When
China's Xinhua news agency published an adulatory report
of a conference at the seaside resort of Beidaihe on
August 5, [1] I was puzzled. Chinese Communist Party
General Secretary Hu Jintao had banned these meetings as
a waste of money and time - they were boondoggles. And
China's media (at least the press that wasn't totally in
the control of the Central Propaganda Department)
praised President Hu's policy as a "populist measure in
support of good government" (qinmin qinglian).
Now, it is true that Hu is in a weak position.
He is heavily outnumbered in the Politburo of the party
Central Committee by disciples of China's strongman,
Central Military Commission chairman Jiang Zemin (who
was also Hu's predecessor as president and party boss).
But certainly Hu should be given due deference. He is,
after all, the titular chief of the party and the
government.
Hu Jintao's 'populist measure for
good government' Which is why I was bemused that
there was a report of any kind of meeting at Beidaihe, a
famous resort and annual leadership retreat on the Bohai
Gulf, 280 kilometers east of Beijing. I recalled that as
a result of Hu's proscription, most governmental and
party organizations, central and political, had shied
away from Beidaihe. Just to confirm my recollection, I
went to the People's Daily Net (www.peopledaily.com.cn)
and pasted "Cancel Beidaihe to handle affairs"
(quxiao Beidaihe bangong) into the search engine.
Sure enough, a string of stories from the summer of 2003
popped out. In September, for example, there was an
entire issue of the China Economic Review [2] devoted to
the hard times at Beidaihe due to the government
vacation ban. The article's big question: "Would China's
'Summer Capital' become history?"
But as I read,
the history of the cancellation of the Beidaihe meetings
became a bit more complex than I remembered. In late
June 2003, the first announcements of the cancellation
of the meetings "for this summer" were linked to the
epidemic of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS). By
late July, news stories praising the permanent cessation
of the Beidaihe sessions appeared on a number of
websites - none of which was one directly responsible to
the Central Propaganda Department. Three articles in
particular, one in Procuratorial Daily [3], one in China
Youth News [4] and another in Southern Metropolitan
News, [5] were lavish in their praise of Hu's decision.
Southern Metropolitan, for example, spoke of "President
Hu Jintao's commitment to the people", that "power is to
be used for the people, our passion is given to the
people, benefit is sought for the people", and it
described Hu's political ally, Premier Wen Jiabao, as
"the premier of the common man" who "deeply understands
what the people expect".
In addition to this
were interminable message posts from private citizens on
the People's Daily website extolling Messrs Hu and Wen.
One random example [6] said "everyone knows that the
very first official act that Hu Jintao, the new
secretary general of the Chinese Communist Center, did
upon his promotion was not 'to hold a meeting', it was
not 'to research', but rather to go directly to the old
revolutionary base area of Xibopo for a discreet tour in
an effort to see for himself the hardships of 'his
peasant brothers'". This lengthy post went on to blast
away at "privileges, corruption, wealth, influence" of
party officials at the local level, and became
uncomfortably unctuous and obsequious.
But there
it was, and I have no doubt that the writer genuinely
felt these things about China's two moderate leaders.
Both President Hu and Premier Wen had become heroes of
Beijing's anti-SARS campaign in 2003, while Jiang and
his coterie decamped to the relative safety of Shanghai.
One of the most recent Beidaihe posts on
People's Daily site was one dated July 30, 2004, under
the title "Hu Jintao Stresses: Deeply Understand the
Special Points and Discipline of Economic Development".
Almost like an imperial memorial, the anonymous post
addressed Hu, saying, "from Xibopo to fighting SARS,
from reforming the official junket system to canceling
the Beidaihe vacation meetings, we see that self-same
work style of the older generation of proletarian
revolutionaries ... General Secretary, the people
support you!"
Zeng Qinghong goes to Beidaihe
anyway The people may support General Secretary
Hu's work style, but his main rival apparently doesn't.
And for those of you who don't regularly divine the
cracks in bovine scapulae or tortoise plastrons gently
toasted over a Beijing hearth, let me add that Hu's main
rival is his nominal deputy, Vice President Zeng
Qinghong. Zeng is capo de capo of military
commission chairman Jiang's "Shanghai Gang", aka
"Shanghai bang" - the irreverent name for the battalion
of top functionaries in the Chinese Communist Party,
army and government structure who worked with Ziang
Zemin in the 1980s when he was Shanghai's mayor and
party boss.
Seemingly in defiance of President
Hu's instructions, Vice President Zeng cheerfully
presided over a conference of his Shanghai
co-factionalists at Beidaihe resort on August 5. The
conference was billed as a "symposium" to express
support for "highly talented personnel" from the western
and northeastern provinces "who were vacationing in
Beidaihe" (this despite Chinese media reports that
government-funded vacation boondoggles in Beidaihe would
be cut back drastically last year).
For a "Who's
Who" of the so-called "Shanghai Faction" in China's
leadership, one only need gaze at the list of attendees
at a conference convened in Beidaihe on August 5 by Vice
President Zeng, who is also the fifth-ranking member of
the Communist Party Politburo's Standing Committee. The
only Shanghai people missing were Politburo members who
outranked Zeng - no doubt they deferred to the vice
president as it was to be Zeng's show. But most of other
the top factionalists were there. Minister of Personnel
He Guoqiang convened the meeting, and apparently
restricted the invitation list to political allies of
Jiang and Zeng. In order of rank, they included former
Shanghai party chieftain Huang Ju, who is now the senior
vice premier of the State Council, as well as Vice
Premier Zeng Peiyan; State Councilor Madame Chen Zhili
and State Council secretary general Hua Jianmin; and
General Xu Caihou, chief political commissar of the
People's Liberation Army (PLA) represented the military.
Wang Gang, director of the party's Central Office, was a
featured guest because of his key role in party
personnel decisions. (Minister of Public Security Zhou
Yongkang, although he wasn't listed, was probably in
attendance as well.)
The fact that Jiang-Zeng
factionalists dominate the day-to-day work of the party,
the State Council and the military was never so clear as
it was when Hua, Wang and General Xu appeared at
Beidaihe on August 5 at Vice President Zeng's
instruction.
Shanghai dominates leadership
politics. At least five of the nine Politburo Standing
Committee members are tattooed blood-brother Shanghai
clique-ists. These five can count on the nominal
"Politics and Law" chieftain Luo Gan for a vote if they
really need it. President Hu, meanwhile, is left with
Premier Wen and possibly discipline-inspection czar Wu
Guanzheng in his intramural battles. In the Politburo,
the influence of the Shanghai faction is even more
pronounced, especially in the military and the Foreign
Affairs, State and Public Security ministries. In the
State Council, the vast majority of ministers are
identifiable Jiang loyalists.
How high are
the stakes? The outcome of the power struggle in
Beijing does make a difference in the rest of Asia, and
indeed the world. President Hu and Premier Wen clearly
are moderates on national-security policy if their
apparent equanimity in the face of Hong Kong's "Article
23" anti-sedition fiasco last summer is any indication.
Hong Kong press reports indicated that Hu-Wen faction
people tried to convey to visiting Hong Kong politicians
that the center in Beijing did not have any opinion on
the timing or content of the legislation, while the
Jiang-dominated Propaganda Ministry and the directly
controlled state media demanded that the legislation be
passed "one time and as written". The signals were so
mixed that Vice President Zeng was forced out of the
shadows to appear as the eminence grise of the
hardline Hong Kong policy.
No doubt these
factional differences resonate in the way Beijing
handles the disputes with Japan over its East China Sea
claims, with Korea over whether the ancient kingdom of
Koguryo was Chinese or Korean - and hence whether its
ancient territories are historically one or the other.
And, of course, how the two factions would deal with
Taiwan is a function of the priority their relative
leaders' place on "economic development" or "territorial
integrity and sovereignty".
Jiang and Zeng see
control and influence over the PLA as essential to
holding power. Consequently, it is essential for Jiang,
chairman of the Central Military Commission, to shower
the PLA with lavish rewards - this means the army must
be given top priority in China's economic structure for
investment, recruitment and pay. And this is exactly
what Jiang has done. Chairman Jiang has given the PLA's
General Logistics Department orders to draft a research
report emphasizing the priority status on military pay
and benefits in an effort to attract young, talented
recruits to the defense establishment.
Jiang
expects to maintain his iron grip on the military by
presenting these new national-security requirements at
the Fourth Plenum of the 16th Central Committee next
month. (The date has not yet been announced.)
Ingratiating himself with the military leadership with
general officer promotions to his loyalists and planning
for a major increase in troop salaries to ensure the
allegiance of the ranks are his obvious tactics.
Identifying "the defense of China's territorial
integrity" - and not economic development - as the
overriding mission of the party is a dangerous policy
choice that Jiang and his Shanghai faction have adopted
solely to bolster their grip on power. If they were in
charge, President Hu and Premier Wen could not possibly
be any more hardline, and more likely would pursue more
moderate policies toward Taiwan and China's other
neighbors.
But as long as the rest of the
world's leaders show fear, anxiety and alarm at the
hardline Jiang-Zeng policies, and as long as the
Jiang-Zeng hard line draws no backlash, the hard line
will prevail. It is ironic, then, that if the US
administration of President George W Bush wants to
moderate China's bellicose rhetoric, it should announce
the approval of Aegis destroyers for Taiwan and
explicitly link the approval to China's inexorable
five-year military buildup against the island. And
ironically, moderation from Beijing would have far
greater chances of success with Beijing's increasingly
suspicious and alarmed Taiwan compatriots than unbending
hostility.
John J Tkacik
is a research fellow in Asian Studies at the Heritage
Foundation in Washington, DC. He is a retired officer in
the US Foreign Service who served in Taipei, Beijing,
Hong Kong and Guangzhou and was chief of the China
Division in the State Department's Bureau of
Intelligence and Research.
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