China-Taiwan: Talking the talk, walking
the walk By Li Jing
HONG KONG
- When it comes to Taiwan, especially Taiwan
independence, China now appears to be really talking the
talk, and it may well be willing to walk the walk - and
pay the price.
As evidenced by its recent fierce
rhetoric, Beijing has adopted a harsh new Taiwan policy
and come up with new tactics to deal with the island and
its re-elected pro-independence President Chen
Shui-bian, who in his inaugural address last week
carefully extended olive branches. These were dismissed
on Monday by China's leadership as inadequate, insincere
and a cloak for despicable independence-leaning
intentions.
Taiwan Affairs Office spokesman
Zhang Mingqing declared that China would "completely
annihilate" any moves toward Taiwanese independence, no
matter what the cost, even the loss of the Summer
Olympic Games to be held in Beijing in 2008 - a clearly
implied reference to possible military action if
necessary. Earlier China had said it would even
sacrifice ties with the United States to regain Taiwan.
"Chen Shui-bian is on the road to independence.
This is a very dangerous road. If he doesn't rein in his
horses, then our only choice is to pay whatever price is
necessary to safeguard national sovereignty and
territorial integrity," Zhang told a press conference.
Chen must accept Beijing's "one-China policy", he said.
Chen refuses.
China's reaction - a new tougher
stand, both publicly and in private - reflects the
subtle relations between Chinese President Hu Jintao and
his still powerful predecessor Jiang Zemin, head of the
Chinese Communist Party's Central Military Commission.
This complex personal and political dynamic is a major
factor in developing a new hardline Taiwan policy, Asia
Times Online has been told by informed sources close to
the discussions and speaking on condition of anonymity.
Last Thursday, President Chen was sworn into
another four-year term. A strong advocate of Taiwan's
independence, he is expected to continue wrestling with
Beijing, especially for his constitutional-reform agenda
set to be accomplished by 2008, which is seen by Beijing
as "a de facto independence timetable" according to its
public denunciation on Monday. Chen was careful to say,
however, that constitutional reform would not address
sovereignty, territory, the actual name of the state
(now called the Republic of China) or other contentious
issues. Still, any constitutional debate - and the
notions that Taiwan could have a genuine constitution
and hold referendums - are odious to Beijing.
China, successful in controlling the terms of
the debate, calls Taiwan a "renegade" province that must
return to the embrace of the benevolent motherland. Many
Taiwanese, however, see themselves as part of a
separate, sovereign nation with a distinct, native
Taiwanese identity.
Top Beijing consensus on
tough stand on Chen The sources told Asia Times
Online that Beijing's top echelon had reached a
consensus on its Taiwan strategy for Chen's second term
of 2004-2008:
First, it will abandon its previous policy of
"listening to Chen's words and watching Chen's
behaviors".
Second, it will step up its efforts to deter Chen
from pushing ahead with constitutional reform through
referendum. The mainland has been an outspoken critic of
the island's previous referendum held concurrently with
the presidential election on March 20. That referendum
asked voters about China's policy of targeting nearly
500 missiles at Taiwan from the nearby mainland, and
adding about 75 missiles a year. Specifically, voters
were asked whether Beijing should be requested to
redirect the missiles and, if Beijing refused, whether
Taiwan should try to acquire advanced anti-missile and
other defensive technology. Of those who voted, 87
percent supported the referendum, but it was not valid
because less than the required 50 percent of all
registered voters cast referendum ballots when they
voted separately for president, re-electing Chen.
Third, Beijing vows to take preemptive actions
against Taiwan, hoping to regain the initiative in the
cross-Strait relationship.
China might pass a
law mandating unification Demonstrating these
principles is Beijing's recent announcement that it is
seriously mulling the introduction of a law mandating
eventual unification with Taiwan, a move widely seen to
be an effort to counteract Chen's constitutional reform
(read perceived "independence") agenda.
On May
9, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao, when meeting Chinese
Embassy officials, businessmen and students in London as
part of his 10-day European visit, promised to give
serious thought to the legislation on unification,
suggested by one lawmaker. The premier is China's first
top leader to make a formal response to the proposal.
Some Chinese pundits made a similar proposal for the
first time last year. It is expected that Wen's open
support could accelerate the drafting of the law for the
next National People's Congress.
China earlier
had discussed enacting such a reunification law, but at
that time it was effectively argued that the timing and
setting a rigid timetable would be an embarrassment to
Beijing. If it set a timetable, or if it sounded
uncompromising on unspecified but early unification,
China might have placed itself in a political and
diplomatic corner, vis-a-vis Taiwan, the US and other
states, making it difficult to make timely calibrations
and adjustments to its policies on unification because
of fickle positions on both sides and changeable
cross-Strait ties.
However, the proposition of
legislation mandating unification is gaining momentum,
especially after Chen, a bigoted separatist in Beijing's
eyes, successfully defended his presidency (he won
narrowly) and continued to call for what China sees as a
pro-independence constitution.
Besides the
political countermeasures, China will take preemptive
measures on the diplomatic and military front.
In the past, Beijing has always played the same
old tune - it reiterated the "one China" principle and
issued stern warnings to Taipei - whenever it perceived
extraordinary movements or pro-independence rhetoric on
the other side of the Taiwan Strait. The new preemptive
doctrine - enshrined by neo-conservatives in the United
States after the September 11, 2001, attacks on the
World Trade Center in New York and on the Pentagon near
Washington - facilitated a change in Beijing's modus
operandi: from passive posture to active.
Now
that the Beijing leadership caucus in charge of Taiwan
affairs is headed by President and Chinese Communist
Party secretary general Hu Jintao, a statement released
on May 17 by the Taiwan Affairs Office is considered
most significant and authoritative policy on
cross-Strait relations since he came to power just over
a year ago. That statement emphasized the paramount
importance of reunification of Taiwan, China's
unshakable and military commitment to achieve it if
necessary. And he declared that China would not hesitate
to sacrifice other ties, including relations with the
US, to achieve unification with the island.
Jiang watching for Hu's Taiwan
missteps Hu's predecessor, Jiang Zemin, now
chairman of the powerful party military commission, is
closely watching Hu for any possible missteps in
handling Taiwan affairs, an insider told ATol.
By taking a so-called preemptive measure, Hu is
trying to reach consensus with his colleagues on the
decision-making Standing Committee of the Politburo
before any difficult Taiwan situation develops. And he
appears to be succeeding in large part. With the
mainland's more aggressive Taiwan action plan adopted by
the Standing Committee, Hu can avoid being blamed by
Jiang, even when the Taiwan problem develops adversely
and is clearly beyond his control, a Beijing official
said on condition of anonymity.
To inoculate
himself further from being the scapegoat in a possibly
failed Taiwan policy, Hu's so-called new Taiwan policy,
as enunciated above (stop just listening and watching,
thwart Taiwanese constitutional reform and take
preemptive actions), has also inherited the essence of
what Jiang proclaimed on January 30, 1995, Beijing
sources added. The previous Jiang administration
appeared to have been dodging the intractable Taiwan
problem. Having inherited the Taiwan hot potato,
President Hu has decided to seize the initiative,
adopting a clear-cut strategy to rein in the island.
Prior to Chen's inauguration, Beijing's Taiwan
Affairs Office released a statement on May 17, outlining
future cross-Strait relations. The statement is based on
the Politburo's consensus.
No matter who holds power in Taiwan in the
next four years, as long as they recognize that there
is only one China in the world and both the mainland
and Taiwan belong to that one and same China, abandon
the "Taiwan independence" stance and stop the
separatist activities, then cross-Strait relations can
hold out a bright prospect of peace, stability and
development along the following seven lines:
Resumption of cross-Strait dialogue and
negotiations, formal ending of the state of hostility
through equal-footed consultations, establishing a
mechanism of mutual trust in military field, and
jointly building a framework for peaceful, stable and
growing cross-Strait relations.
Maintaining close links in an appropriate manner
between the two sides of the Strait so as to address
the problems in cross-Strait relations through timely
consultations.
Realizing comprehensive, direct and two-way "three
links" so as to facilitate commerce, trade, exchanges,
travel, tourism and other activities by compatriots on
both sides.
Establishing a closer economic-cooperation
arrangement on the basis of reciprocity and mutual
benefit. Taiwan can optimize its industrial structure
and upgrade its enterprise competitiveness in the
course of cross-Strait economic exchanges and
cooperation and join the mainland in meeting the
challenges of economic globalization and regional
integration. Taiwan can also acquire greater market
access to the mainland for its agricultural products.
Increasing exchanges between the compatriots on
the two sides of the Strait in the interest of
removing misunderstanding, enhancing mutual trust and
building common ground.
The Taiwan compatriots can realize their
aspirations for cross-Strait peace, social stability
and economic prosperity while enjoying harmony and
tranquility in cross-Strait ties.
Properly addressing, through consultations, the
issue of international living space of the Taiwan
region commensurate with its status so as to share the
dignity of the Chinese nation.
While
reiterating its usual dictum, the one-China principle,
China has surprised many by refraining from mentioning
its "one country, two systems" proposal, which the late
paramount leader Deng Xiaoping had seen as a solution to
the Taiwan problem. Beijing officials believed that, by
giving priority to bilateral trade, a concern on both
sides of the Taiwan Strait, this more pragmatic posture
would not only enable local Taiwanese business people to
call the tune, but would also curb Chen, who must heed
his pro-China business community.
Obviously,
Beijing is presenting sweets, as usual, to tempt Taiwan,
but with the prerequisite that Chen Shui-bian must not
push for a referendum to establish a new constitution in
his second term. During such a period, the aforesaid
seven lines will be the yardstick of cross-Strait
relations.
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