SHANGHAI - When Russian President Vladimir Putin visited China, who really got
what? Who were and are the winners in the short term and the long run? Russia
got a chunk of territory and China's endorsement of Moscow's World Trade
Organization (WTO) entry; China did not get a coveted pipeline but there were a
spate of mutually beneficial economic accords. Still, China takes the long view
and figures that it will come out on top. It may take 20 years, strategic
analysts calculate, but China sees itself the winner.
Putin paid his third state visit to China last week, marking the 55th
anniversary of the establishment of Sino-Russian (then Sino-Soviet) diplomatic
relations. Putin got what Russia wanted from China: approval of a powerful
state for Russia's accession to the WTO. Russia and China also resolved their
long-standing dispute over their 4,300-kilometer-long borders, somewhat in
Russia's favor. More than 10 (primarily economic) agreements were signed, but
not the big prize - the route of an oil pipeline. China seeks a branch from
Russia's far east to China's northeast region. Putin said directly that this
should be considered from Russia's interests. In other words, China didn't get
what it wants to get from Putin's visit, and was disappointed. The outcome,
however, is linked by Chinese analysts, and others, to the fact that China is a
rising power while Russia is the declining empire. Japan, meanwhile, is also in
the running for the pipeline and has offered huge financial incentives to
Moscow.
More generally, people in China have all kinds of misunderstandings and
questions over Sino-Russian relations, and are unwilling to agree
with Putin that Sino-Russian relations are enjoying the best period in their
history. They consider that there is a phenomenon of "upper hot while lower
cold" - politics hot while economy cold - and naturally there is distrust
between the two. The An-Da (Angarsk to Daqing) oil line has not been resolved
and its possible death - though not actually confirmed - was especially
damaging to China's perception of Russia.
There is a saying that even in the Chinese countryside, the old women complain
that Russians are too snobbish, cannot be trusted; many people think
Sino-Russian relations are an example of those in which each makes use of the
other to show dissatisfaction with America's unipolar hegemony, and so
ties are just symbolic and temporary. At the same time, the new Chinese
leadership, without the background of being educated in Russia and without
personal relationships with Russian leaders, makes such worry rational and
natural.
How should we understand the future of a Sino-Russian strategic partnership? Is
it simply a revival of the 1970s China-America-Russia strategic triangle in
which China joins Russia against the United States? Or does it mean, from the
standpoint of some Americans who wanted to improve diplomatic ties with Beijing
to offset the Soviet superpower, that "my enemy's enemy is my friend"?
China-America-Russia, a new strategic triangle?
Considering their military power and influence on world affairs,
China-US-Russia relations do have the impact of a strategic triangle. China and
Russia do disagree with and resist America's strategic pressure and unilateral
hegemony. Although the Sino-Russian strategic partnership is not targeting the
third party, the United States, the common consensus between China and Russia
does have the effort of balancing US unilateralism.
Russia is yesterday's superpower, the US is today's only superpower and China
will be tomorrow's world power. This is the key to understanding the new
strategic triangle involving China, the US and Russia. In other words, the
United States has had more space to develop in order to reach the peace bonus
since the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union. Right now
China is keeping a low profile but preparing to do what it wants to do and what
is in its own best interest. The decline of Russia is not over yet. This will
influence the dynamics of the China-US-Russia strategic triangle.
After the killings by separatists in Beslan, North Ossetia, last month, former
US national security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski published an article in the
Wall Street Journal portraying Putin as Moscow's Benito Mussolini. He
criticized the administration of US President George W Bush in supporting
Putin's dictatorship in the name of anti-terrorism. Someone even suggested that
if Senator John Kerry were elected president, the United States should add
Russia to the "axis of evil", joining Saddam Hussein's Iraq, Iran, and North
Korea. Another report is that the US wants to dismember Russia and the
independence of Chechnya is the starting point. Russia's disintegration would
have a second, even a third wave of repercussions.
If this is true, then under such circumstances, Russia's strategic need for
China is increasing. China also must consider the potential strategic conflict
over the Taiwan issue with the US, paying considerable attention at this time
to the Sino-Russian strategic partnership. That comes as no surprise. A Russian
partner would be helpful if the situation in the Taiwan Strait deteriorated and
the US entered the conflict. However, China's huge market and rising influence
in international affairs make America's anxiety over China's developing much
less than over Russia's development. Because of a high degree of economic
interdependence and comprehensive cooperation in international affairs, Sino-US
relations are actually among the closest in the world. So the weak point of the
China-Russia-US strategic triangle lies in the Russian side, because of its
weakness and need for the United States.
But the Sino-Russian relationship has its own logic, which has surpassed the
meaning of the China-Russia-US strategic triangle.
The logic of the Sino-Russian relationship
Besides providing a balance to the US superpower with its unipolar world view,
China and Russia coming closer together has other rationales. To make their
exchanges economically and politically beneficial, cooperation and enhancing
their mutual consensus have three aspects.
1. Exchange. Sino-Russian relations are very pragmatic. Each side
calculates carefully: what can the other side provide for me? Both parties are
simply concerned with their own demands, not interdependence, and are even
unwilling to give what the other side wants. For instance, Russia exports oil
to China while keeping another eye open to Japan, selling more advanced weapons
to India than to China, slighting the Chinese side. The reason is that since
Russia, which is the weak side, is more limited in its strategic choices than
China, Russia is concerned more about the rise of China than China is concerned
about the rise of Russia.
In the political arena, there is mutual support for China and Russia in dealing
with domestic issues: I support your attacks on terrorism and separatists of
Chechnya; you support my endeavors against Taiwan's independence. Compared with
the more difficult cooperation in energy (Russia fears China's rise and Japan
offers lucrative pipeline inducements), terrorism, Chechnya and Taiwan are
solid and reliable issues for both sides.
2. Win-win. To pursue a stable and long-term relationship, Sino-Russian
relations must surpass the level of exchanges and simple trade, creating the
win-win effect. Putin's China visit reveals it clearly. Both sides are eager to
develop relations, narrow the gap between Russia and China and focus on
fundamental, absolute concerns (terrorism and Taiwan). As a result,
Sino-Russian relations have great potential. For instance, on the
petroleum-piping alignment, Putin said this should emphasize the development of
Russia's far east region, bringing the necessary cooperation between both
nations in the region - and in China's northeast as well. The key is, can both
sides bring this into the broad perspective of regional integration?
3. Consensus. On the international level, in maintaining domestic
stability and in their development models, the two nations share great common
consensus. There is a saying that Russia is following Deng Xiaoping's pragmatic
reform model. Both sides uphold political multilateralism, oppose hegemonism
and oppose the double standards of anti-terrorism.
The problem is - with this logic and common ground - how to evaluate the
strategic development period and space of the Sino-Russian strategic
cooperative partnership?
How long will Sino-Russian strategic cooperation last?
Since last year, after the standoff of the pipeline alignment from Russia's
Angarsk to China's Daqing oil refinery, Putin promised to increase railroad
transport to China and increase Sino-Russian cooperation in developing natural
gas, which is clearly the intentional compensation to the failed pipeline plan
and a repair for Sino-Russian strategic cooperative partnership.
The difference between railroad and pipeline reflects Russia's inflexible and
incomplete attitude in dealing with China relations. The reason may be Russian
worries about China's rise and the effect of such rising on Russia's security,
but China also doubts whether Russia will maintain its domestic stability. So
China pays more attention to diversifying its petroleum and weapon imports,
spreading the strategic risk and not being dependent on a single large
supplier. With the reduced reliability of Russia's resources for China's
energy-hungry economy, Russia's weight in the view of China's strategic
thinking will be devalued.
At the same time, after Sino-Russian relations enter what should be the fast
track for economic development, Russia is dragging its feet in the development
of its power resources, and is lagging behind in its ideas for the future. Both
countries are now in the stage of post-socialist reform, their common mission.
But once China enters the upper level of economic reform, Sino-Russian
relations will wittiness a qualitative change, revealed by China's different
expectations, compared with Russia's, concerning the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization. Russia continues to believe the SCO should focus on striking
three forces - terrorism, separatism and fundamentalism - while China hopes
primarily to move the SCO to the level of economic cooperation. When Chinese
Premier Wen Jiabao visited Russia last month, he consistently suggested
building up Eurasia as a free-trade zone with Russia, but he was rejected by
his Russian counterpart. The reason appears to be that Russia feels it is in
crisis and manifests a siege mentality. Moscow appears to believe that if a
free-trade zone were established, then Russia's economy and the regional
Central Asian economies would actually be controlled by China, and Russia would
thereby lose its political influence in the former Soviet republics.
Another factor influencing Sino-Russian strategic cooperation is the United
States. After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the US leaders
estimated that five terms of four-year presidency - 20 years - would be needed
to finish the initial task of fighting terrorism. Therefore, anti-terrorism, as
the common pursuit, provides the possibility of 20 years of the new strategic
triangle involving China, the US and Russia. Sino-Russian joint statements
contain many words about anti-terrorism and anti-proliferation, which helps to
make the US more comfortable with the advance of Sino-Russian relations.
After the Cold War, especially after September 11, 2001, the international
structure stepped into a period of great adjustment. Once that adjustment
period ends, Sino-Russian strategic cooperative partnership will cross its own
threshold and realize its own strategic possibilities. To the extent that such
changes impact the mutual perception between China and Russia, ie, what
benefits I derive from Sino-Russian ties is greater than what I fear from the
other side, then China-Russia relations will reach the turning point. This
buildup period is expected to last for 20 years. According to a widely accepted
economic estimation, by 2020 China will become the second-largest economic
entity after the United States. Then the asymmetric Sino-Russian relations will
have to through the pattern of strategic partnership (recognizing China's
dominance), or it has to be changed.
How much potential space for a strategic partnership?
Because China and Russia are neighbors and great powers, each has its own great
strategic goal, so if Sino-Russian relations will not be put into the
Asia-European integration network, the strategic period of the Sino-Russian
relationship will meet its end. Particularly, the potentialities and future for
Sino-Russian strategic partnership lies in the Middle Asian integration after
the transition of the SCO and East-Asian integration following the six-party
talks on the North Korean nuclear crisis. It would be difficult for a pure
bilateral exchange and mutual Sino-Russian political support to seize and
benefit from the development of economic globalization and regional
integration.
Compared with their political relations at present, Sino-Russian economic
relations are too weak and unvarying and lacking dynamism and creativity. To
date, Sino-Russian cooperation is still driven by two engines: energy and
anti-terrorism. Russia promises to transport 8 million tons oil to China this
year, increase that to 10 million tons next year, and to 15 million tons by
2006. But China's oil imports from Russia are just 8.5% of its total oil
imports. China has been the second-largest consumer and importer in the world
since last year. It is still a question whether China's oil imports from Russia
can meet the rising demand.
Ninety-five percent of Russia's exports to China are energy resources, while
China's exports to Russia primarily are value-added industrial products. If
both countries can realize the dream of extending the bilateral trade from
today's US$20 billion to $80 billion per year, it will be very necessary to
expand the new realms of cooperation with new visions in many areas.
So, during Putin's visit to China, the main topic for discussion was long-term
cooperation over high-value-added products, including space flight, atomic
energy, engineering, manufacture high technology and information technology.
Putin's state visit to China came just two weeks after Chinese Premier Minster
Wen Jiabao's visit to Moscow. During Wen's visit, Russia made a commitment to
increase supplies of crude oil to China; China also promised to invest $12
billion to Russian infrastructure by 2020. It seems that increasing the extent
of interdependence for both sides, not just increasing the amount of trade, but
also optimizing the trade structure, will provide a solid base for a strategic,
mutually reinforcing partnership.
From the strategic position, China is the stronger player. The Sino-Russian
strategic partnership should and will be used by China to serve its grand
strategy of peaceful rise. So to understand Sino-Russian strategic partnership,
we should examine it from the point of view of the strategic period and space
of China's grand strategy. To grasp the coming 20-year strategic opportunity
period, winning time at the cost of space is the basic choice for China. Now we
can understand why Sino-Russian borders, disputed for years, finally have been
settled somewhat in Russia's favor. The strategic period and space of
Sino-Russian relations are compatible with China's grand strategy, and should
have more potential in the future.
Yiwei Wang is the assistant to the dean of the Institute of International
Studies, Fudan University.
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