The
cross-Strait political tinderbox
By Craig Meer and Macabe Keliher
TAIPEI - War is not simply a game of strategic chess, in which beligerents back
their interests with military capability. It can be very much, as the
Prussian military philospher Carl von Clausewitz said, politics by other
means. The reason for war is turned on its head to become a question of
the "opportunity cost of doing nothing". That is to say, sometimes compliance
with a foe's demand is worse than any conflict, no matter what the odds of
winning - remember the attack on Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, after the United States
imposed an oil embargo on Japan.
The People's Republic of China (PRC) and Taiwan have long cultivated a
relationship in which they oblige each other to respond to statements and
events in an antagonistic or threatening manner. But the evolution of the
status quo into a non-binding version of diametrically opposed positions - "one
China" or Taiwanese independence - has pushed each side into a corner from
which a violent clawing out may be the only plausible option. To do otherwise,
and to acquiesce with the adversary across the Strait, would necessitate
putting up with a state of affairs (ie, maintaining a version of the uneasy
peace) that is ultimately intolerable by each side's own respective standards
of national success and failure.
The view from Beijing
In the view from China, Beijing is holding steadfast to the idea that Taiwan is
an inalienable part of Chinese territory, of which all belongs to the PRC.
Perceivable differences between the presidencies of Hu Jintao and his
predecessors Jiang Zeming and Deng Xiaoping on the Taiwan question are subsumed
beneath an essential unity of purpose that is as old as the PRC itself - dating
from 1949.
This thinking is represented most vividly in Beijing's diplomatic and military
posture toward the island. Because of pressure from Beijing, only 27 countries
now have formal relations with Taiwan, and "Chinese Taipei" is represented as a
sovereign entity in a mere handful of international institutions, and none of
the major ones, such as the United Nations and its agencies.
Furthermore, Beijing currently has an estimated 500 ballistic missiles - 496
according to intelligence estimates - deployed and targeted at Taiwan, and
about 75 are added each year in bases along China's southeast coast.
As the Chinese population is beginning to think less along the lines prescribed
by the government and Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and more for itself (see
Who cares about Taiwan? Not the Chinese, December 23, 2003), any
backing down by the party on the Taiwan question could show signs of weak
leadership.
Therefore, the cost to Beijing of not acting - as Taiwan moves closer to
independence - would be catastrophic. The CCP would face serious internal
challenges to its monopoly on power on the mainland, and such opposition would
in all likelihood be far less benign than the democracy movement of the late
1980s. Furthermore, the People's Liberation Army has not only been preparing
itself for a showdown with Taiwan, but derives its authority and bureaucratic
power from the issue of reunification. The PLA would be far from a willing
spectator at the birth of a Taiwanese republic.
More dramatically, however, an election and larger political loss to Taiwan to
independence forces could give momentum to other separatist movements within
China, perhaps encouraging the ultimate breakup of the country along the lines
of the former Soviet Union, or of China's own feudal and not so distant past.
Warlordism has a long history and recent manifestations in China, and the loss
of Taiwan could encourage disaffected separatist groups in Tibet, Xinjiang,
Inner Mongolia and other provinces and regions. The center's grip on far-flung
regional China is increasingly tenuous, as demonstrated by last year's crisis
over severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS), when inter-government
cooperation failed even when unquestionably beneficial to the nation as a
whole.
The view from Taipei
The view from Taipei is in stark contrast. After more than two decades of
democratization, the island is no longer home to a serious debate about
reunification with the mainland. Local politicians must now appeal to a
constituency that is extremely proud and protective of its de facto
independence. All major political parties on the island, including the ruling
Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and the aspiring former governing Kuomintang
(KMT), espouse views on cross-Strait relations that are a variation on the
independence theme, rather than an alternative to it.
While most Taiwanese people stop short of demanding formal, de jure
independence from mainland China, about 70 percent prefer a continuation of the
status quo, according to polling. This position is irrespective of the widely
held view in Taiwan and elsewhere that changing geopolitical realities - the
end of the Cold War, China's growing economic power, and US preoccupation with
the "war on terror" - will probably make the status quo impossible to maintain
forever.
In light of this political environment, a decision by the island's elites not
to defend Taiwan's current autonomy from Beijing's overtures or machinations
would have immediate and deleterious consequences. To begin with, any
acquiescent leadership in Taipei would almost certainly suffer a sharp loss of
popular support for what some describe as "selling out" to Beijing. The only
political party in Taiwan that still openly declares its support for mainland
reunification, for instance, is the New Party, which holds but one seat in the
Legislative Yuan, from a peak of 14 in the mid-1990s.
In Taiwan's current presidential race, the "unification-leaning" ticket of the
KMT's Lien Chan and vice-presidential nominee James Soong of the People First
Party (PFP) is on the back foot when campaigning on the cross-Strait issue. As
demonstrated in recent televised debates, Lien Chan has opted to dodge rather
than challenge incumbent President Chen of the DPP on his crusade for a
referendum on cross-Strait ties and defense, concurrent with the poll on March
20.
Furthermore, failing to safeguard Taiwan's current autonomy could tear apart
the delicate political compromise that underpins the island's democracy - ie,
that the local population should be the first, last and constant concern of
government policy. Any effort to undermine this unspoken but widely
acknowledged pact, deliberate or inadvertent, would encounter stiff political
and social resistance.
In the Taiwan Strait, the opportunity cost of peace has become extraordinarily
high for both China and Taiwan. While armed conflict is still very much
avoidable, the shrill and uncompromising voices coming out of Beijing and
Taipei are far from politics as usual. On the contrary, they may truly indicate
just how bad things really are.
Craig Meer is a post-doctoral fellow at Academia Sinica. Macabe Keliher
is an independent historian and journalist, and a regular contributor to Asia
Times Online. His website is
www.macabe.net.
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