Taiwan referendum = big military
challenges By Stephen Blank
Taiwan's referendum on China's menacing missile
deployment ended inconclusively and did not give
authoritative direction to the government - although 87
percent of those who voted opposed China's deployment of
nearly 500 missiles and supported acquisition of
advanced anti-missile technology to counter the mainland
threat. Still, not enough voters cast ballots - less
than the required 50 percent of all registered voters -
for the referendum to be considered valid.
So,
the referendum failed to give either the Taiwanese
government or the people a clear sense of how the nation
views the ever-rising threat of Chinese missiles
deployed across the Taiwan Strait. Nor did it give
Taipei any clear basis for taking appropriate military
action to deter this or other threats. Thus Taiwan's
government and armed forces are obliged to counter this
and other threats without any dependable mandate or
guide to action.
(The Ministry of National
Defense had said that it intends to go through with its
purchase of United States-made Patriot PAC-3
anti-missile systems - whatever the result of the
referendum. The deal has already been agreed with the
US. But that's only part of what Taiwan needs and will
need.)
Taiwan faces such a difficult strategic
environment that many observers both inside and outside
of Taiwan are now talking about the need for a strategy
of so-called "active defense" that entails both
defensive and offensive actions. This could mean taking
the battle to the mainland, either through air strikes
or attacks on the missile sites in particular. This
scenario is fraught with risk and is still in the
think-tank stage, observers say.
Indeed, Taiwan
confronts an increasingly intolerable military
situation. In general, as China's power and wealth
grows, it is increasingly able to isolate Taiwan
diplomatically throughout the world.
China's
11.6% hike in defense spending Further, China
announced at its recent National Peoples' Congress an
increase of 11.6 percent in its annual defense spending
for this year. Moreover, this figure does not increase
the costs either of procurement of weapons or of
research and development, leading analysts to believe
that real spending is four times higher than what is
openly announced.
China can thus register
double-digit increases in military spending annually and
close the gap that had hitherto existed between its
capabilities and those of Taiwan. Therefore most
military analysts believe that China will acquire a
discernible military superiority over Taiwan some time
this decade, assuming all things remain equal.
Taiwan's economy continues to sputter, its
military reforms are proceeding slowly and encountering
considerable internal resistance, and it appears to be
somewhat adrift in its strategic planning. Given the
growing range of Chinese military threats it confronts
and its unenviable strategic situation, this is not
surprising. But continuation of these trends risks
creating a volatile situation around Taiwan because the
one certain result of its close and disputed election on
March 20 is its people's passion for democracy - a
passion and a goal unacceptable to Beijing and at the
root of the crisis over Taiwan's future.
China's
military is the leading edge of the government's
pressure against Taiwan. Taiwan faces threats that go
far beyond the danger posed by the annual addition of
some 50-75 conventionally armed short- and medium-range
ballistic missiles on the Chinese side. Those missiles
now total approximately 500, including modified M11A and
M9A missiles that have a range of 600 and 500 kilometers
respectively and can strike any area of Taiwan from
their bases in the Nanjing military region encompassing
Fujian, Jiangsi, Guangdong and Zhejiang provinces.
China's government and armed forces are
undertaking a comprehensive buildup of naval, air and
ground forces, space capabilities, and general
capabilities for waging information warfare. The
objective: not only to intimidate Taiwan, which it
considers a breakaway province, but also to deter the US
from coming to Taiwan's defense. China has never
renounced the use of force as a last resort in order to
reunify the island with the mainland. Beijing's
representatives in Washington had urged members of the
US Congress to urge Taiwan to vote against the
referendum's questions. Because of Beijing's and
Washington's pressure, the referendum questions were
watered-down, but still deeply troubling to Beijing,
which rejects the notion that the people of the island
have any right to referendum.
China's
amphibious, aerial and missile maneuvers It
staged amphibious and aerial maneuvers in the Taiwan
Strait in February, and also conducted missile maneuvers
last month - annual exercises that took on greater
significance given Taiwan's presidential election and
referendum. China also staged joint military exercises
with France this month in the Taiwan Strait - a reminder
to voters on the eve of the Taiwan presidential election
and defense referendum.
Taiwan thus faces
serious challenges from conventional ballistic and
cruise missiles, submarines, surface vessels and China's
air force. China also is steadily upgrading its
amphibious force's capability, suggesting an effort to
at least acquire the option of actually invading the
island.
China not only has been materially
assisted by acquisition of Russian arms and technology,
it also is increasingly able to produce its own weapons
using indigenous, Russian or other foreign technologies,
enabling it to put a man into space and undertake an
extensive shipbuilding program. Increasingly, China is
buying technologies rather than weapons from Russia and
other sources. It also is now fielding new indigenous
jets like the Jian-10, which boasts semi-stealth
capabilities
All these actions indicate that
Beijing's rising confidence in its ability to use power
to restrain Taiwan and its rising concerns over Taiwan's
democratization and independence impulses.
While
this may be a paradoxical development - increasing
Chinese power and increasing anxiety over Taiwan - it is
no less a real phenomenon, and a highly dangerous one,
given developments on the island.
Taiwan's
military reform is urgent The evolving strategic
context puts enormous pressure on Taiwan's leaders and
strategic planners who face an uncertain public -
threatened by China and the political opposition to
oppose the defense referendum - a sputtering economy,
and a military machine that has admittedly not fully
awakened to the need for reform of its strategy,
operations, missions, force structure and still lacks a
full appreciation of the range and diversity of threats
that it faces.
It is difficult for Taiwan
policymakers to discern just what is the priority threat
posed by China and to respond accordingly, given that
any military budgetary process must make decisions based
on priorities and cannot cover all contingencies. As the
range and sophistication of China's capabilities grows,
and it presents an increasingly diverse and highly
visible "menu" of threats, Taiwan's strategic planners
must undertake military reforms under pressure and
accept the possibility that they might have to fight
without US support for an extended period of time.
It is a sign of the difficult strategic
environment that many observers both inside and outside
Taiwan are now talking about the need for a strategy of
"active defense" calling for both defensive and
offensive actions. This could mean taking the battle to
the mainland, either through air strikes or attacks on
missile sites. Some strategists say that even floating
such an idea might have a deterrent effect.
So
far, this is think-tank talk. Obviously such a strategy,
whatever its merits as a strategy of deterrence, also
raises the possibility of a much more dangerous and
wider battle. Obviously no government in Beijing would
be prepared to accept such strikes on its assets or
territory and such a strategy could therefore
precipitate an all-out war. This is also because no
Beijing government that goes to war can then afford to
lose the war over Taiwan. That outcome certainly spells
the end of its and the Communist Party's power.
Preemptive strikes dangerous and
far-fetched The calls for a strategy based on
taking the battle to the mainland at least under certain
conditions, also invokes the necessity of preemptive
strikes or of preventive war, which are not the same
thing. But in either case, they mean that in this
scenario Taiwan's leaders would see a materializing
threat that they would have to strike at before it
struck at Taiwan. Again such doctrines are fraught with
the most dangerous unpredictability whatever value they
may have as deterrents to a Chinese attack.
Under the circumstances it is hardly surprising
that Taiwan's US friends are urging it to undertake ever
deeper and more systematic military reforms, to bring
its military more fully into the 21st century, to spend
more on defense and not to cut the armed forces.
Moreover, they want Taiwan to make better use of its
existing weapons and capabilities and potential American
support in the form of arms sales.
These actions
to strengthen the military require strong political
leadership, a clear threat assessment by Taiwan's
strategic leadership and a growing public commitment to
meet the Chinese threat - in dollars, not referendums.
Many foreign observers remain dubious that this can
happen or is happening with sufficient urgency and some
have expressed concern in policy circles over the risk
inherent in the active defense scenario or the idea of
taking the battle to the mainland.
The
uncertainty and failure of the referendum on defense
will likely make it harder to push for such
comprehensive military reforms and rethinking of
Taiwan's strategic challenges or of its opportunities,
which are by no means negligible. But the failure to
undertake such reforms and rethinking will only heighten
the already high tension around the island, especially
as China realizes its expected military superiority.
In other words, despite the inconclusive outcome
of the referendum and the extremely close presidential
election, for Taiwan's leadership the future is now. If
the leaders hope to preserve the island's hard-won
virtual independence, liberty, democracy and prosperity,
they must take vigorous strategic military and political
action - now before their options narrow to the point
that others might have to make those decisions for them.
Stephen Blank is an analyst of
international security affairs residing in Harrisburg,
Pennsylvania.
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