Beijing's balancing act in Hong
Kong By Bruce Klingner
The
massive demonstrations in Hong Kong early this month
highlighted the depth of the populace's continuing
passion for democracy, but the amorphous nature of the
movement will likely hinder its ability to manifest
change. Last year's July protest was directed primarily
against local authorities, driven by outrage over the
Article 23 anti-sedition law and exacerbated by a
combination of unease over Hong Kong's ailing economy,
anger over government ineptitude in responding to the
SARS (severe acute respiratory syndrome) outbreak, and
continuing animosity toward Chief Executive Tung
Chee-hwa. Pro-democracy forces, emboldened by their
success in forcing the government to rescind plans to
implement Article 23 and a strong showing in district
elections in November, generated larger-than-expected
New Year's Day demonstrations in response to Tung's
deferral of a timetable for democratic reform.
The view from Beijing The Chinese
leadership is attempting to combat the influence of the
growing pro-democracy movement by establishing the
parameters within which allowable political debate could
occur. Beijing initially adopted a low-profile policy,
allowing Tung to bear the brunt of criticism, while
periodically issuing veiled warnings. President Hu
Jintao commented last year that he was "very concerned"
about political developments and warned that reform in
the territory must be "orderly and gradual". Hu
emphasized that Beijing "cares deeply about the
situation in Hong Kong [which must remain] stable".
Chinese officials stressed that Hong Kong's
constitutional development should be "gradual and
orderly" and that economic stability in Hong Kong takes
precedence over democracy.
Beijing's dispatch of
legal scholars, including authors of Hong Kong's Basic
Law constitution, to the territory at the beginning of
the year signaled an intent to influence Hong Kong's
future more openly and reflected increasing anxiety over
the region's push toward greater democracy and the
potential for a spillover to the mainland. Xiao Weiyun,
a law professor at Beijing University, infuriated
residents by stating that it might be "unconstitutional"
to introduce full democracy in Hong Kong for at least
another 30 years.
The National People's Congress
(NPC) consequently issued its interpretation of the
Basic Law, announcing that it retained exclusive rights
to amend the document. Qiao Xiaoyang, deputy secretary
general of the NPC's Standing Committee, emphasized that
"a locality has no fixed power. All powers of the
locality derive from the authorization of the central
authorities."
Beijing's increasingly strident
media campaign served to articulate its concern over
developments in Hong Kong and unambiguously warn
reformers that demands for accelerated democracy were
"unpatriotic" and akin to a call for independence - a
clear red line for the Chinese leadership. Moreover,
China's accusations of collusion between Hong Kong
reformers and Taiwanese separatists, as well as
suggestions of involvement by foreign governments,
underscored its apprehension over the situation.
Hong Kong pro-democracy forces It is a
mistake to think of the Hong Kong democratic movement as
single entity striving toward a common objective.
Instead, it is an amorphous collection of groups and
individuals who share goals but differ over the means to
attain them. The scope of the rallies reflects
democracy's appeal but participants range from
pro-democracy groups vocal in their criticism of Beijing
and adamant in their demands for universal suffrage to
citizens angered over China's perceived reneging of
promises contained in the Basic Law but unwilling to
launch a rebellion.
Taiwan The shadow
of China's other troublesome renegade looms large over
Hong Kong. Beijing is concerned that the two issues are
inextricably linked, with gains made by anti-China
groups in one region emboldening those in the other.
Taiwan President Chen Shui-bian's quest for independence
and increasingly strident denunciations of the "failure"
of Beijing's "one country, two systems" policy have
emboldened pro-democracy groups in Hong Kong while
concurrently strengthening Beijing's resolve to assert
its control over the region.
The parallel
dilemmas of Taiwan and Hong Kong pose serious
difficulties for the Chinese leadership, as it must
consider that Chen's separatist movement could result in
military tensions or hostilities with Taipei and
Washington while pro-democracy forces in Hong Kong risk
contagion to the mainland. Beijing will have to weigh
the negative ramifications of strong action in Hong Kong
on its efforts to woo Taiwan toward reunification as
well as leverage international pressure to force Chen
away from his independence goal.
An
irresistible force meets an immovable object The
most likely scenario for the near term is a continuation
of the uneasy status quo, but China watchers are less
sanguine in their longer-term predictions. The
Legislative Council elections on September 12 will
likely result in an increase in seats for democratic
groups, providing a stronger voice advocating universal
suffrage by 2007. The Chinese and Hong Kong governments
will retain the upper hand, however, and will continue
to use legalistic means provided by the Basic Law to
constrain democratic progress.
The scenario that
everyone fears is, of course, another Tiananmen Square,
but memories of that tragic incident will serve to
constrain more extreme measures by both sides. That
said, Beijing may eventually lose patience, especially
if Hong Kong democrats or Taiwan independence activists
go beyond a Chinese red line. An added danger is that
Beijing may miscalculate the extent of Hong Kong's
impetus for democracy. The leadership was reportedly
surprised by the scope of the 2003 and 2004 protests and
may be basing its calculations on faulty information or
interpretations. Moreover, China's leadership has
generally responded slowly and ineffectively during
crises because of its slow, consensus-building style of
policymaking. Reports of a continuing leadership
struggle between President Hu Jintao and his predecessor
Jiang Zemin, now chairman of the Central Military
Commission, would hinder decision-making and might force
Hu to implement strong measures to protect his political
flank against the conservative faction.
Faced
with the likelihood of additional demonstrations,
Beijing will struggle with conflicting goals of delaying
the implementation of democracy in Hong Kong while not
inflaming the increasingly volatile situation through
the use of heavy-handed tactics. It will likely continue
its current course of alternating harsh and conciliatory
messages, but such a policy may be insufficient to stave
off a confrontation with the Hong Kong populace.
Bruce Klingner is director of analysis
for Intellibridge Corp in Washington, DC. His areas of
expertise are strategic national security, political and
military affairs in China, Northeast Asia, Korea and
Japan. He can be reached atbklingner@intellibridge.com.
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