SOOCHOW,
China - As Taiwan's March 20 presidential election and
"defensive" referendum approach, the competition between
the opposition pan-blue and governing pan-green camps is
reaching a boiling point. And to top things off, last
Saturday a peace rally formed a human-chain "hand in
hand across Taiwan". Then, of course, there is also the
forthcoming public referendum on Chinese missile
deployment. How is Beijing likely to view all of this?
We have already seen a range of more flexible
tactics from Beijing, be it the explosive disclosure of
the so-called Taiwanese "spies", the subtle and indirect
pressuring of Taiwan by other countries, such as the
United States, Japan and others, and the establishment
of the pan-blue support group in mainland China.
("Pan-blues" refers to the opposition
Kuomintang, or KMT, and People First Party, PFP,
alliance that is challenging President Chen Shui-bian of
the governing Democratic Progressive Party, or DPP, and
its allies - known as the pan-greens. The pan-blues are
said to be closer to Beijing while the pan-greens favor
a separate Taiwan identity, if not independence.)
Beijing has come to realize that the policy
differences between the pan-blue and pan-green camps may
not be so huge after all - especially once whichever
party has become the ruling party. Nonetheless, from an
ideological point of view, China clearly prefers the
pan-blue ticket. Interestingly enough, leaders in
Beijing have so far refrained from doing things they did
in Taiwan's past elections, and thus harsh words,
saber-rattling and military intimidation have been
largely left by the wayside. This is only because these
very actions have proved to be counterproductive
measures that only help elect the candidate they did not
like.
That does not mean that China does not
intend and has not already tried to influence the
election outcomes in Taiwan. As a matter of fact,
China's attempts to sway the election in Taiwan are so
evident that they have already caused Beijing some
trouble.
China's Taiwan policy more subtle,
flexible China's policy toward Taiwan over the
period leading up to and during the presidential
elections has become more sophisticated, more subtle
and, at times, somewhat more flexible. One of the most
obvious changes is the shift in strategy. In the past,
China has chosen to take a direct approach, as was seen
in 1996 with the missile tests, and also in 2000, in the
lead-up to the last presidential election, with the
various military exercises. Nowadays, China is taking a
much more indirect approach.
First, it is
apparent that China is pressuring other actors to carry
out its wishes. Particularly in recent weeks, the United
States has quite effectively been pushed to the
forefront in pressuring Taiwan on the referendum issue,
while China takes a back seat. In fact, it would seem
that the criticism directed toward Chen by US President
George W Bush hit the mark quite nicely, and it must
have pleased China to see that Chen was hurt by these
remarks (see Green light turns amber, December
17, 2003). Then French President Jacques Chirac attacked
Taiwan's proposal to hold the public referendum, going
so far as to say it was a "grave mistake" and
"provocation".
Yet another area in which China
prefers to take an indirect approach is with respect to
the united-front strategy. By pandering to Taiwanese
business people living in China that are even slightly
open to the notion of unification, or even to those who
are dissatisfied with cross-Strait policy, China has
managed to find an avenue through which to exert
influence upon Taiwan's domestic politics. The
establishment of the pan-blue support group in mainland
China is proof of the continuance of such tactics, since
without the approval of China, there is no way that this
could have occurred. But since it has become apparent to
all that China is not a detached observer, the united
front strategy has begun to backfire in Taiwan. By
taking steps to outlaw the support group, Beijing has
extricated itself to some degree, but in fact these
pan-blue support groups are still active on the
mainland.
A second aspect to China's policy
toward Taiwan is the effective freeze on cross-Strait
relations. The overall aim of this strategy is to try
not to give the incumbent Chen any credit when and if
there is some progress in cross-Strait relations.
Beijing's rejection of Taiwan's proposal for direct
charter flights between the two sides is a good case in
point. Yet another example is the influx of illegal
immigrants into Taiwan from the mainland - China could
control this but instead it has allowed this development
to get worse. Both examples reflect a strategy of
creating situations that make Chen appear unable to
handle cross-Strait relations.
China has other
tactics to complement this approach. There is the
attempt to generate insecurity and a sense of threat
among Taiwanese business people on the mainland. It is
increasingly apparent that Taiwanese business people
needing to file claims to the Mainland Affairs Council
are often dissatisfied and that even where lawsuits are
won this does not mean that the courts in China will
execute the judgment. Similarly, many in Taiwan have
come to the conclusion that the arrests of the 24
so-called Taiwanese "spies" in December and the recent
charging of the two Taiwanese "spies" in Nanjing are
meant to discredit Chen further, and that the latter is
Beijing's response to Chen's having noted with some
accuracy that "there are 496 missiles targeting Taiwan"
(see Taiwan spies - the Men in Black,
February 26).
Finally, it almost goes without
saying that the newspapers and radio stations in China
continue to go all out criticizing Chen and the proposed
referendum. This is done in as harsh a manner as in
2000, and yet there is a subtle difference, since it is
carried out in a more low-profile way.
In sum,
the leaders in Beijing have their preferences and they
have tried to sway the election. On the surface Beijing
has asserted a "take no action" and "wait and see"
policy. Look a little further, and it is obvious that
Beijing has tried everything possible to influence the
outcome in its favor.
Chih-cheng Lo is
an associate professor at Soochow University, China. He
can be reached atlo@mail.scu.edu.tw.
This article originally appeared as a Taiwan
Perspective e-Paper on February 26 and appears here with
permission ofPacific Forum CSIS.
