Beijing has shown great diplomatic dexterity in
handling the North Korea nuclear-weapons issue. As host
of the six-party talks, the Chinese have played the role
of broker and conciliator, working assiduously to narrow
differences among the parties and find areas of
consensus. As a consequence of its diplomatic efforts,
China has won the praise of all the participants in the
six-party talks, and it has enhanced its regional and
global image as a responsible player in the community of
nations. The six are North and South Korea, China,
Japan, Russia and the United States.
By
contrast, in dealing with Taiwan, Beijing's approach has
been devoid of diplomatic deftness. The ineffectiveness
of China's policies toward Taiwan is increasingly
apparent. In recent years, support for independence on
the island has grown, not diminished. Contrary to
Chinese hopes, economic integration of the two sides of
the Taiwan Strait has not promoted a desire among the
majority of the Taiwan people to merge with the mainland
politically. China has successfully thwarted Taiwan's
efforts to participate in a host of regional and
international organizations, but at the cost of
alienating the people of Taiwan whose hearts and minds
the Chinese seek to win over.
China's
unrelenting military buildup has not deterred Taipei
from pursuing policies that Beijing finds objectionable
and has not dissuaded the Taiwan people from casting
their votes in favor of a president, Chen Shui-bian,
whom China has castigated and refused to deal with.
Beijing's unbending position that cross-Strait dialogue
can only be resumed once Taiwan accepts its "one China"
principle has met with staunch resistance in Taiwan.
If China can apply some of the skillfulness
toward Taiwan that is has demonstrated in managing the
North Korean nuclear challenge, perhaps the impasse in
cross-Strait relations can be broken. A few suggestions
follow.
Dangling carrots to Pyongyang, rather
than brandishing sticks, has been Beijing's preferred
modus operandi. China has provided North Korea with
considerable economic aid as an incentive to remain
engaged in the six-party process and has urged the
United States and other parties to provide enticements
to North Korea to disarm. In dealing with Taipei,
however, China has demonstrated a propensity for
toughness and has offered few, if any, positive
inducements. Moreover, Chinese leaders have harshly
criticized the US for extolling the commitments made by
President Chen in his May inaugural address to revise
the Republic of China constitution according to rules
set out in the existing constitution and its amendments,
and to exclude sensitive issues from the current round
of constitutional revision. The notion of rewarding
North Korean leader Kim Jong-il for good behavior makes
sense to Beijing, but praising Chen for adopting a
conciliatory stance is deemed deplorable because it will
ostensibly embolden him to press forward toward
independence.
Based on North Korea's objections,
the Chinese urged Washington prior to the last round of
six-party talks to modify its stance that North Korea
agree to the complete, verifiable, and irreversible
dismantlement (CVID) of its nuclear programs. Insisting
on that phrase, the Chinese argued, would inhibit any
progress and could even torpedo the talks. The US
administration of President George W Bush agreed to drop
the term, while not abandoning its objectives. In
dealing with Taiwan, Beijing has stuck to its demand
that Taipei accept the "one China" principle, bequeath
sovereignty to China, and agree to unification based on
a formula of "one country, two systems". This is an
offer that has fallen on deaf ears in Taiwan. Like the
US, China should show tactical flexibility and modify
its proposal so that at a minimum, cross-Strait talks
can get under way.
A core component of China's
approach to resolving the North Korea nuclear-weapons
issue is its contention that Pyongyang's feeling of
insecurity is an obstacle to progress. Beijing has
encouraged all parties, the US in particular, to provide
security assurances so that North Korean leaders can be
confident that if they agree to give up their nuclear
deterrent, they will not be the target of military
attack. Similar logic could be applied to Taiwan. An
insecure Taiwan that is threatened with military
coercion and squeezed diplomatically is fearful of
engaging with Beijing. China's growing offensive
military capabilities against the island have generated
interest in Taiwan in procuring weapons to strike
targets on the mainland as part of a retaliatory
strategy or to degrade the People's Liberation Army's
capacity to sustain an attack. China's interests would
be better served by implementing confidence-building
measures and declaring that it will refrain from using
force except under the sole circumstance that Taiwan
declares juridical independence.
Although
Beijing has embraced the six-party-talks process, it
continues to hold that the crux of the North Korean
nuclear-weapons problem is the mutual hostility between
Pyongyang and Washington. To ease their suspicions and
build trust, China seizes every opportunity to get US
and North Korean negotiators to talk bilaterally. It is
no secret that the nub of the cross-Strait deadlock is
also a lack of trust. In the absence of dialogue, it is
hard to envisage how a settlement can be reached.
China's approach to Taiwan is out of step with
its increasingly sophisticated, confident, and skillful
diplomatic practices on a rapidly expanding list of
regional and international issues. By contrast, Chinese
policies toward Taiwan are ham-handed, unimaginative and
counterproductive. Beijing should update its approach to
Taiwan based on lessons drawn from its diplomatic
success in shepherding the six-party talks.
Bonnie S Glaser is a senior associate
with the Washington-based Center for Strategic and
International Studies and with Pacific Forum CSIS in
Honolulu. She can be reached atbglaser6@comcast.net.
This article originally appeared in the South China
Morning Post on July 27 and was made available byPacific Forum CSIS.
