Proliferation is in the eye of
the beholder. Or, put another way, it is relative,
meaning that before one passes judgment on a state for
what it has done in proliferating nuclear weapons
exports, or not done in stemming such exports, one would
be well advised to look at what other states have been
doing, or not doing.
For some, China's actions
are worrisome. The second annual report of the US-China
Economic and Security Review Commission, released on
June 15, stated, "China's continued failure to
adequately curb its proliferation practices poses
significant national security concerns to the United
States."
That may be, but China is hardly alone.
Consider Pakistan, for example. For years it's been the
world's worst kept secret that Pakistan helped develop
nuclear programs in Iran, North Korea and probably in
Libya.
After September 11, 2001, the news media
reported that two Pakistani scientists had direct
contacts with Osama bin Laden while he was operating in
Afghanistan. Investigators later alleged that Abdul
Qadeer Khan, the father of Pakistan's nuclear program,
had traveled almost a dozen times to North Korea to help
Pyongyang develop a uranium-enrichment program. And
International Atomic Energy Agency officials reported
that uranium-enrichment equipment inspected in Iran was
identical to that found in Pakistan.
Though it
now seems like years ago, it was only last February 4
that Khan gave a speech, broadcast on Pakistan
television, in which he apologized for having
transferred nuclear secrets to other countries.
The recent investigation was ordered by the
government of Pakistan consequent to the disturbing
disclosures and evidence by some countries to
international agencies relating to alleged proliferation
activities by certain Pakistanis and foreigners over the
last two decades. The investigation has established that
many of the reported activities did occur, and that
these were initiated at the behest of this writer.
In interviews with the concerned government
officials, this writer was confronted with the evidence
and the findings and voluntarily admitted that much of
it was true and accurate. Khan's revelations that he
operated a huge black market in nuclear materials and
technology and supplied uranium-enrichment technology to
Libya, Iran, and North Korea confirmed everyone's worst
fears: that a huge arsenal of nuclear material and
technology is diffused without control.
In
October 2002 North Korea reportedly admitted it had a
clandestine uranium-enrichment program and the press
reported that Pakistan had exchanged centrifuge
enrichment technology for North Korean help in
developing longer range missiles. But last November the
Washington Post reported that the administration of US
President George W Bush had evidence that Pakistan aided
North Korea's suspected nuclear weapons program as
recently as last August.
Publicly, the United
States has said that while Pakistan aided North Korea's
nuclear weapons efforts in the past, Islamabad had cut
off assistance after the September 11, 2001, terrorist
attacks on the US. The White House is said to believe,
however, that Pakistan continued to exchange technical
nuclear information, and possibly materials, in exchange
for missile components until last summer.
According to the US Congressional Research
Service, by the time Pakistan probably needed to pay
North Korea for its purchase of medium-range No Dong
missiles in the mid-1990s (upon which its current Ghauri
missiles are based), Pakistan's cash reserves were low.
With its nuclear tests in 1998 Pakistan could offer
North Korea a route to nuclear weapons using highly
enriched uranium (HEU) that would circumvent the
plutonium-focused 1994 Agreed Framework signed with the
United States and would be difficult to detect.
Given how loudly the United States sounds the
alarm about proliferation, it is worth noting that its
own record on proliferation is far from spotless.
In December 2002, The Associated Press stated,
dozens of suppliers, most in Europe, the United States
and Japan, provided the components and know-how Saddam
Hussein needed to build an atomic bomb, according to
Iraq's 1996 accounting of its nuclear program.
Iraq's report says the equipment was either sold
or made by more than 30 German companies, 10 American
companies, 11 British companies and a handful of Swiss,
Japanese, Italian, French, Swedish and Brazilian firms.
It says more than 30 countries supplied its nuclear
program.
And in late 2002, Iraq delivered a
report to the United Nations, pursuant to a Security
Council resolution, in an attempt to avert a US
invasion. US officials intercepted the report and
removed certain sections, based on claims of "national
security". It turned out that the deleted sections
involved the delivery of those weapons of mass
destruction (WMD) components and equipment by the United
States and other Western countries to Saddam Hussein. A
February 3, 2003, Sunday Morning Herald article
reported, "What is known is that the 10 non-permanent
[Security Council] members had to be content with an
edited, scaled-down version. According to the German
news agency DPA, instead of the 12,000 pages, these
nations - including Germany, which this month became
president of the council - were given only 3,000 pages."
So what was missing? The Guardian reported that
the nine-page table of contents included chapters on
"procurements" in Iraq's nuclear program and "relations
with companies, representatives and individuals" for its
chemical weapons program. This information was not
included in the edited, scaled-down version.
On
nuclear arms control initiatives, the US has also proven
itself an obstructionist. Last December, when the UN
General Assembly voted on resolutions on disarmament and
security, the United States consistently voted against
the most important resolutions on nuclear disarmament:
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty: The US cast the only
vote against this resolution calling for bringing the
CTBT into force. It was adopted by a vote of 173-1, with
four abstentions;
Path to the total elimination of nuclear weapons:
The US and India were the only countries to vote against
this resolution. Sponsored by Japan, it called for
compliance with the program for transparent, verified,
and irreversible reduction and elimination of nuclear
forces agreed by all states (including the United
States) participating in the 2000 Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) review conference. It was
adopted by a vote of 164-2, with 14 abstentions;
New agenda for a nuclear-weapon-free world:
Sponsored by Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New
Zealand, Sweden and South Africa, this resolution
centered on a call for compliance with the 2000 NPT
program and also addressed missile defenses,
weaponization of outer space, and reduction of
non-strategic weapons. It was adopted by a vote of
128-6, with 41 abstentions. The negative votes were cast
by the United States, France, India, Israel, Pakistan
and the United Kingdom;
Obligation of nuclear disarmament: Paragraph one of
the resolution on follow-up to the 1996 opinion of the
International Court of Justice underscores the court's
unanimous conclusion that there is an obligation to
pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion
negotiations on nuclear disarmament in all its aspects.
In a separate vote, the paragraph was approved by a vote
of 165-4, with three abstentions. The four countries
voting "no" were the United States, France, Israel and
Russia.
This concludes the three-part
report
David Isenberg, a senior
analyst with the Washington-based British American
Security Information Council (BASIC), has a wide
background in arms control and national security issues.
The views expressed are his own.
(Copyright
2004 Asia Times Online, Ltd. All rights reserved. Please
contact content@atimes.com for
information on our sales and syndication policies.)
Part 3: Pointing
fingers
