Taipei to undermine the relationship of the other.
Beijing seems to have grasped this; Taipei apparently
has not.
While the primary responsibility for
the current controversy rests with Chen, Beijing and
Washington are not free of their share of the blame.
China continues its diplomatic full-press against
Taipei, thus raising Chen's frustration level. Beijing's
refusal to permit Taiwan's entry into the World Health
Organization, even as a "health entity" - a status that
reinforces China's "one China" claim - increases the
"separatist" feelings China claims to be combating. More
importantly, Beijing seems to have concluded that if
stationing 100 missiles opposite Taiwan is a good thing,
500 must be five times as good. The point of diminishing
returns has long since been passed. At some point,
Washington will feel compelled to respond with more
advanced missile defense systems (such as Aegis), which
will then prompt Beijing to accuse Washington of
emboldening Taiwan. Neither Taipei nor Beijing seem to
understand the principle of cause and effect.
Meanwhile, comments by administration hardliners
claiming that Bush is Taiwan's "guardian angel" and that
he did not "oppose" independence were enthusiastically
interpreted in Taipei as a green light to push the
cross-Strait envelop. While Washington remains
officially neutral regarding the outcome of the March
2004 Taiwan presidential elections, Chen's supporters
have been citing such remarks as "proof" that Washington
not only backs Taiwan democracy - which it does - but
also Chen's re-election bid. Bush's recent comments
should help correct this misperception. (While Bush was
criticized for his "leader of Taiwan" phraseology, had
he said "President Chen" in Wen's presence, it would
have been immediately interpreted as a further
"endorsement" of Chen, despite the admonition his words
contained. Likewise, had Bush made reference to "the
Taiwan authorities", he would have handed a major
propaganda victory to Beijing. He did neither, staying
carefully on the message.)
By speaking up when
and as he did, Bush has changed the green light to
yellow. The message: time to slow down and prepare to
stop. Unfortunately, the more common response,
especially among those inclined to drive recklessly, is
to stomp on the gas and rush ahead.
It would be
unrealistic to expect Chen to abandon his referendum
drive completely. The initiative, as currently described
- voters will be asked if they oppose the presence of
Chinese missiles aimed at Taiwan or the use of force in
resolving the cross-Strait issue - is pure politics and
nothing more; is anyone in favor of being threatened?
But, having painted himself into a corner once,
Chen now seems intent on not allowing the paint to dry.
He seems to be openly confronting and antagonizing
Washington (as well as Beijing), apparently confident
that revealing a little bit of anti-Americanism might
also serve his near-term political interests. That this
might harm Taipei's long-term interests seems to matter
little.
Rumor has it that when Chen was advised
recently that he was pushing Washington too far, he
replied, "Once I win, the US will have little option
other than to back me." That, of course, presumes that
Taiwan's voters will find his current brinkmanship in
their national interest. It also presumes that Bush will
not feel compelled to take even more direct steps to
express Washington's displeasure, or that more public
branding of Chen Shui-bian as a potential "troublemaker"
will not cost him votes. Is that a red light ahead?
Ralph A Cossa is president of the
Pacific Forum CSIS. He can
be reached at pacforum@hawaii.rr.com.
This article is used by permission.
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