The year to fear for Taiwan:
2006 By Wendell Minnick
TAIPEI
- If China ever makes the decision to invade Taiwan it
is unlikely to be a large-scale Normandy-style
amphibious assault. The reality is that China is more
likely to use a decapitation strategy. Decapitation
strategies short circuit command and control systems,
wipe out nationwide nerve centers, and leave the
opponent hopelessly lost. As the old saying goes, "Kill
the head and the body dies." All China needs to do is
seize the center of power, the capital and its leaders.
If China decides to use force to reunify the
mainland with what it terms a breakaway province, the
window of opportunity is believed to be 2006. This would
give China a couple of years to clean up the mess before
the 2008 Summer Olympics. Most analysts estimate that
China's military strength will surpass Taiwan's defense
capabilities by 2005. So 2006 - the Year of the Dog - is
clearly the year to fear.
United States Defense
Department officials now are reexamining China's
military threat to Taiwan. This rethink has caused a
dramatic shift in the way many think of defending
Taiwan. Traditionally, Taiwan had always feared an
amphibious assault - the Normandy scenario - and its
defense strategy was always designed to stop such an
attack. Now with a potential decapitation strategy
believed to be in the works, US defense officials are
beginning to think what had once been unthinkable:
losing Taiwan in only seven days.
The Taiwan
takeover scenario China's deployment of its
special forces and rapid-deployment forces, combined
with air power and missile strikes, is the most likely
formula for successfully taking Taiwan with the least
amount of effort and damage. The military acronym KISS
(Keep It Simple, Stupid!) is in full force here. Special
forces, which blend strength with deception and flair,
offer China laser cutters rather than sledge hammers for
defeating Taiwan's armed forces.
An airborne
assault directly on Taipei by China's 15th Airborne
Corps (Changchun), with three divisions (43rd, 44th,
45th) would be the first phase of the assault, with
additional paratroopers being dropped in Linkou, Taoyuan
and Ilian, to tie up Taiwan's four divisions assigned to
the 6th Army (North). A Chinese airborne division
contains 11,000 men with light tanks and self-propelled
artillery. Some intelligence reports have indicated that
China was able to airlift one airborne division to Tibet
in less than 48 hours in 1988. Today, China's ability to
transport troops has greatly improved. China is expected
to be able to deliver twice that number - 22,000 - in
two days.
Taiwan's 6th Army has seven infantry
brigades: 106, 116, 118, 152, 153, 176, and 178. The
152/153 Dragons and the the 176/178 Tigers are said to
be the best. Also a direct assault on the 6th Army's
269th motorized brigade, 351st armored infantry brigade,
and the 542nd armored brigade would be mandatory for
Chinese forces.
Most of the initial fighting
would be in the Zhong Zheng District, Taipei, which
contains the Presidential Building, the Ministry of
National Defense, and the Legislative Yuan. As soon as
China's troops hit the ground they would have to deal
with Taiwan's Military Police Command (MPC). The MPC is
responsible for protecting key government buildings and
military installations. Its personnel are the
gatekeepers, holding all the keys and guarding all the
doors. They are considered no-nonsense and are humorless
when approached. China's airborne forces would meet
immediate resistance from these Taipei forces. Regular
army units, all based outside of Taipei, would take
hours, perhaps days, to respond. It would be up to the
MPC to hold the Chinese back until reinforcements
arrived - which might be never.
Assassins,
saboteurs would be prepositioned Pre-positioned
special forces, smuggled into Taiwan months before,
would assassinate key leaders, and attack radar and
communication facilities around Taiwan a few hours
before the main attack. Infiltrators might receive some
assistance from sympathetic elements within Taiwan's
military and police, who are believed to be at least 75
percent pro-Kuomintang (KMT), and hence,
pro-unification. Many could use taxis to move about the
city unnoticed. Mainland Chinese prostitutes, already in
abundance in Taiwan, could be recruited by Chinese
intelligence to serve as femme fatales, supplying
critical intelligence on the locations of key government
and military leaders at odd hours of the night; death is
the ultimate aphrodisiac.
The second phase would
begin after airborne forces captured Sungshan Airport.
With a secure landing strip, China would fly in elements
of its 14 divisions of "rapid reaction" troops using
Ilyushin Il-76, Shaanxi Y-8, Antonov 26, and Xian Y-7
troop transports, with air support from China's 1,000
bombers and fighters. China's 10 Il-76 transports can
carry 130 troops apiece, though this limitation could be
overcome by commandeering aircraft belonging to
commercial courier and passenger airlines. China has
about 500 Boeings and Airbuses from which to choose.
Some of China's heavy-lift transports would bring in
BMD-2 Airborne Combat Vehicles and an assortment of
armored vehicles. These air-lifted troops would spread
throughout the city, securing bridges and key
intersections. In addition, China has 200 transport
helicopters capable of carrying commandos to Taiwan.
China might encounter opposition from Taiwan's
new rapid deployment force. The newly created Aviation
and Special Forces Command (ASFC) has united three
aviation helicopter brigades, the 601st, 602nd, and
603rd, with the 862nd Special Warfare Brigade under one
command. The 862nd is Taiwan's elite paratrooper brigade
and modeled after the US Army Rangers. The helicopter
brigades are made up of a combination of CH-47SD Chinook
transport helicopters, AH-1W SuperCobra attack
helicopters, OH-58D Kiowa armed observation helicopters,
and UH-1H Huey transport helicopters.
Taiwan
also has some noteworthy smaller commando units. There
are two Marine Corps units: the Amphibious
Reconnaissance Patrol (ARP) and the Special Services
Company (SSC). The army also has two: the 101st
Amphibious Reconnaissance Battalion (ARB) or "Army
Frogmen", and the Airborne Special Services Company
(ASSC). The ASSC is a new unit modeled after the US
Delta Force. ASSC recruits from the 862nd and performs
counter-terrorism and other special missions. The
question of whether these forces could, or would, be
moved into the conflict area in time is another matter.
Except for special forces and the marines, it is
unlikely that the rest of Taiwan's infantry brigades
scattered across the island would do much. As the saying
goes, "It's not the size of the dog in the fight, but
the size of the fight in the dog that matters." Taiwan's
military is rife with lethargic and ineffectual troops
just begging for their 20-month tour of duty to end so
they can go back to their girlfriends and jobs. Many
call Taiwan's youth, including its young soldiers, the
"strawberry generation" because they are soft and
spoiled by the good life. US military officials visiting
Taiwan often complain that the military's boot camps are
too lax. The military appears more afraid of angering
the parents of the conscripts than confronting a Chinese
invasion, say visiting US soldiers. One politically
correct legislator recently complained to Asia Times
Online, "Taiwan has to do something about violence in
the military." The correspondent reminded him, "The
military is a violent institution." The conversation was
over; the lesson lost.
Identity crisis within
Taiwan's military Taiwan's military also faces an
identity crisis. The idea that Taiwan is part of China
still resonates strongly within the military. For
example, unit patches worn by soldiers often bear the
outline of China, not Taiwan. The 6th Army, 8th Army,
46th Division, and Marine Corps have the image of China
on their patches. The 117th Infantry Brigade has an
eagle landing on mainland China. The 34th Division,
157th Infantry Brigade, and 200th Motorized Brigade
display the Great Wall of China. None of the unit
patches or emblems bears the image of Taiwan. In fact,
visitors to military bases see no evidence whatsoever
that they are located in Taiwan. China is the central
theme of the whole military experience for Taiwan's
conscripts. Even the names of naval vessels have Chinese
themes.
Taiwan's navy would have little to do in
this war scenario, except sink like rocks. A few would
shoot down a small number of the Chinese planes heading
to Taiwan, but most would be taken out of action by
China's numerous anti-ship missiles. Of particular
annoyance is the nasty Russian-made Sunburn anti-ship
missile (ASM). Three times as fast as the US Harpoon
ASM, the Sunburn does not slam into the side of a ship
like the Harpoon; instead, as it nears the target it
rises above it and then dives straight down through the
deck of the ship. The speed and angle of the attack make
it nearly impossible to shoot down or to disable by
electronic countermeasures or jamming.
Taiwan's
air force would be kept busy trying to repair runway
damage caused by the estimated 500 short-range ballistic
missiles deployed along China's coast and targeting
Taiwan. China's Second Artillery Corps would launch Dong
Feng 11 (M-11) and DF-15 (M-9) in multiple-wave and
multi-directional saturation attacks on air bases, port
facilities and other strategic locations. Only a small
number would be intercepted by Taiwan's three Patriot
(PAC-2 Plus) anti-missile defense batteries located
around Taipei. The PACs will only be able to hit
missiles coming down on northern Taiwan. The south is
totally unprotected from ballistic missiles. China's
special forces, infiltrated to Taiwan, would take a keen
interest in locating and destroying the PACs. Everyone
knows where they are, so it would not be too difficult.
Even if Taiwan could dispatch some of its
fighter aircraft, China would meet them in the air with
some of its brand new Sukhoi 30, Su-27 and JH-7
fighters. China took delivery of 154 Russian Su-27
fighters earlier this year. By the end of 2004 China is
expected to have 273 advanced Sukhoi fighters. Those
fighter pilots able to take off before their bases were
destroyed would give the Chinese a hell of a fight, but
once their aircraft began to run out of fuel they would
have no where to land. Many would simply fight to the
bitter end and eject if they cared enough.
In
the meantime, China's 100 Xian H-6 (Tu-16) Badger and
approximately 500 Harbin H-5 (Il-28) Beagle bombers
would clean up those areas not destroyed by the initial
missile attack. Of particular concern to the Chinese are
two "secret" air bases located within hollowed-out
mountains in eastern Taiwan, Chiashan in Hualien and
Chihhang in Taitung. These would probably survive the
initial missile strike, and require a little more effort
from China's air force.
New pro-Beijing
government swiftly sworn in Once Taipei was
captured, a new government chosen by Beijing would be
sworn into office. There would be plenty of Taiwanese
politicians to choose from. It is well known there are
many pro-China legislators who have investments in China
and more than a few who have had private meetings with
Beijing officials. The inauguration would be conducted
in the spotlight of the international media, giving it
some psychological legitimacy in the eyes of the
international community. There would be too many
pro-China people in the US State Department - privately
relieved the Taiwan issue was finally settled - to say
anything in Taiwan's defense.
With the new
government inaugurated, the new president would declare
an end to all hostilities with China. During a
nationwide televised speech, the new president would
order all military forces to stand down. With the
pro-China sentiments running high in the Taiwan
military, it is likely that most would grudgingly accept
the new president.
The new president would
contact the US Department of Defense via the new hotline
installed by the US government in 2002 and warn against
any US military actions taken on behalf of Taiwan or
against Taiwan's new guests, the Chinese military. Using
the hotline would demonstrate to the US that the new
president and his people have access to the codes
necessary to transmit an encrypted message, and also
validate that the new president has the authority to
access the hotline within Taiwan's Ministry of National
Defense - a demonstration of power and control.
US military forces could respond in this
scenario if so ordered. The question is, how committed
is the US to Taiwan's defense? Given the speed of the
Chinese attack, it is unlikely that US aircraft carriers
would initially be involved, except for the USS Kitty
Hawk. The closest US military support that could act
quickly is only 20 minutes away in Okinawa.
Under the 5th Air Force based in Japan,
Okinawa's Kadena Air Force Base has two fighter
squadrons of F-15 Strike Eagle fighter aircraft (44th FS
Vampires and 67th FS Fighting Cocks). In addition, the
Misawa Air Base in Japan has two fighter squadrons of
F-16 Falcon fighter aircraft (13th FS Panthers and 14th
FS Samurais). The 7th Air Force in Korea has three
squadrons of F-16s and the 11th Air Force in Alaska has
three squadrons of F-15s and one squadron of F-16s.
Call in the US Marines? The US Marine
Corps is another potential thorn in China's side. Under
the Marine Aircraft Group 12 in Iwakuni, Japan, the
marines have three squadrons of F/A-18 Hornets, one
squadron of EA-6B Prowlers, and one squadron of AV-8
Harrier fighter aircraft (Okinawa).
China has
every reason to fear US air power. US pilots are far
better trained than the Chinese. China has been lax in
its training programs, so it would not be surprising to
see TV images of Chinese aircraft plummeting to earth in
flames. One can understand why China fervently hopes US
military forces will be pulling out of South Korea and
Japan.
If the US were able to send aircraft
carriers to the scene, the US Navy's Pacific Fleet has
six aircraft carriers in its arsenal: USS Kitty Hawk,
Carl Vinson, Nimitz, Abraham Lincoln, John C Stennis,
and Ronald Reagan. These ships carry F-14 Tomcat,
F/A-18, and EA-6B aircraft. The Kitty Hawk is the only
permanently forward-deployed aircraft carrier in the US
military. Based at Yokosuka, Japan, it recently visited
Hong Kong and is often mentioned in media reports
regarding potential conflicts involving Taiwan.
The US Marine Corps has seven amphibious assault
ships in the Pacific equipped with a variety of
helicopters, fighter aircraft and assault troops. These
are basically self-contained invasion forces. There are
the USS Tarawa, Belleau Wood, Peleliu, Essex, Boxer, Bon
Homme Richard, and Iwo Jima. Basically mini-aircraft
carriers with an attitude, the Tarawa, for example, can
carry four AH-1 Sea Cobra attack helicopters, six
heavy-lift CH-53 Stallion transport helicopters, 20 M-60
tanks, 29 light armored vehicles, 29 AAV-7 amphibious
assault vehicles, and 1,900 men of a Reinforced Marine
Battalion.
US aircraft carrier strike group
may move to Guam China may also have to consider
the newest arrivals to Andersen Air Force Base in nearby
Guam. In February, six B-52s Stratofortresses arrived
from the 5th Bomb Wing based at Minot, North Dakota, at
the request of the US Pacific Command (PACOM) in Hawaii.
PACOM requested a "rotational bomber force on the island
until it's no longer needed".
PACOM argues that
the move is in response to North Korea, but others are
suggesting that Taiwan is the basis of much of the move.
This is a common theme in US military planning in Asia:
the overt reason used is North Korea, but the covert one
is Taiwan. Guam is now being considered for possible
placement of an aircraft-carrier strike group to be
moved from Hawaii.
Japan is another element in
the equation, and it could intervene. Many argue that if
China takes Taiwan, both Japan and South Korea would
quickly develop and deploy nuclear weapons - probably in
a few months. Losing the Taiwan Strait to China and
facing a militarily adventuresome Beijing would send
shock waves throughout the region. If Japan chose to
intervene, it has nine squadrons of F-15 fighters to
throw into the fight. Japan's naval arm could engage
Chinese naval forces with close to 50 destroyers, 10
frigates, and 16 submarines.
However, in an
escalating conflict involving the US, there is a
possibility that China would attack US military bases in
the region. Slamming DF-21C Terminal Guided Missiles on
Okinawa could be a start. Beijing would consider this to
be an option only after US forces have engaged Chinese
naval vessels and aircraft crossing the Taiwan Strait,
according to analysts. China might even get more
aggressive by using special forces against US military
bases in Japan, Alaska and Hawaii. All these options
would give China more time to consolidate forces on
Taiwan, and forestall US intervention.
Why is
Taiwan worth fighting for?
To anyone who looks
at a map of the region, the reasons are obvious.
Taiwan's strategic location makes it extremely valuable.
The Taiwan Strait is a critical sea lane, and taking
Taiwan would allow China to choke off international
commercial shipping, especially oil, to Japan and South
Korea, should it ever decide to do so. In addition,
Taiwan serves as a vital window for US intelligence
collection. Taiwan's National Security Bureau and the US
National Security Agency jointly run a Signal
Intelligence facility on Yangmingshan Mountain just
north of Taipei (see Spook Mountain: How US spies on
China, March 6, 2003). Taiwan's inclusion
into China's military power structure would be
unthinkable for Japan.
Of course, this is only a
scenario based on selected facts and seasoned with
conjecture. Speculation about what China could do and
what it will do are rarely comparable. Too many media
pundits make mention of a Normandy-style invasion, or an
apocalyptic-style missile strike, without seriously
considering the fastest way between two points. Of
course, China, be warned: "No plan survives the first
seconds of combat."
Wendell Minnick is
the Jane's Defence Weekly correspondent for Taiwan and
the author of Spies and Provocateurs: A Worldwide
Encyclopedia of Persons Conducting Espionage and Covert
Action (McFarland 1992). He can be contacted at
janesroc@yahoo.com.
(Copyright 2004 Asia Times
Online Co, Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact content@atimes.com for
information on our sales and syndication policies.)
TAIPEI
- If China ever makes the decision to invade Taiwan it
is unlikely to be a large-scale Normandy-style
amphibious assault. The reality is that China is more
likely to use a decapitation strategy. Decapitation
strategies short circuit command and control systems,
wipe out nationwide nerve centers, and leave the
opponent hopelessly lost. As the old saying goes, "Kill
the head and the body dies." All China needs to do is
seize the center of power, the capital and its leaders.
Taiwan's military also faces an
identity crisis. The idea that Taiwan is part of China
still resonates strongly within the military. For
example, unit patches worn by soldiers often bear the
outline of China, not Taiwan. The 6th Army, 8th Army,
46th Division, and Marine Corps have the image of China
on their patches. The 117th Infantry Brigade has an
eagle landing on mainland China. The 34th Division,
157th Infantry Brigade, and 200th Motorized Brigade
display the Great Wall of China. None of the unit
patches or emblems bears the image of Taiwan. In fact,
visitors to military bases see no evidence whatsoever
that they are located in Taiwan. China is the central
theme of the whole military experience for Taiwan's
conscripts. Even the names of naval vessels have Chinese
themes. 
