On the
surface, it appears that China, Taiwan and the United
States share the same objective of preserving the status
quo in the Taiwan Strait. The problem is that all three
have different definitions of the status quo.
Beijing insists that Taiwan is part of China.
The legitimacy of its regime is intertwined with
preventing Taiwan from gaining juridical stature as a
sovereign country. Taipei views itself as an
independent, sovereign nation and is seeking to make
that status irreversible, unless the people on the
island vote otherwise in a referendum. The US has a "one
China" policy and insists that differences between the
two sides of the Strait be worked out peacefully, lest
the US be compelled to become involved militarily under
obligations stipulated in the Taiwan Relations Act.
The status quo is thus in dispute and is
unstable.
The danger of military conflict is
present and may be increasing. Since being re-elected
for a second term, Taiwanese President Chen Shui-bian
has reaffirmed his pledge to hold a referendum in 2006
on a new constitution that would be enacted in May 2008.
Washington is not likely to object to a new Taiwanese
constitution that promotes more effective governance, as
long as it is formulated and adopted through legal
mechanisms and does not seek to resolve unilaterally the
dispute over sovereignty. China strongly opposes a new
constitution for Taiwan because it could break the
continuity of the Republic of China (ROC) and represent
the founding of a new Taiwanese state. And, Beijing
argues, as a part of China, Taiwan has no right to its
own "sovereign" constitution. Beijing's red lines are
not unalterable, however. China might not overreact to
the enactment of a new constitution, even one that is
approved by a referendum, if the preamble and articles
1-6 of the current document, which address the ROC's
name, geographic boundaries, and its relationship to
China, are left largely intact.
Frustration on
the mainland is rising with a policy toward Taiwan that
many Chinese view as too soft. China has shown
considerable restraint in the past year in the face of
what it judged as repeated provocations, including the
passage of a law by Taiwan's legislature giving the
people the right to vote on referendums that bind its
leaders. Taiwan held its first referendum on the same
day as the presidential election, March 20. Beijing's
relatively relaxed approach was premised on an
expectation that Chen would be replaced by the
opposition pan-blue forces, an alliance of the
Kuomintang (KMT) and the People First Party (PFP) - both
of which are more pro-China than Chen's governing
Democratic People's Party (DPP).
Chen's
re-election has alarmed Beijing and stoked a fierce
debate over what mix of policies will prevent Taiwan
from permanently severing its ties with the mainland.
Voices in China favoring the use of military
force to compel Taipei to halt its movement toward
juridical independence are growing louder. They say that
doing so is imperative to disprove Taiwan's's claim that
China is a paper tiger that doesn't dare use force
because it would risk an all-out war with the United
States. Some Chinese even believe that there is
sufficient concern in Washington about Chen's
pro-independence actions and his future agenda that the
US might acquiesce in a limited use of force by the
People's Liberation Army - for example, to seize an
offshore island, temporarily impose a limited blockade,
or fire a single missile at a military target on Taiwan.
Those in China who question the advisability of
relying on military means to warn Taipei of the dangers
of going too far may be losing ground in this debate.
Proponents of using economic levers to attract Taiwan
toward political integration with the mainland have lost
credibility as cross-Strait trade has flourished while
failing to bridge the political divide. Even though more
than half a million Taiwan businessmen have established
residences on the mainland, this has not stemmed the
growth of a separate Taiwanese consciousness.
Now that more than half of Taiwan's electorate
has cast votes for Chen, who ran on an anti-China
platform, there is growing doubt about pinning hopes on
the Taiwanese people and Taiwan's business community to
preserve a political link with the Chinese motherland.
Beijing now worries that in the wake of its astonishing
loss, the pan-blue opposition, once thought to be
invincible, will splinter and lose its majority in the
legislative elections slated for December.
As
China's confidence wanes in Taiwan's internal checks
that might curb momentum toward de jure independence,
Beijing increasingly is looking to the US to rein in
President Chen. The Chinese hope that Washington will
pressure Taipei to back down from its plan to create a
new constitution. They also seek to establish a broader
understanding with the administration of US President
George W Bush on what steps by Taipei would constitute a
provocation and how the United States and China would
respond separately or jointly if those agreed-upon red
lines were crossed.
Is Washington likely to
cooperate with Beijing to avert a crisis in the Taiwan
Strait? Surely this would not be the Bush
administration's preferred option. Siding with a
communist country against a democracy would draw fire
from Republicans and Democrats alike. President Bush is
no doubt peeved at President Chen for disregarding
Washington's calls to back down from holding a
referendum. (Voters were asked whether China should be
asked to redirect nearly 500 missiles aimed at Taiwan
and, if Being refused, whether Taiwan should seek
advanced military defensive technology.) Bush, however,
would probably find it distasteful to collaborate with
China, the nation of 1.3 billion that he once termed
America's strategic competitor, against the 22 million
people on Taiwan. Early in his presidency, Bush promised
that he would do "whatever it took" to help the
Taiwanese defend themselves against an attack from the
mainland.
Instead, the US is working primarily
on its own to compel Taiwan to refrain from actions that
will further inflame cross-Strait tensions. The message
to Taiwan to cool it has become clearer and louder in
recent weeks. In testimony to the US Congress on April
21, assistant secretary of state James Kelly said it
would be irresponsible for Taiwan to treat Chinese
statements on the possible use of force as empty
threats. He also noted that there are limits on what the
US will support as Taiwan considers changing its
constitution. Kelly called on President Chen to be
responsible, democratic and restrained. He also reminded
Taiwan that US support is not a blank check to resist
dialogue with the mainland. Washington expects Chen to
enunciate a clear vision of Taiwan's future relationship
with the mainland in his inaugural address next Thursday
and to offer a roadmap for realizing that goal.
While admonishing Taipei, Washington is taking
steps to reassure Beijing that it will oppose unilateral
efforts by Taipei to sever Taiwan from the mainland and
will not recognize Taiwan as an independent country. At
the same time, US officials are publicly and privately
stating that the use of force under any circumstances
will not be countenanced. In addition, they continue to
prod China to take steps to reduce its military threat
to Taiwan. Calls for implementing military
confidence-building measures to reduce the likelihood of
miscalculation or misunderstanding leading to conflict -
not heard from US officials since the late 1990s - are
again in vogue.
The new hands-on approach to
managing cross-Strait relations is a significant shift
from the laissez-faire attitude that marked the first
two and a half years of Bush administration policy
toward cross-Strait relations. The shift is both welcome
and necessary. The United States must be more actively
engaged in preventive diplomacy in the Taiwan Strait .
The stakes are high. Washington simply cannot afford a
clash in the Taiwan Strait.
Bonnie S
Glaser is a senior associate at the Center for
Strategic and International Studies in Washington, DC,
and at the Pacific Forum CSIS, which
made this article available. Glaser can be reached
atbglaser6@comcast.net.
