Time for a new Marco Polo Friendship
Bridge By Jing-dong Yuan
MONTEREY, California - This week marked the 67th
anniversary of the Marco Polo Bridge (Lugou Qiao)
Incident when the Japanese military launched the all-out
invasion of China, thus beginning the eight years of the
Chinese People's War of Resistance against Japanese
Aggression (1937-45) and bringing China into World War
II. The date was July 7, 1937.
The Sino-Japanese
War was an unfortunate episode, and still vivid, in the
chronicle of these two nations dating back millennia.
However, the imprint of history has always cast a long
shadow over the bilateral relationship. Indeed, the two
recent anniversaries that deserved much celebration -
the 30th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic
relations between Beijing and Tokyo (1972-2002) and the
25th anniversary of the Sino-Japanese Treaty of Peace
and Friendship (1978-2003) passed with only low-key
observation.
It's time for new bridges, of
political understanding, genuine cooperation, concession
and enlightened leadership to close the gaps, to be
built from both sides. Maybe they would meet somewhere
in the mutual center of common interests.
Almost
six decades after the conclusion of World War II and 15
years since the end of the Cold War, Asia's two great
powers remain estranged from each other politically even
as their economic ties are growing at a fast pace. This
detachment of the political relationship from the
economic and cultural nexus marks a unique yet
disquieting bilateral relationship, unlike those between
most other major powers.
Indeed, the contrast
could not have been greater. On the economic front,
Sino-Japanese bilateral trade reached US$133.5 billion
in 2003, an unprecedented net increase of $31 billion
over the previous year, making Japan China's largest
trading partner, according to Chinese statistics.
Japanese investment in China has also been growing in
the past few years, with auto and electronics
manufacturers among the sectors that have relocated
significantly to China and opened branches. While
reduced in recent years, Japan's Official Development
Assistance (ODA) to China remains sizable.
In
addition to the growing economic interdependence, social
and cultural exchanges also continue unabated. Two
hundred twenty pairs of sister provinces/cities have
been established since normalization of diplomatic
relations in 1972. Eighty thousand Chinese students are
studying in Japan, accounting for almost 70% of all
foreign students in the country.
However, the
bilateral relationship remains tenuous and deep distrust
between the two countries prevents a Franco-German-type
entente in Asia. There are historical and geostrategic
reasons, as well as territorial disputes, for continued
suspicion and misgivings toward each other. The Japanese
invasion 67 years ago and the 14 years of occupation of
China (1931-45) inflicted deep wounds on the Chinese
people.
While successive postwar Japanese
governments have made apologies in various forms, Tokyo
has yet to convince China and many Asian countries that
it has indeed repented and learned the lesson of
history. Indeed, the lingering suspicion has only been
reinforced from time to time by the actions of
right-wing Japanese politicians and groups, epitomized
in some Japanese government officials' (especially prime
ministers and cabinet members) visits to the Yasukuni
Shrine where 14 Class A war criminals are buried among
the 2.5 million dead. Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro
Koizumi has made the most visits to the shrine, at least
four, causing great controversies and resulting in the
cancellation of his summit visit to China.
The
historical legacy in Sino-Japanese relations was further
highlighted by the incident last August in Qiqihar,
northeastern China, where Japanese abandoned chemical
weapons (ACW) left over from World War II killed several
Chinese residents. The incident again reminds the
Chinese people of the Japanese atrocities during the war
when chemical and biological warfare and experiments
were carried out against innocent civilians.
Dissatisfied with Japan's attitude toward
history, Beijing has also in recent years become
increasingly concerned over what it considers Tokyo's
intention to revise its "peace constitution" renouncing
war and all combat by Japanese forces except in
self-defense. China is also suspicious of Japan's role
in Northeast Asian security and its seeking
normal-country status. Beijing is closely monitoring the
expanded role of the Japanese Self-Defense Force since
the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks against the
United States, including the dispatch of SDF personnel
overseas beyond UN-sponsored peacekeeping operations.
Chinese commentators suggest that Tokyo is using this
and the North Korean nuclear crisis as pretexts not only
to become a "normal" country but also to embark on a
path of remilitarization.
Japan likewise is wary
of China's growing military and economic power; in
particular the latter's increasing defense budgets and
its nuclear and strategic ballistic-missile
modernization. The recently released US Department of
Defense annual report on China's military power suggests
that some of China's short-range missiles are targeted
at US forces in Okinawa. There are growing voices within
Japan against the continued Japanese ODA to China,
largely because of these developments.
China and
Japan have yet to resolve their territorial disputes
over the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands. Tokyo reacts strongly
to what it considers serious intrusions into its
territorial waters by Chinese maritime survey ships.
Beijing is angered by the Japanese government's
acquiescence in allowing right-wing Japanese groups, and
some politicians, to conduct provocative activities.
Offshore developments of oilfields along continental
shelves cause additional disputes over the reaches of
the exclusive economic zones in areas where Chinese and
Japanese territorial waters overlap.
This
tenuous nature of the bilateral relationship does not
bode well for regional peace and stability. Beijing and
Tokyo must make greater efforts to address these issues
to dispel mutual suspicions and misunderstanding and
chart a new course for bilateral relations in the coming
years.
The two countries should strive to
restore the old traditions of regular high-level
exchanges to promote common interests. While growing
economic interdependence provides the necessary
foundation for a closer bilateral relationship, the
leaders in both countries must realize that they also
need to devote political capital to nurture such a
relationship. The ASEAN-plus-three (Association of
Southeast Asian Nations plus China, South Korea and
Japan) sessions, the China-Japan-South Korea summits,
and the six-party talks on on defusing the North Korean
nuclear crisis are indicative of many of the common
interests of China and Japan and they provide venues for
greater consultation and cooperation.
There are
additional common interests shared by the two countries.
These include energy security, human security, regional
economic integration and environmental protection. All
of these issues require the two countries to work
together closely.
Promoting better understanding
among the two countries' young and future generations of
leaders, as Zhou Enlai, Liao Chengzhi, Hu Yaobang,
Kakuei Tanaka, Masayoshi Ohira, Takeo Fukuda Tanaka, and
Yasuhiro Nakasone did in the 1970s and 1980s, could
build the bridges to close the gaps in different
perspectives. That remains a daunting challenge, as
leaders in both countries face growing domestic
sentiments and pressures, not always conducive to
cooperation. However, this is what leadership is about.
Until a true entente between China and Japan can
be established, real peace and lasting prosperity in
East Asia will likely remain elusive. The Marco Polo
Bridge Incident reminds us of an unfortunate episode in
the past, and the best way to mark the occasion is to
find a way, a bridge for the future. This is a historic
responsibility that both Beijing and Tokyo are obligated
to undertake.
Jing-dong Yuan is
director of research for the East Asia Nonproliferation
Program at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies,
Monterey Institute of International Studies.
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