Beijing's man in Hong Kong
falters By Qiu Xin and Janus Lam
HONG KONG - As public distrust of the Tung
Chee-hwa administration mounts in Hong Kong due to the
chief executive's widely acknowledged mediocre
governance and lingering economic hardships, Beijing is
trying to play a bigger role in the territory's affairs,
lest it lose influence over the former British colony.
This trend has become more pronounced since
former president Jiang Zemin, reportedly Tung's patron,
stepped down last month as China's powerful military
commander-in-chief. Tung is pro-Beijing and he is
supposed to be Beijing's man in Hong Kong, but his
position may be shaky.
A recent press conference
by Tung - totally unnecessary - to announce the
territory's new chief health officer, is a sign of this
change. Dr York Chow, an experienced orthopedic surgeon,
was appointed as the new secretary for health, welfare
and food, replacing the former secretary Yeoh Eng-kiong,
who resigned over the botched response to the epidemic
of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) in 2003.
Though the press conference had been scheduled for
October 7, it was postponed by one day because official
approval from Beijing had not arrived on in what is
supposed to be a largely self-governing territory.
Referring to such an unusual delay, political
observers reading the tea leaves suggest that this
highlights some possible changes in Beijing's attitudes
towards the unpopular chief executive after Jiang's
descent from the top echelon of Beijing. The delayed
approval of the nomination could be a deliberate,
foot-dragging decision since some elements in the
central government refuse to cut through red tape at the
pace demanded by Tung. Political commentators argue that
Beijing clearly is not attuning itself to Tung, and this
is said to indicate that Tung has been marginalized and
Beijing is nibbling away at his control over Hong Kong
affairs.
In the Chinese rule book for
appointments, the nominations of officials at
ministerial or higher levels are only required to be
announced by the Communist Party's official Xinhua News
Agency, and no separate press conference is needed. This
rule also applies to the appointment of Hong Kong's new
health secretary Chow, and there is no need for the
chief executive to host a press conference to make the
announcement. A concurrent press release through Xinhua
News Agency would have been enough. The high-profile
press conference, with Tung as the leading actor,
demonstrates that Tung is desperately telling Hong Kong
people and his rivals that his position as chief
executive is still rock-solid and he still has a say in
policy-making.
Tung said to get cold shoulder
from Hu However, some Beijing officials
personally point out that Tung Chee-wah is out of favor
with some top leaders. That is because first, the local
economy has been moribund or at least stagnant since
Hong Kong's handover to the mainland in 1997, second,
the government was severely blamed for its inability to
check the SARS epidemic last year, and third, Tung tends
to fall back on the central government for rescue in
times of crisis. When Tung led a delegation to Beijing
for National Day celebrations on October 1, he received
what was described by observers as a rather cold
shoulder from Hu, who had just assumed Jiang's old job
of chairman of the party's Central Military Commission.
He also is state president and party chief.
On
December 3, 2003, Hu openly urged Tung not to be distant
in his administration, to stay in touch with the people,
learn about their lives and listen to their voices. Some
analysts say Hu is disgruntled with Hong Kong's chief
executive since he is selective in the opinions he
adopts that his policy-making deviates from the
mainstream sentiment for long periods. As some observers
say, the fact that Hu invited the democrats in Hong Kong
to visit Beijing on the occasion of the National Day
more or less reflects this dissatisfaction with Tung.
But it seems that Tung Chee-wah's circle of
advisors misunderstood Hu's directive to stay in touch
with the people and listen to them. After late 2003,
Hong Kong became engulfed by tension over the definition
of "patriotism" and who were the "real" patriots; this
dispute involved the maverick democrats and supporters
of the Communist Party, leaving society divided and
economic development disturbed. The debate was not
halted until Beijing ordered an end to the divisive
political struggle in the middle of this year. Perhaps
that case strengthened Beijing's determination to more
directly handle affairs in Hong Kong to ease the
problems of administration and prevent society from
being split - splits reflect badly on Beijing.
Some say that the conventional Chinese
bureaucracy always sits on the fence until it figures
out which way the wind is blowing. Now, observers are
trying to figure out what Beijing is going to do with
its previously favorite minion - Tung.
Beijing cautiously courts HK
democrats For some time, moderate reformist Hu
and backroom regent Jiang Zemin diverged over what to do
with the difficult and noisy Hong Kong mavericks, the
democrats who distrust Beijing and want more freedom,
not less. Now, however, with Hu in charge and his views
prevailing, Beijing has finally decided that the
sharp-tongued democrats should be recruited into Hong
Kong's top decision-making body, the Executive Council
(EC).
The Hong Kong government convened a closed
discussion on whether to invite members of the Article
45 Concern Group into the EC, Lau Siu-kai, head of
government's Central Policy Unit, confirmed on October
5. In fact, a widespread rumor after the mid-September
election of the Legislative Council had it that the
government planned to absorb some democrats into the EC,
especially the rising Article 45 Concern Group composed
of elites in the legal profession, in an effort to
redeem its sinking popularity.
(The Legislative
Council has 60 seats, 30 of them democratically elected,
the other 30 functional constituencies, virtually
appointed. All-in-all, 25 are in the pro-democratic
camp, 35 are pro-government - HK-Beijing; among those
democratically elected, 18 are pro-democracy and 12 are
pro-government.)
Article 45 of the Basic Law
that governs Hong Kong spells out that "universal
suffrage" is the "ultimate aim" for the selection of the
chief executive and the Legislative Council (Legco).
Earlier this year, however, the Standing Committee of
the National People's Congress (NPC), China's
parliament, ruled out universal suffrage for the
election in 2007 of the chief executive and the polls in
2008 for the Legislative Council - and this refusal
crated a backlash among democrats of all stripes. Tung's
second term ends in 2007.
(The Basic Law,
however, does give Beijing 50 years from the 1997
handover from Britain to implement universal suffrage,
but there is no precise timeframe or deadline and
Beijing is allowed to take into consideration the
political conditions in Hong Kong and issues of
stability as it decides on full democracy.)
Hu invites some democrats to Beijing
Among the unhappy democrats is the Article 45
Concern Group, which is doggedly pursuing direct
elections, but in such a moderate manner that Beijing is
willing to converse with it. For instance, the central
government's liaison office in Hong Kong arranged a
meeting with four elected legislators from the group
immediately after the Legislative Council election on
September 12. From that, observers have noticed nuances
in Beijing's policies towards the two special
administrative regions, Hong Kong and Macau, ever since
Hu succeeded Jiang as chairman of the Central Military
Commission.
On the occasion of National Day, Hu
allowed a few democratic lawmakers from Hong Kong to
visit Beijing for the celebration and sightseeing.
Besides four legislators from the Article 45 Concern
Group, Sin Chung-kai, a legislator of the
Beijing-challenging Democratic Party, was also invited,
which signals a landmark step in the dialogue between
Beijing and the democrats. Hu even granted a formal
audience to the Hong Kong visitors.
Since Hong
Kong's handover, some have recommended that the
democrats be introduced into the administration so that
they have a direct inner channel for communication and
dialogue and avoid the public embarrassment of
criticizing the government openly. To some extent,
public pressure against the government could be relieved
in this way. But until recently the Hong Kong government
has not been interested in the recommendation. Now,
however, Beijing (and that means Hong Kong) has decided
to invite some of its vocal democrat critics into the
EC, the territory's top decision-making body.
This idea of including critics in the
administration is based on the political theory of
"administrative absorption of politics", an appellation
that King Yeo-Chi, well-regarded scholar and former
chancellor of the Hong Kong Chinese University, gives to
the governing mode of the previous Hong Kong
administration under the British.
This approach
opens executive channels to voices from all social
sectors, allows policy-making to satisfy demands and
consider the interests of various sectors to the largest
extent; it is also intended to promote conciliation and
reduce public resentment through consultation. In the
1970s, when people were crying for democracy and direct
election, the British Hong Kong government absorbed some
dissidents into consultation.
A double-edged
sword Suppose that Leong Kah-kit, a hardcore
democrat seeking universal suffrage for the elections in
2007 and 2008, joined the EC as rumored. He would then
be obliged to support the decisions of the National
People's Congress Standing Committee in Beijing. This
could be a double-edged sword, however, for the EC also
would be under pressure then to acknowledge his dissent,
or at least listen to it, and make it part of the
record.
Anyway, Beijing has softened its iron
fist - or at least put on a velvet glove - towards the
democrats for the first time since they instigated a
mass demonstration on July 1, 2003, when 500,000 people
took to the streets to protest vague and
all-encompassing anti-subversion legislation. For the
past seven years, the opposition Democratic Party has
been tilting at governmental policies, while the
administration of Tung has gradually lost prestige and
popularity.
Hearing the public outcry against
poor governance, Beijing has abandoned its laissez-faire
policy of leaving decisions to Tung and now appears to
be instructing the Hong Kong government, but carefully
and quietly lest opponents seize upon Beijing's
interference (even if it is better than Tung's
maladministration). But still, misunderstanding
snowballs between the central government and the Hong
Kong natives. In this situation, the Chinese Communist
Party Central Politburo, at the prodding of Hu Jintao,
has decided to listen to various voices from the Hong
Kong society and begin to thaw the icy relations with
the democrats. Presumably, those mavericks who were
invited to visit the capital and celebrate the National
Day are considered by Beijing as approachable targets,
open to discussion.
On the other hand,
participating in the EC would mean a conundrum for the
democrats. Unlike consultation committees, the council
swears its members to secrecy and group responsibility.
When a policy is enacted, no member then is allowed to
make any critical comment on the policy or the
government outside the council, even though he or she
disagrees. If needed, she or he even may be required to
defend the enacted policy they oppose. That may be an
intractable problem, a mission impossible for the
opposition accustomed only to public outcry and
denouncing the government.
Political reform will
remain in the spotlight for the coming years. Leong
Kah-kit, who is also in the Article 45 Concern Group,
has been frenetically calling for universal suffrage.
Now that the NPC Standing Committee vetoed popular
voting for the 2007 and 2008 elections, how would Leong
join in the EC and meanwhile advance the pursuit of his
democratic workmates if the Hong Kong government
suggests no timetable for direct election in its
political development proposal?
In earlier days,
some pro-Beijing figures in Hong Kong tended to leftism
and almost split society with a controversy over the
definition of "patriotism" - true patriots, they said,
supported Beijing. That crisis apparently was defused
after Beijing intervened to turn down the leftist
volume. Now it appears ready to take measures to turn
down the democratic volume.
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