SPEAKING
FREELY Seeking stability in the Taiwan
Strait By Jing-dong
Yuan
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Taiwan's
re-elected President Chen Shui-bian has provided some
relief to anxious watchers of the cross-Strait
relationship in both Beijing and Washington. In his
inaugural speech Thursday, Chen did emphasize a growing
Taiwan identity, reasserting its sovereign existence and
vowing to continue pushing for its international spaces.
At the same time, however, Chen also reaffirmed his May
2000 promises (although he did not repeat the four "no"s
and one "not to"), pledged not to make unilateral
changes to the status quo and proposed to exclude the
issue of unification/independence from the planned
constitutional re-engineering project.
In
addition, he called for greater contacts between the
people on both sides of the Strait and challenged the
mainland to create an environment for peaceful
development and freedom of choice as the framework for
cross-Strait engagement.
Will Beijing accept
Chen's statement at face value? Three days before Chen's
inauguration, China issued a strongly worded statement
accusing Chen of betraying his May 2000 pledges and
warning the Taiwan leader not to play with fire.
Reiterating the "one China" principle, Beijing also
called for the resumption of cross-Strait dialogue to
establish a framework for peace, including
confidence-building mechanisms in the military field,
and demonstrated its willingness to discuss Taiwan's
needs for participation in certain international
activities. The mainland also proposed to expand
bilateral economic ties, to establish at an early stage
the three links [such as direct air and shipping] and to
encourage better understanding between people across the
Taiwan Strait.
Despite elements of flexibility
and even reconciliation, the positions of the two sides
remain poles apart. Beijing's insistence on the "one
China" principle contrasts with Taipei's call for a
"peace and stability framework" for interaction without
any preconditions. Taiwan refuses to be coerced into
unification; Beijing is intolerant of any movement
toward independence. Misperception, miscalculation, and
mishandling of the delicate cross-Strait situation could
result in military confrontation and lead to regional
instability.
Indeed, the cross-Strait arms
dynamic remains one of the potential destabilizing
factors in East Asia. Both China and Taiwan have been
engaged in an arms competition for well over a decade.
According the Stockholm International Peace Research
Institute, the two rank among the world's top arms
recipients, respectively spending US$10.8 billion and
$15.5 billion in 1992-2001 on imported weapons. China
has purchased Sovrenenny-class destroyers, Kilo-class
submarines, SS-N-22 Sunburn anti-ship missiles, and
SU-27 and SU-30 advanced fighter aircraft from Russia.
Taiwan has acquired F-16 fighters, Kidd-class
destroyers, and Patriot missiles from the US, and Mirage
2000-5 and Lafayette-class frigates from France.
This cross-Strait arms dynamic is being driven
by the uncertainty over the future of Taiwan. The last
20 years have also witnessed a sea of changes in
Taiwan's political processes whereby the island has
undergone significant democratization. At the same time,
generational changes in leaders have introduced new
elements of domestic politics in Taiwan, including a
growing proportion of indigenous Taiwanese politicians
moving into key government positions. Beijing watches
with dismay as prospects for unification decline even as
economic ties between the two sides have deepened
dramatically during the same period. The election of the
Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) candidate Chen
Shui-bian as Taiwan's president in March 2000, the DPP
legislative victory in December 2001, and Chen's
re-election in March 2004 further raise the prospect of
permanent separation of Taiwan from the mainland and
possible de jure, from de facto independence.
Coercion could backfire: China emphasizes
economics All of these developments have worried
the Chinese leadership and engendered corresponding
responses. These range from pressure and intimidation,
inducement and united-front tactics, and the emphasis on
economic integration. However, Beijing may have learned
a lesson that coercion and intimidation could well
backfire and the threats of military actions are not
adequately supported by its current capabilities. That
may explain why Beijing has shifted to focusing more on
the non-military aspects of the general unification
strategy, emphasizing economic interactions and
exchanges of people.
The current leadership
under President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao
inherits many of the policies and strategies from the
administration of president Jiang Zemin, and it has by
and large stayed the course. What have marked the Hu-Wen
administration are the low-key approaches to the Taiwan
issue, given past backlashes and the delicate situation
of the upcoming presidential elections in Taiwan.
Beijing has also been more active in engaging the
administration of US President George W Bush by sending
high-level officials to Washington.
The US
policy has always been that it leaves to the people on
both sides of the Strait to determine the final
resolution of the issue but it insists that it be
achieved through peaceful means. Within this broader
context, it has reiterated its "one China" policy but at
the same time sought to maintain cross-Strait stability
through arms sales to Taiwan in to maintain military
balance.
How to enable Taiwan to defend itself
against growing Chinese military coercion remains a
critical component of overall US strategy in East Asia.
That strategy envisions strong alliance relationships,
forward US military presence, and forestalling the rise
of any major power that may challenge vital US
interests. Within this broader context, the ability and
resolve to help Taiwan defend itself not only fulfill
key US obligations and commitments under the Taiwan
Relations Act but also demonstrates the resolve and
credibility of its commitments to allies and friends.
This is indeed the broader framework within
which the current US administration has handled its
China/Taiwan policy. Bush has moved away from a Taiwan
policy anchored in "strategic ambiguity". Administration
officials have emphasized US obligations under the
Taiwan Relations Act, a strong preference for peaceful
resolution of the issue, and explicit opposition to
coercion and the use of force. In April 2001, the Bush
administration approved the largest arms sale to Taiwan
in over a decade. Taiwan's defense minister, Tang
Yaoming, was granted permission to travel to the US in
March 2002 and met with high-ranking US officials. The
US and Taiwan are also engaged in substantive
discussions on boosting bilateral defense cooperation.
All of these developments add substance to President
Bush's controversial statement that the United States
would do "whatever it takes" to help Taiwan defend
itself.
The September 11, 2001, terrorist
attacks on the US and Washington's focus on combating
global terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction have necessitated changes in the US's
China policy. On the one hand, Beijing's support of
anti-terrorism campaigns and its pro-active role in
defusing the North Korean nuclear crisis are much
appreciated by Washington. On the other hand, the Bush
administration has become more sensitive to cross-Strait
situations, and on occasion has shown its disapproval of
what it considers to be Taipei's reckless and
provocative postures that could disrupt the status quo
and create unnecessary tension at a time when American
focus and capabilities are engaged elsewhere.
For the short- to medium-term, the best chance
for cross-Strait peace and stability remains cool-headed
handling of the complex triangular relationships and
resistance to unilateral actions. The strategy of
economic integration may be more favored by Beijing but
economic interdependence itself cannot resolve the
identity/sovereignty issue. Confidence building and
political dialogue are important elements that need to
be brought into the processes to develop and promote
frameworks that could provide greater stability and
security for all concerned. Time would also provide the
cushion against which future deliberation of the
cross-Strait issue could be conducted.
The two
sides of the Taiwan Strait should seek the opportunity
to promote the common interests and positive aspects as
laid out in both the mainland statement and Chen's
inaugural speech. That should be key task in the next
four years for both Beijing and Taipei.
Jing-dong Yuan, PhD, is director of
research for the East Asia Nonproliferation Program at
the Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey
Institute of International Studies.
Speaking Freely is an Asia Times
Online feature that allows guest writers to have their
say. Please click hereif you
are interested in contributing.
