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US-CHINA: QUEST FOR
PEACE
Opinion by Henry C K
Liu
Part 7: The referendum
question
By Henry C K Liu
Part 1: Two nations, worlds apart
Part 2: Cold War links Korea, Taiwan
Part 3: Korea: Wrong war, wrong place, wrong
enemy
Part 4: 38th Parallel leads straight to
Taiwan
Part 5: History of the Taiwan time bomb
Part 6: Forget reunification - nothing to
reunite
In the unconstitutional 2000
local elections on Taiwan for national offices, after
losing the Guomindang, or GMD (in Taiwan known as the
Kuomintang, or KMT) nomination for president to
then-vice president Lien Chan, James Soong ran as an
independent. The GMD responded by expelling Soong and
his supporters from the party. In the final months
leading up to the 2000 elections, the GMD, then under
Lee Teng-hui's leadership, sued Soong for theft,
alleging that as party secretary general, he stole
millions in party funds in cash on behalf of the family
of the late president Jiang Jing-guo and hid the money
in the Chunghsing Bills Finance Co.
Initially
leading in the polls, Soong narrowly lost the election
with 36.84 percent of the vote to Chen Shui-bian of the
Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), who also failed to
score a plurality, with only 39.3 percent of the votes
cast. Lien came in a distant third with only 23.1
percent. Were it not for the winner-take-all system, a
runoff between the two top candidates would surely have
put Soong in the winner's circle. It is widely believed
that Lee Teng-hui secretly supported Chen against all
other candidates, frustrating the popular will.
After losing the election, Soong and his
supporters formed the People's First Party (PFP), a
spinoff from the GMD. The loss of PFP splinter votes was
a major factor in pushing the GMD to swing toward
seeking political accommodation with the Chinese
Communist Party (CCP) and in causing the subsequent
expulsion of Lee Teng-hui. The struggle between the GMD
and the CCP has always been a party-to-party struggle
within one nation.
"Reunification" is a
misnomer, since the country itself has never been
divided to begin with. So no reunification is needed,
except reunification between two political parties into
a political coalition. What is needed is a peaceful
permanent political accommodation between two political
parties of different but reconcilable ideology. These
two parties had cooperated twice in the past until
right-wing extremists took control of the GMD.
For half a century, since the founding of the
People's Republic of China (PRC), a GMD Revolutionary
Committee has been active on the mainland. It was headed
first by Song Qing-ling, the widow of Sun Yat-sen and
the oldest sister of Madame Jiang Jie-shi (Chiang
Kai-shek) and He Xiang-ning, the widow of Sun's top aide
and leader of the GMD left, Liao Zhong-kai. Liao's
assassination by rightists in 1925 caused the first
split between the Communists and the Nationalists, and
other top GMD members.
On the first anniversary
of Liao's assassination, Liu Shao-qi, who 33 years later
would become president of the PRC in 1959, wrote:
For to draw into the revolution the great
majority of the worker and peasant masses who will
fight for it with all their might, the revolution must
reflect their vital interests. The workers and
peasants are not to be tricked into joining the
revolution. If we genuinely fight for their interests,
continually help to improve their conditions and
earnestly work for their emancipation, we will
naturally win their enthusiastic participation in the
revolution. With their participation the success of
the revolution will certainly not be far off. Mr Liao
[Zhong-kai] was the first person to implement a worker
and peasant policy. He took an active part in
promoting the worker and peasant movements and
persevered despite many difficulties and much calumny.
Mr Liao had a true understanding of the process of
China's national revolution and of the workers' and
peasants' part in it. Hence his greatness and
exemplary role for all Guomindang
members! All Chinese seek single Chinese
state
The national goal of all Chinese is a
single Chinese state under a single government that
regains all territorial integrity of China. As Hong Kong
and Macau are now again under the sovereignty of China,
the immediate outstanding issue is now Taiwan. The
government of the PRC under the leadership of CCP, and
to varying degrees the GMD and the PFP on Taiwan, all
support peaceful political inter-party accommodation
toward national reconstruction. In Taiwan politics, this
group is known as the pan-blue coalition.
It is
opposed by supporters of Taiwan independence, such as
the DPP and the Taiwan Solidarity Union, which are known
as the pan-green coalition. The CCP has proposed
political accommodation with the GMD, and the government
of the PRC has proposed the reincorporation of Taiwan
with the mainland under a "one country, two systems"
policy similar to that for Hong Kong and Macau. This has
little support in Taiwan, however, even among so-called
"reunification" supporters, understandably so, because
the situation of Taiwan is fundamentally different from
that of the two former European colonies.
Taiwan
is already Chinese territory. The dispute is between two
political parties, not two governments or two countries.
And unless and until the GMD regains political control
of Taiwan and restores the Republic of China (ROC)
government to its legitimate status as a pretender
government of China, there is no basis for any political
negotiation between the PRC and the current illegal and
unconstitutional Taiwan authorities. China has as much
right to re-establish Chinese control over Taiwan as US
president Dwight Eisenhower had the constitutional
authority to send federal troops to Little Rock,
Arkansas, in 1957 to enforce school desegregation
ordered by the US Supreme Court under the US
constitution, let alone president Abraham Lincoln's
right to preserve the union from secession by
slave-holding southern states.
From the collapse
in 1947 of negotiations to form a coalition government
in China until the mid-1970s, political accommodation
was not the main subject of discourse between the CCP
and the GMD; each formally envisaged a military takeover
of one by the other in an unfinished civil war. In 1979,
with Deng Xiaoping as leader, the PRC replaced the
policy of liberating Taiwan by force with the policy of
peaceful political accommodation with the GMD on Taiwan.
Within the GMD, the possibility of militarily
retaking the mainland was finally recognized as an
impossible dream in the 1970s, particularly after the
death of GMD leader Jiang Jie-shi. The prospect of
political accommodation between the two parties briefly
looked promising under Jiang Jing-guo, who had been a
CCP member in his youth.
Unfortunately, US
opposition prevented Jiang Jing-guo from making any
meaningful rapprochement with the PRC, despite repeated
overtures from the CCP. With the loosening of
authoritarian rule in the 1980s and the shift in power
within the GMD away from the mainlanders, the GMD began
to move away from the claim of being a government of
China.
Taiwan sets up new warlord
regime
With a sizable standing military backed by
the United States, the Taiwan authorities in fact
established a new warlord regime on Taiwan, an anomaly
that the GMD itself fought against, with the help of the
communists, in the historic Northern Expedition against
warlordism in 1926. In the 1990s, Lee Teng-hui as an
illegitimate president of the ROC unconstitutionally
exacerbated the shift toward warlordism within the GMD,
leading to a separatist confrontation with the PRC and
factional splits within the GMD.
Until the
mid-1990s, supporters on Taiwan of the concept of one
China were also bitterly opposed to communism. Since the
mid-1990s there has been a considerable warming of
relations between the CCP and the GMD, and between them
the one China concept has never been an issue. Closer
ties with the mainland are undeniably in the interest of
Taiwan as a province of China.
After the
elections of 2000, which unconstitutionally and
illegally brought the independence-leaning DPP to power,
the GMD, faced with factional defections to the PFP,
expelled the traitorous Lee Teng-hui. In 2001, Lee
helped create the Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU). Lee's
primary motivation was to stop the GMD from moving away
from his ideas of Taiwanese separatism and from shifting
the party toward peaceful political accommodation with
the CCP. The government of the PRC under the leadership
of the CCP adopted policies of economic incentive
designed to encourage Taiwanese businesses to investing
on the mainland and to create a pro-accommodation bloc
within the Taiwanese electorate.
Within Taiwan,
supporters of peaceful political accommodation with the
CCP generally do not assert that the ROC should be the
sole Chinese government. On the other hand, the PRC
government has declared that under the principle of one
China, all issues can be discussed, including the
appellation of the state and the selection of a new
national flag and national anthem. The GMD can even keep
its separate military on Taiwan. In addition, supporters
of political accommodation do not oppose localization or
a Taiwanese identity, but rather see Taiwanese identity
as a component of a broad Chinese identity - not a
separate cultural identity. What supporters of peaceful
political accommodation do oppose is de-sinicization or
the effort to create a Taiwanese national identity in a
separatist context.
Despite the factional
rivalry between Lien, the GMD chairman after 2000, and
Soong, the new PFP chairman, the GMD and PFP have
pledged to cooperate in future elections in order to
prevent splitting the vote, since they basically share
the same electorate. The GMD-PFP alliance, known as the
pan-blue coalition, has been stormy, but it has been
marginally successful thus far because of their
realization that united, they stand a better chance of
winning in any election whose voters are overwhelmingly
Taiwanese natives.
Though losses in the 2001
legislative elections made the DPP the largest single
party in the Legislative Yuan, the pan-blue coalition
holds a narrow majority over the pan-green coalition. In
April 2003, after discussions between the GMD and the
PFP, Soong announced that he would run as a
vice-presidential candidate under Lien Chan in the 2004
elections. There are widespread rumors that Soong agreed
to take the vice-presidential post in exchange for a
pledge by Lien to give him significant power, including
the premiership, in a Lien government. Many GMD members
are opposed to the linkage and political rewards, as
they consider Soong an opportunist and political
traitor.
Non-aggression pact a non-starter
The key difficulty lies in the GMD's
acquiescence in subjecting national offices to local
elections. In his campaign, Soong advocated a gradual
union between Taiwan and the mainland by first signing a
non-aggression pact followed by the formation of a
cross-Strait union similar to the European Union. This
proposal is a non-starter, since the two sides are not
separate countries with which any union can be formed.
Soong's platform called for the characterization
of relations between the mainland and Taiwan as neither
foreign nor domestic. Although widely seen as the
candidate most friendly to the mainland, Soong took
particular effort to counter the perception that he
would "sell out" Taiwan. His base of support includes
strong supporters of political accommodation with the
CCP, rural voters who remain grateful for the selective
economic development undertaken during his governorship,
and urban middle-class voters who see him as a cleaner
alternative to the GMD old guard. Soong has been a
staunch opponent of Taiwan independence and has publicly
attacked President Chen for proposing a referendum on
independence.
(The referendum scheduled for
March does not specifically ask about independence.
Voters would be asked, among other things, whether the
PRC should be requested to redirect nearly 500 missiles
currently aimed at the ROC from the mainland, and if
Beijing refuses, whether the ROC should improve its own
defensive missile capabilities.)
In January
1988, on the death of Jiang Jing-guo, Lee Teng-hui
succeeded him as president, but not without resistance.
The hardline faction of the GMD, headed by General Hau
Pei-tsun, deeply distrustful of Lee, threatened a coup.
With the help of James Soong, who calmed down the
hardliners, Lee was allowed to assume the presidency
unobstructed. Lee consolidated his power by speaking of
defending the GMD party line, while emphasizing the
global trends of reform. Lee and his allies in the
government used the pressure from the hardliners as a
tool to work for developing the underlying Taiwanese
localization movement. In December 1991, the original
members of the Legislative Yuan, elected in 1947 to
represent mainland constituencies, were forced to resign
and new elections were held to apportion affirmatively
more seats to local legislators, bensheng ren.
The elections forced Hau from the premiership, a
position he had been given in exchange for ending his
opposition to Lee.
The Taiwanese localization
movement has its roots in the home-rule groups founded
during Japanese occupation, and they have emphasized
Taiwan as the center of political deliberation, as
opposed to China proper. During the two-generation Jiang
dynastic rule, China had been promoted on Taiwan as the
focus of awareness around which a Chinese national
outlook could be instilled in a people who had once
considered themselves Japanese colonial subjects during
50 years of occupation.
Given this China focus,
Taiwan was seen as a temporary place for mainlanders to
reside while they waited for the re-conquest of the
mainland from communism. Taiwan was often relegated to a
backwater province of China in the GMD-supported history
books. People were discouraged from studying about
Taiwan and old local customs were to be overwhelmed by
Chinese mainstream customs.
Lee supports
Taiwan independence
By contrast, Lee Teng-hui
sought to turn Taiwan into a national center rather than
an appendage of the mainland. Lee presided over the
democratization of Taiwanese society and government in
the late 1980s and early 1990s through the promotion of
local chauvinism. During his presidency, Lee was dogged
by persistent suspicions that he secretly supported
Taiwan independence. These suspicions were proved valid
by Lee's behavior after his presidency, which eventually
led to his expulsion from the GMD. He subsequently
became the spiritual leader of the strongly
pro-independence Taiwan Solidarity Union. Since leaving
office, Lee has actively campaigned on behalf of
pan-green coalition candidates and has actively opposed
candidates of his former party. In addition, Lee has
publicly stated that he supports changing the name of
the country from the Republic of China to the Republic
of Taiwan and opposes increased economic ties with the
mainland.
Elections for the president of the ROC
on Taiwan are scheduled for March 20. For the ruling
DPP, backed by the pan-green coalition, incumbent Chen
Shui-bian will be the presidential candidate and Annette
Lu, also incumbent, the vice-presidential candidate. The
opposition pan-blue coalition will run a combined ticket
- GMD chairman Lien Chan as the presidential candidate
and PFP chairman James Soong as the vice-presidential
candidate.
As with all elections, the contest
will be to woo the undecided. The main issues in the
campaign are relations with the mainland, political
reform, and the economy. In addition, although they tend
not be noticed by the international press, local issues
have been important in the campaign, particularly
because these issues influence undecided voters. These
issues vary from county to county but include funding
for irrigation projects, the location of new
expressways, and the redrawing of local administrative
boundaries.
The DPP has been attempting to
portray the Lien-Soong ticket as one that would "sell
out" Taiwan to PRC mainland interests, and it has been
emphasizing constitutional reform, proposing a new
constitution and holding a referendum on the future of
Taiwan. This has led to justifiable fears that Chen
intends to use a new constitution and a referendum to
declare Taiwan independence, which would lead to a
military response from China. Worries about this have
caused even the United States at several points to ask
for and receive assurances that Chen has not abandoned
the "Four Nos plus One Without" (si bu, yi
meiyou) pledge made in his inaugural speech on May
20, 2000, concerning the political status of Taiwan.
The pledge is an important part of cross-Strait
relations. It states:
Provided that the PRC does not
attack Taiwan, Chen's administration would:
Not declare Taiwan independence.
Not change the national title from "the Republic of
China" to "the Republic of Taiwan".
Not include the doctrine of special state-to-state
relations in the new constitution.
Not promote a referendum on unification or
independence.
In addition, the "one without" was
Chen's pledge not to abolish the National Unification
Council or the National Unification guidelines.
Four Nos plus One Without pledge
The
"Four Nos plus One Without" pledge has become an
important basis of Taiwan-US relations. Chen has had to
reassure the United States on several occasions that the
pledge has not been abandoned. The US responded by
saying it "appreciates Chen's pledge and takes it very
seriously".
In a televised address on January
16, Chen reiterated his "Four Nos plus One Without"
pledge, but justified the forthcoming "peace referendum"
on March 20 by some rhetorical questions:
"The
People of Taiwan demand that the Taiwan Strait issue be
resolved through peaceful means. Should mainland China
refuse to withdraw the missiles it has targeted at
Taiwan and openly to renounce the use of force against
us, would you agree that the government should acquire
more advanced anti-missile weapons to strengthen
Taiwan's self-defense capabilities?
"Would you
agree that our government should engage in negotiation
with mainland China on the establishment of a 'peace and
stability' framework for cross-Strait interactions in
order to build consensus and for the welfare of the
peoples on both sides?"
The Lien-Soong ticket
attempts to portray Chen as someone who lets politics
get in the way of improving the Taiwanese economy, which
depends on integration with the mainland. It focuses on
Chen's inability to deal with the prolonged recession.
The PRC in mid-November 2003 issued several very
sharp warnings at high levels that it would not stand by
if Taiwan declared independence. This was widely seen as
a response to US reverses in its promise gradually to
disengage from Taiwan, as stipulated by the Three
Communiqués that define US-China relations. In early
November, Chen Shui-bian took an unofficial trip to the
United States in which he was much more on public view
than in previous visits. This trip increased his
popularity on Taiwan to the point where most polls
indicated that he was even or slightly ahead of the
Lien-Soong ticket. His US trip in early 2003 also
alarmed the PRC in that it appeared to convince them
that the US would do less to constrain Chen Shui-bian
than it had earlier indicated.
Another
referendum could ask about independence
Chen's
rise in the polls caused the opposition to change its
campaign strategy. To counter Chen's platform for a new
constitution by 2008, the opposition campaigned for a
major constitutional change by 2004. In addition, the
opposition ended its obstruction of a referendum bill,
thus permitting referendums. The vetting of the
referendum bill prompted Beijing to issue sharp warnings
about passage of a referendum bill - which at some point
would also permit a popular vote on sovereignty. The
bill that was passed on November 27 did not contain
restrictions on the content of referendums, but it did
include very high hurdles for referendums on
constitutional issues.
In addition, the bill
contained a provision for a defensive referendum to be
called if the sovereignty of the ROC were under threat.
On November 29, Chen announced that given that the PRC
had missiles aimed at Taiwan, he had the power under the
defensive-referendum clause to order a referendum on
sovereignty - although he did not do so. This statement
was very strongly criticized both by Beijing and by the
pan-blue opposition coalition. But instead, Chen
proposed a referendum to ask the PRC to remove missiles
aimed at Taiwan.
During Chinese Premier Wen
Jaibao's visit last November, US President George W Bush
gave a clear statement that it "opposes" any form of
referendum that would unilaterally change the status quo
of Taiwan. The United States fears that Chen will put
Washington in the unwelcome position of having to show
its hand in its policy of ambiguity adopted in recent
decades - if Chen's game of pushing the independence
envelope should trigger a PRC military confrontation in
the Taiwan Strait. That conflict would involve the US.
The US has an implied obligation to help Taiwan
defend itself, as stated somewhat ambiguously in the
Taiwan Relations Act, a US domestic law that infringes
on the internal affairs of China in the name of
defending democracy. Yet democracy on Taiwan is not the
issue. The issue is Taiwan independence. The US is
unwilling to confront China in East Asia especially
while it is bogged down in an Iraq quagmire, with no end
in sight. Also the issue of Pyongyang's nuclear
proliferation hangs in the balance. Despite vocal US
reservations, however, Chen continues to insist that a
referendum will be held on March 20, as well as the
presidential vote.
Former US secretary of state
Henry Kissinger, chief architect of US-China
rapprochement under president Richard Nixon, published
an essay titled "The way to avoid confrontation"
regarding US policy toward China and Taiwan in the
October 25, 1999, edition of Japan's Yomiuri Shimbun. In
sum, the idea is to avoid a crisis of Sino-US
confrontation and defer China's "reunification" with
Taiwan by getting Taiwan to agree that Taiwan is part of
China.
Kissinger wrote: "Relations between the
United States and China this year [1999] have come under
the greatest strain since bilateral diplomatic ties were
re-established in 1971 ... In this atmosphere Taiwan's
sudden and unilateral challenge to the existing
political understandings in the Taiwan Strait ... is
interpreted in Beijing as the culmination of a US plot
to divide China. Chinese warnings of a possible military
response have taken on a severity reminiscent of the
prelude to the Chinese intervention in the Korean War in
1950."
Next: Avoiding another war with no winners
Henry C K Liu is chairman of New
York-based Liu Investment Group.
(Copyright
2004 Asia Times Online Co, Ltd. All rights reserved.
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