Power struggle in Beijing: Hu vs
Jiang By Wang Chu
HONG KONG -
China watchers, the Zhongnanhai watchers, like Kremlin
watchers before them, scrutinize the comings and goings
of leaders, their lineup for official photos, changes in
their positions and especially their non-appearance. And
their changed schedules, too, are scrutinized, like
entrails, for what the reconfiguration may or may not
mean in terms of the Chinese leadership, who holds
power, whose grip is getting stronger and whose is
slipping. Slight discrepancies and nuances in protocol
open vast horizons of speculation - and so it is today.
Transparency doesn't translate well into Chinese.
Some Chinese call it "wrestling", some just
call it a struggle in the corridors of power.
On June 28, Chinese President Hu Jintao
abruptly canceled his planned attendance at the 28th session
of the World Heritage Committee (WHC) held in the
eastern Chinese city of Suzhou and only addressed the
meeting with a written statement. Generally speaking, the
host country's head of state usually makes a presentation
at major WHC meetings worldwide, as did French
President Jacques Chirac at the previous session in Paris the
previous June.
In fact, Hu chose to stay in Beijing and
entertain the visiting Argentine President Nestor
Kirchner. Political commentators point out that the
shift in his schedule and protocol is a result of the
recently intensified wrestling, or power struggle,
between Hu and the former president Jiang Zemin, the
country's commander-in-chief and chairman of its highest
military body, the Communist Party's Central Military
Commission (CMC). Jiang holds significant influence in
the corridors of power in Beijing. It seems quite
plausible that Hu would change his agenda to meet a
friendly state's president, but knowledgeable sources
told Asia Times Online that there was "an inside story
behind the shift".
It's not easy
to unearth the "inside story", but one thing is for sure:
Hu is now busy hedging his bets and
countering his predecessor's recent moves, in an effort to increase
his own influence in Beijing. Maybe it was better politically
to remain in Beijing than to visit Suzhou.
But being president isn't everything.
According to precedent and tradition, China's
president should control the Central Military
Commission and be the commander-in-chief. Not now; this
is an anomaly, and everyone knows it. The powerful
ex-president Jiang controls the military commission, not
President Hu.
On June 20, Jiang promoted 15
military officials to full general, including his top
bodyguard You Xigui, an unprecedented elevation widely
believed to consolidate his control over the military.
The upgrade ran counter to relevant regulations, since a
serviceman in You's position, director of of the central
bodyguards bureau, is seldom elevated to four-star
general.
Only three days later, the
China National Audit Office published its annual
report, exposing corruption-related crimes and breaches of
duty in some of former president Jiang's dominions,
including the banking and communication sectors. In its June
25 editorial, the party's own official Xinhua
News Agency condemned the malpractices found by the
report, called for resolution and moves to tackle these
problems head-on.
Wrestling for dominance in
Beijing In fact, the Hu-Jiang power struggle
began earlier this year. In April, Premier Wen Jiabao,
the incumbent president's ally and part of the
one-year-old Hu-Wen administration, launched a series of
macro-control policies to cool down the country's
red-hot economy, to no avail in quarters such as real
estate, steel and cement. Some measures encountered
powerful resistance, overtly and covertly, by obstinate
Jiang officials who preferred massive, showy, high-cost
projects while the economy was still rising at an
amazing speed. In the first quarter, China's gross
domestic product grew at a rate of 9.7% and the
investment in fixed assets surged by 43% to 879.9
billion yuan (US$106 billion); the rate in January and
February was even higher at 53%.
In view of the
administrative flaws revealed by the audit report,
President Hu is expected to come up with new, pragmatic
reform measures to "enhance the Chinese Communist
Party's governance", which surely will compromise the
vested interests of the pro-Jiang faction. Presumably,
Jiang will not acquiesce to Hu's efforts.
In
a few months, public attention will focus on Jiang
to determine whether he will relinquish his
current position as the country’s commander-in-chief in
the party's upcoming plenum scheduled for this
autumn.
Judging from his recent military
promotions, most political pundits believe Jiang will
not make the final but inevitable handover to Hu any
time soon.
Andrew
Yang,
a Taiwanese expert on the Chinese military,
echoed that opinion, saying that You's promotion was
"a sign Jiang will not leave this year …
There is no need to promote him if there are no
plans to keep him. It creates unnecessary competition."
The power play within Beijing's top echelon, as
always, is expected to go on. Its results will determine
the agenda of the party's plenary session and who will
become the next boss of the armed forces - and when.
Military: Key factor in Hu-Jiang power
play Concerning the evident power play between Hu
and his predecessor Jiang, most analyses focus solely on
their conflicts of interests. However, there is still
some consensus and accommodation between the two
leaders, as Jiang is widely believed to cling to his
control over the military, and both leaders nonetheless
have no choice but to tolerate each other for some time.
A compromise could be sensed at the promotion
ceremony for the military officials held on June 20.
Both Jiang and Hu, his deputy on the CMC, attended the
ceremony. The official Xinhua news agency emphasized
that the elevations were announced jointly by Hu and
Jiang, issuing certificates to the new generals in
person.
Though the
promotion of You is seen as a sweeping
victory for Jiang, some of those who advanced to general
are considered part of President Hu's camp.
One
of Hu's men is Zhu Qi, the commander of the Beijing
Military Zone, the most politically important military
zone among a total of seven nationwide. According to
Chinese military rules, anyone upgraded to four-star
general must meet two requirements: holding positions
for one or two years in China's major military regions
and being lieutenant general for at least four years.
Zhu was only made commander of the Beijing Military Zone
last year, and so his rise to full general is considered
to be thanks to Hu's intervention.
Before ascending to the presidency, Hu was the party
chief in the country's far-flung areas of Guizhou and
Tibet between the late 1980s and early 1990s, when Zhu
began to climb the military ladder in the Chengdu
Military Zone covering the two regions. Zhu provided
significant help to Hu to rein in the riots ignited by
restive Tibetan lamas and those unhappy with Chinese
rule. After Hu became the vice chairman of party's CMC
in 1999, he stepped up his efforts to extend his
influence throughout the military. Now Zhu is reaping
his rewards.
Another staunch supporter of
President Hu is Ge Zhenfeng, deputy chief of the general
staff since 2002; Ge is very close to Chief of General
Staff Liang Guanglie, one of Hu's stalwart supporters.
Nonetheless, the former president benefits most
from the recent promotions, further strengthening his
control over the military. According to some political
pundits, Hu is still no match for his predecessor Jiang
in terms of military connections, a situation that, some
say, is conducive to the stability and balance of the
Chinese military.
Yet Hu still holds
an ace: his right-hand man Song Defu. In 1985, when Hu
left his domain, the Communist Youth League (CYL), a
cradle where senior party officials are nurtured, he
recommended Song to replace him as the chief of CYL.
When Hu finally entered the standing committee of the
Politburo in 1992, he soon helped Song take up both of
the state and military positions in charge of personnel
appointment.
Song's experience as a
serviceman for over 28 years is welcome additional
political capital for Hu, who actually has few effective
connections with the military. So it was a serious loss
for Hu when Song took ill last year and had to
relinquish his position as the party chief of Fujian, a
developed province along China's southeast coast.
Political commentators hold that the power of
the pro-Hu camp will be significantly enhanced if Song
manages to recover and return to the political arena in
Beijing. If so, he presents a formidable deterrence to
Jiang's clique. Unfortunately, when and even if he can
pull through is still a big question.
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