The
administration of US President George W Bush came into
office with a clear policy toward East Asia that
emphasized consolidating relations with key allies like
South Korea, and with longstanding friends, such as
Taiwan, in the face of threats posed by North Korea and
China. In addition, several important allies, notably
Japan and Australia, have cooperated closely with the US
on regional affairs, Iraq and the "war on terrorism".
Thus, US relations with and reliance on Tokyo and
Canberra remain strong.
In the case of South
Korea, however, a convergence of circumstances has
prompted the Bush administration to greatly lower its
expectations of Seoul, while relying much more on China
to help manage the threat posed by North Korea.
Meanwhile, Taiwan's protracted domestic political
struggle in the months leading up to the contested
presidential election on March 20 has called into
serious question the US administration's previous
approach to Taiwan. Recently, the US government has
greatly lowered its expectations of the Taiwan
government, which in US eyes increasingly is seen as
capable of unpredictable and provocative actions that
could lead to conflict in the Taiwan Strait.
Taiwan's perceived unpredictability and
unreliability seem certain to continue following the
disputed election, which Lien Chan, chairman of the
opposition Kuomintang, claimed was rigged after
incumbent President Chen Shui-bian and Vice President
Annette Lu of the governing Democratic Progressive Party
beat Chan and People First Party chairman James Soong by
a slim margin of 30,000 votes.
As the election
dispute rages on, Taiwan's political situation will
appear shaky in the lead up to crucial legislative
elections later in the year as well, and probably will
remain so into the foreseeable future. In this context,
in order to secure US interests in peace and stability
in the Taiwan Strait, the Bush administration may have
few good alternatives other than to gravitate toward the
same path it followed on dealing with Korean issues,
seeking pragmatic US arrangements with China in order to
reduce the chances of conflict in this sensitive area.
Aside from instability in Taiwan, perhaps the
most important change in circumstances from 2001 to 2004
is the US's strategic preoccupation with Iraq,
Afghanistan, Southwest Asia and the broader "war on
terrorism". Under this climate, US policy can ill
afford, and seeks to avoid, new conflicts in sensitive
areas such as Korea and the Taiwan Strait, while
remaining firm against aggression by or the perceived
appeasement of adversaries.
Downgrading
Seoul, relying on Beijing The Bush administration
has remained conflicted about dealings with North Korea,
and US policy toward it was drifting in 2001-2002 until
North Korea brought matters to a head by breaking past
agreements and overtly pursuing a nuclear weapons
program. However, preoccupation with the looming
confrontation with Iraq and the broader "war on
terrorism", caused the Bush administration to fall into
a reactive stance in dealing with the North Korean
crisis.
The US approach also was seriously
complicated by strong anti-American sentiment in South
Korea and South Korean government policies that diverged
strongly from the Bush administration's stance. Elected
in December 2002 on an anti-US platform, the new South
Korean president, Roh Moo-hyun, subsequently shifted in
the face of US advice and other concerns to a somewhat
more supportive stance regarding US interests, but his
administration was weak, conflicted and provided a less
than steady base for US policy in dealing with the
North. President Roh's impeachment last month is the
latest development underlining the weakness and
uncertainty in South Korea and its contribution to US
policy toward the North.
At present, the US
still works closely with the South Korean military in
deterring the North and formally coordinates US policy
with Seoul as well as Tokyo, but US policy between
2002-2004 has found greater common ground over North
Korean issues with the Chinese government, which unlike
South Korea has been stable and predictable, anxious to
avoid instability in the region and to find ways to
improve relations with the US. As an illustration of
this point, US officials with responsibility for East
Asian affairs and dealing with North Korea lauded
China's role in recent testimony before the US Congress,
an about-face from two years earlier when these same
officials in testimony to Congress in 2002 had shown
great reserve in comments about China, while giving
clear pride of place to positive features of the
US-South Korean relationship.
Bush's Taiwan
problem The Bush administration had anticipated
that a strong US posture toward Beijing and strong
support for Taiwan would deter China from taking
aggressive action against the island, which China
considers a breakaway province. Meanwhile, Taiwan was
encouraged to work closely and cooperatively with the US
in taking careful and concrete steps to offset China's
military buildup and other intimidation tactics.
Beijing appeared deterred, though it has
continued its military buildup and has opposed enhanced
US support for Taiwan. However, unlike Chinese practice
in the previous decade, Chinese policymakers since
mid-2001 have endeavored to avoid serious confrontation
and conflict with the US administration, leading to a
broadening of common ground between the two powers and a
marked improvement in bilateral relations. Taiwan, for
its part, has cooperated with US military efforts that
avoid major Taiwan expenditures, while Taiwan leaders on
the other hand have engaged in provocative rhetoric and
political maneuvers regarding sensitive cross-Strait
issues that have seriously complicated US interest in
preserving peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait.
Despite strong efforts by Bush and his senior
officials in recent months, the US government was unable
to get Chen to back away from his determination to hold
referendums on sensitive cross-Strait issues in the
March 20 elections and to conduct a presidential
campaign seemingly designed to provoke Beijing into a
hostile response. As leader of the pan-green alliance of
the DPP, which supports independence from the mainland,
there seems to be little likelihood that Chen will
abandon his stated agenda to seek a new constitution and
other political steps toward greater independence that
are seen as serious challenges and possible causes of
military action by Beijing.
Indeed, the
imperative of the pan-green leader to take new steps to
energize his political base in the highly charged and
divided political atmosphere in Taiwan is likely to
remain strong in the lead up to the crucial legislative
election at the end of this year and probably longer.
Domestic Taiwan politics clearly trumped Taiwan concern
over alienating the US government in the lead up to the
presidential election, and this seems likely to remain
the case for the foreseeable future.
In the
event that Lien Chan, the leader of the pan-blues, as
the opposition alliance is known, were to be declared
the winner of the election, the problems for US policy
would not go away. The pan-green camp would keep up its
political pressure, while the pan-blues' more
accommodating posture toward mainland China would mean
that US efforts to encourage sober and rigorous defense
preparedness in Taiwan would meet resistance from
officials unwilling to spend the money on these
expensive efforts.
Avoid conflict in the
Taiwan - work with China? A key problem for the
US under these circumstances is how to avoid conflict in
the Taiwan Strait prompted most immediately by the
continuing and perhaps worsening uncertainty in Taiwan.
As in the case of recent US policy with an unpredictable
South Korea, Taiwan seems unreliable and a big part of
the problem. Of course, the US can try to press Taiwan
to adjust its policy more in line with US interests, but
this seems unlikely to be successful. The US may also be
able to use military, economic, or other measures on its
own that could stabilize the situation, but it is hard
to see what unilateral US measures would work well under
the current circumstances.
Meanwhile, a path
that has been surprisingly satisfactory for the Bush
administration in the case of Korea is to deal more
directly and constructively with China. Beijing leaders
also seem to have a need to work closely with the US in
order to avoid confrontation and conflict with the US
prompted by unpredictable developments in Taiwan. Such
Sino-US dealings need not go beyond established lines of
communications nor involve more than initial steps to
reassure one another that they will not resort to
precipitous military action when cooperative Sino-US
steps can be pursued to ease tensions and manage Taiwan
issues in ways that do not lead to war. As in the case
of South Korea, Taiwan would obviously be marginalized
in US policy through this process, but the imperative of
avoiding a new, and for the US, unnecessary conflict at
a time of major US strategic preoccupation elsewhere
could provide sufficient justification for this US
policy adjustment.
Robert Sutter is a professor in the School of Foreign
Service at Georgetown University in Washington DC. He
can be reached at sutterr@georgetown.edu
.
