SPEAKING FREELY Five triggers for a Chinese
attack on Taiwan By Lawrence E
Grinter
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With the re-election of Chen Shui-bian as
president of the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan,
continuing trends toward Taiwan's de jure independence
and this summer's military exercises by China, the
United States and Taiwan, it seems useful to review
China's stated or implied "trigger" events for a
People's Liberation Army (PLA) attack against the
democratically governed nation of Taiwan.
Beginning with former president Jiang Zemin's
Eight Points proposal in December 1995, and amplified in
subsequent statements, China's leadership has stated or
implied five events that they say would cause them to
use force against Taiwan. Throughout these
pronouncements, Chinese authorities have continued to
publicly treat Taiwan as an internal Chinese province,
although the Republic of China has never been ruled by
the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).
Each of
China's five conflict triggers lends itself to Beijing's
particular interpretation. However, it is probable that
the Chinese leadership's internal definitions of when
and how Taiwan might be crossing a "red line" is fluid
and under debate within the CCP Standing Committee and
Central Military Commission. The five trigger events
are:
1) A declaration of
independence Taiwan is de facto independent and
has been since the sovereign ROC government took over
administration of the island in 1947. The Republic of
China government, established by Sun Yat-sen on the
mainland in 1912, was a founding member of the United
Nations and a formal security treaty ally of the United
States between 1954 and 1979. Provided the PRC has no
plans to attack Taiwan, President Chen Shui-bian has
twice formally promised not to declare de jure
independence. So what might constitute for Beijing the
threshold of Taiwan's de jure independence? Evidently
not the recognition of the Taiwan government by 26 other
sovereign governments. Nor Taipei's recent use of
referenda or a proposed constitutional revision that
speak about sovereignty. I assume President Chen's
forthcoming constitutional proposals also will be
carefully crafted. So, short of an explicit formal
independence declaration by the president of Taiwan,
Beijing faces the dilemma of having to live with
Taiwanese measures that come right up to, but stop just
short of a formal declaration.
2) A military
alliance by Taiwan with a foreign power When the
United States dropped its recognition of the Republic of
China in January 1979, the US-ROC bilateral Mutual
Defense Treaty also ended. In its place came US
commitments under the Congressional Taiwan Relations Act
of 1979, pledging Washington to make available to Taiwan
necessary defensive equipment. Since 1979 Taiwan has
purchased billions of dollars of weapons and equipment
from the United States and Mirage 2000 jet fighters from
France. Evidently, for Beijing, these weapons purchases,
related training and resupply pipelines have not
constituted a "military alliance". But what if Taipei
votes for the money to purchase new theater missile
defense or Aegis fire-control systems? There seems to be
very little Beijing can do about it. What seems to most
disturb Beijing is potential new US-ROC technological
cooperation that could deflect or negate China's growing
offensive threats against Taiwan.
3) Internal
turmoil in Taiwan Taiwan is a democracy with a
robust political system and an essentially wide-open
media. Beijing has no choice but to live with this. So,
just what might constitute sufficient "turmoil" in the
Republic of China for the People's Republic of China to
mount an attack? Interestingly, demonstrations last
spring in Hong Kong against Beijing's proposed internal
security provisions saw nearly 500,000 Hong Kong
citizens take to the streets, and Beijing did very
little about it. Nor did Beijing intervene following the
apparent assassination attempt on President Chen and
Vice President Annette Lu one day before the election of
March 20 in Taiwan.
So what is Beijing's
definition of "turmoil"? Clear examples of that took
place in Beijing in May and June 1989, when nearly a
million Chinese citizens demonstrated in Tiananmen
Square, demanding democracy, and Deng Xiaoping finally
ordered in the PLA to drive them back. And in 1999, when
Chinese internal security forces squelched 10,000
Chinese citizens (belonging to the Falungong) in
Beijing. Given the offshore distances, Beijing would
seem to have a high "turmoil" threshold regarding
Taiwan. However, one can assume that PRC security
services have thousands of agents inside Taiwan, agents
trained in instigating "turmoil". Presumably Taiwan
authorities are prepared for such actions.
4)
Possession of weapons of mass destruction The
Chinese government has operationally deployed about 450
nuclear weapons. By summer 2004, the PLA had pointed
nearly 600 short-range ballistic missiles (M-9s and
M-11s) at Taiwan. By contrast, Taiwan has never
operationalized a weapon of mass destruction (WMD), and
threatens no one. Taiwan signed the nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1988, and ROC nuclear
reactors are under International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) full safeguard inspections. Since then, no
evidence has surfaced from Beijing, Washington or Taipei
about any ROC WMD. From Beijing's viewpoint, what would
constitute WMD in Taiwan? Biological, chemical, nuclear
radiological materials? Unassembled or operationalized?
Offensive or defensive? Information warfare
capabilities? ROC missiles capable of retaliating
against a PRC attack? What if Chinese agents placed WMD
materials inside Taiwan, and Beijing announced their
"discovery" to the world? How would Taiwan disprove such
WMD?
5) Unwillingness to negotiate on the
basis of 'one China' Former president Jiang Zemin
stated this war trigger in December 1999. Over the past
five years, Taipei has made hundreds of offers to meet
with PRC representatives in open or closed discussions
on unification matters with no prior conditions.
President Chen reiterated his offer after his May 20
re-election. However, Beijing has stonewalled all of
Taipei's offers. One wonders what else the ROC can do to
appear reasonable in Beijing's eyes, short of
capitulation.
Of China's five war "triggers",
the three that President Hu Jintao's government is
currently emphasizing are a formal independence
declaration, emergence of technology to defeat a PRC
attack and lack of progress in negotiations. With no
Taiwanese WMD in the picture, the Chen government being
cautious on independence declaration rhetoric and
continuing to make negotiation offers to Beijing, it
seems to be the US-ROC defensive arms purchase that is
most worrying Beijing. Once again, China faces the
dissonance between its stated policies, or "triggers",
and the changing power realities across the Taiwan
Strait and in Washington.
Lawrence
Grinter is professor of Asian Studies, Air War
College, United States. The views expressed here are
those of the writer and do not necessarily represent the
views of the US Air Force or the US government.
Speaking Freely is an
Asia Times Online feature that allows guest writers to
have their say. Pleaseclick here if you are interested in
contributing.
