In the past,
China has undeniably contributed to proliferation,
fueled by its economic reforms, liberalization and
urgent quest for foreign markets for its defense
industrial complex.
According to an analysis
last year presented to Congress by Leonard Spector of
the Monterey Institute Center for Nonproliferation
Studies, "Chinese economic reforms that began in 1979
loosened controls on exports and reduced government
support for China's defense industrial complex. The
result was a surge in Chinese proliferation activity, as
Chinese defense enterprises took advantage of new
opportunities to seek foreign markets for their
products, including exports of ballistic missiles,
nuclear technology, and precursor chemicals and
equipment useful for the production of chemical
weapons." Chinese weapons went to Pakistan, Iran,
Algeria and Saudi Arabia.
But in the past decade
or so China has become much more engaged with the world
community on arms control issues. So how does its record
on nonproliferation look?
The answer is
generally better than Beijing is given credit for. This
contradicts the conventional wisdom on China in regard
to nuclear proliferation, which says that Beijing is a
source of continuing concern. But the conventional
wisdom is wrong.
For example, the latest
biannual report from the US Central Intelligence Agency,
"Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass
Destruction, and Advanced Conventional Munitions",
notes: "Over the past several years, Beijing improved
its nonproliferation posture through commitments to
multilateral arms control regimes, promulgation of
export controls, and strengthened oversight mechanisms."
Even the US State Department's arms control
unit, which under the leadership of neo-conservative
John Bolton, the under secretary of state for arms
control and international security, has been uniformly
hawkish, acknowledges that China has been cooperative
when it comes to nuclear nonproliferation. Testifying
before the House International Relations Committee on
May 18, John S Wolf, assistant secretary for
nonproliferation, noted that the US supported China's
application for formal membership in the Nuclear
Suppliers Group (NSG), also known as the Zangger
Committee. He noted that since the US first suggested
Chinese membership in the NSG in 1994:
First, China promulgated nuclear export controls in
September 1997 and based those controls on an itemized
list that was substantively identical to the trigger
list developed and used by the Nuclear Suppliers Group;
Second, at the October 1997 US/China summit, China
committed publicly not to provide any assistance to
unsafeguarded nuclear facilities and nuclear explosive
programs;
Third, China promised to promulgate strengthened
dual-use controls by the middle of 1998, which it did.
Those dual-use controls employ a control list
substantively identical to the one used by the NSG;
Fourth, China did join the Zangger Committee, or the
NSG, in 1997 and has been a cooperative member ever
since.
The 40-member NSG is comprised of
nuclear-supplier states that have agreed to coordinate
their export controls governing transfers of civilian
nuclear material and technology to prevent nuclear
exports intended for commercial and peaceful purposes
from being used to make nuclear weapons.
Meanwhile, in contrast, the administration of
President George W Bush plans to develop a new
generation of low-yield nuclear weapons, sending the
message that nuclear weapons are a viable tool of war,
and refuses to join the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.
The US position on new mini-nukes has not
escaped Chinese notice. During the first week of the
2004 preparatory committee for the 2005 review
conference of the treaty on the non-proliferation of
nuclear weapons held from April 26 to May 7, China's
ambassador to the UN Conference on Disarmament, Hu
Xiaodi, said: "In this situation, such moves as adopting
pre-emptive strike strategy, explicitly listing other
states as targets and development of new types of
easy-to-use nuclear weapons, and shortening the time of
preparation for nuclear tests not only run counter to
international trend, but also do harm to international
non-proliferation efforts, which is in the interests of
no state."
China explores joining
missile-control group Earlier this year, China
began talks exploring possible membership in the Missile
Technology Control Regime (MTCR). The 33-member MTCR is
an export-control regime that aims to limit the spread
of ballistic and cruise missiles. China agreed in 1991
to abide by the key parameters of the MTCR, but it
continued to exploit loopholes and ambiguities in its
commitments to the US to export missile components and
missile production technology to countries such as
Pakistan and Iran. China exported 34 complete M-11
missiles to Pakistan in 1991-92, its last known
transfers of complete MTCR Category I-class missile
systems.
Even before this, China, in response to
US urging, had moved over the past several years to
bring its national export controls into line with those
of MTCR members. In November 2000, Beijing declared that
it would not assist other states in acquiring missiles
capable of delivering a nuclear warhead. That pledge was
defined as applying to missiles capable of delivering a
500-kilogram payload 300 kilometers or more - the same
formulation that appears in MTCR guidelines. Then, in
August 2002, China published a list of missile-related
and dual-use goods that required government approval
before being exported.
China is also very
interested in the Proliferation Security Initiative, a
US-led multilateral effort formally announced in May
2003 to interdict shipments of weapons of mass
destruction and related materials. State Department
spokesperson Richard Boucher said on February 17 that
"we have seen progress by China" on proliferation issues
and that China is "very interested in the Proliferation
Security Initiative".
On April 12 Beijing issued
a white paper on China's non-proliferation policy and
measures. It specified many of China's actions in the
areas of nuclear, chemical and biological
nonproliferation, including:
Joining the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) in 1984, and voluntarily placing its civilian
nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards;
Acceding to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in 1992;
Taking an active part in the negotiations of the
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) at the
Conference on Disarmament in Geneva and being among the
first countries to sign CTBT in 1996;
Signing the Protocol Additional to the Agreement
Between China and IAEA for the Application of Safeguards
in China in 1998, and in early 2002 formally completing
the domestic legal procedures necessary for the entry
into force of the additional protocol, thus becoming the
first nuclear-weapon state to complete the relevant
procedures;
Participating constructively in the missile field in
the work of the United Nations Group of Governmental
Experts on Missiles, as well as the international
discussions on the draft of the International Code of
Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation and the
proposal of a Global Control System.
Chinese
strengthens export controls In recent years China
has passed the following laws and regulations to
strengthen its export control system:
Circular on Strict Implementation of China's Nuclear
Export Policy, May 1997;
Regulations on Nuclear Export Control, September
1997 (Note: The control list included in the 1997
regulations is identical to that used by the Nuclear
Suppliers Group, which China joined this month.)
Regulations on Export Control of Dual-Use Nuclear
Goods and Related Technologies, June 1998;
Nuclear export control list as amended, June 28,
2001.
Of course, like that of every other
country, China's record is not spotless. Towards the end
of the 1980s, revelations of Chinese nuclear and missile
transfers to countries in the Middle East, the Persian
Gulf and South Asia raised serious proliferation
concerns and were a contributing factor in the "China
threat" debate in the US. Among the controversial
Chinese arms transfers were the sale of the Dong Feng 3
(CSS-2) intermediate-range ballistic missiles to Saudi
Arabia, HY-2 (Silkworm) anti-ship missiles to Iran, the
nuclear reactor deal with Algeria, and missile-related
transfers to Pakistan.
Still, its actions to
date tend to confirm the analysis of a past evaluation
by the Center for International Trade and Security at
the University of Georgia, which found that China's
nonproliferation export controls continue to become more
compatible with emerging multilateral standards,
especially in the area of nuclear export controls.
The analysis also found that China had become
more willing to adopt policies that impose real costs on
its enterprises in order to meet its international
nonproliferation commitments. In recent years, China has
moved beyond the symbolic acts of treaty ratification to
implement its nonproliferation obligations. It has,
among other actions, halted sales of some sensitive
items, imposed new systems of licensing with
considerable administrative costs, and placed its
military industries under more civilian control.
Tomorrow: Part 3: Pointing
fingers
David Isenberg, a senior
analyst with the Washington-based British American
Security Information Council (BASIC), has a wide
background in arms control and national security issues.
The views expressed are his own.
(Copyright
2004 Asia Times Online, Ltd. All rights reserved. Please
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PART 2: All the right
noises
