Battle royal over Taiwan arms deal
By Mac William Bishop

KINMEN - "From here, you can give China a personal greeting," said a colonel in the Taiwanese military, as he raised his middle finger and pointed it westward toward the Chinese mainland.

"Oh, and don't write about that," he added, laughing nervously. His name and unit are being withheld to keep the officer in good standing with his superiors, who might share his sentiments, but who act with decorum.

The colonel was speaking from the Mashan Military Observation Post on Kinmen (also called Jinmen or Quemoy) Island, only 1.8 kilometers away from Chinese territory. Kinmen is controlled by Taiwan and is part of Fujian province.The island hosts about 10,000 Taiwanese military personnel, and it was long considered the "frontline" in the simmering conflict between China and Taiwan. And the conflict is still simmering - by no means is it cooling down.

A geopolitical environment that is far removed from the Cold War days of the Chiang Kai-shek regime, coupled with advancements in military technology have made the island more useful for the production of gaoliang (a sorghum-based liquor) than for staving off an invasion by the People's Liberation Army (PLA).

On a recent visit to the island, Asia Times Online spoke with several military officers about a contentious military procurement budget that has divided Taiwan's Legislative Yuan, which ends its session in late December, while elections for the 225-seat Yuan are all up for grabs on December 11. This is the first time the legislature and the president, Chen Shui-bian, who was re-elected in March, stand a chance of being controlled by a single party, the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and its pan-green allies. The pan-blues, however, hold a legislative majority of around 112, five or take some seats.

The arms package, supported by President Chen,  is unlikely to pass during this legislative term, but it is expected to pass in some form, possibly scaled back or extended over years later on.

The NT$610.8 billion (US$18 billion) Special Arms Purchase Budget has become one of the most divisive issues in the campaign for December's legislative elections. The big arms purchase, sought by President Chen, is unlikely to pass before the election, though a version is expected to pass at some point. The ruling DPP and its allies, including the smaller Taiwan Solidarity Union (known as the pan-greens for their party emblem), are generally supportive of the expenditure, which would allow Taiwan to purchase eight diesel-electric submarines, 12 P-3C Orion maritime patrol aircraft and six Patriot PAC-III anti-missile batteries from the United States.

Pro-Beijing parties oppose arms purchase
The opposition pan-blue camp (the Chinese Nationalist Kuomintang or KMT and the People First Party, PFP, known as the blues for the color of the KMT emblem), which holds a legislative majority, is generally opposed to the budget, and several legislators have spoken vociferously against approving the purchase.

The opposition pan-blues are generally considered more open to improving relations with China - Beijing strongly opposes Taiwanese president and DPP chairman Chen, who it sees as an advocate of independence. Chen and his party emphasize a distinct Taiwanese identity and have refrained from accepting Beijing's one-China principle.

The purchase has been a long-running issue in Taiwan, and portions of it were first proposed in 1995, when the KMT, the leading force in the pan-blue camp, was in power. The US approved the arms deal in 2001, under the administration of President George W Bush.

It has remained in limbo ever since.

Deterrent capabilities
Defense analysts in Taiwan say the new and advanced weapons systems are necessary to help narrow the gap in military capabilities that has been steadily increasing since the
early 1990s.

The eight diesel submarines, in particular, are viewed as essential by some members of Taiwan's navy. An effective submarine force would give Taiwan the ability to inhibit China's control of strategic waterways in and around the Taiwan Strait. In addition, it would force mainland Chinese to commit a substantial number of assets to anti-submarine warfare (ASW) operations, a time-consuming, labor-intensive task.

This would have the net effect of seriously complicating China's efforts to control the areas surrounding Taiwan, should hostilities occur.

For the same reason, Taiwan wants to purchase the 12 P-3C Orion aircraft for their utility as ASW platforms, although the aircraft also can carry anti-ship munitions and be used for reconnaissance and search-and-rescue operations.

One of the most intensive efforts in China's military modernization program has been the acquisition and upgrading of its submarine forces. The venerable Orion aircraft are considered a necessary, if not vital, asset for Taiwan's anti-submarine warfare capabilities, which have been described as "useless" and "virtually non-existent" by visiting US naval officers.

Finally, the PAC-III Patriot anti-missile batteries are viewed as necessary to help defend critical facilities against missile attack. Beijing has approximately 650 short-, medium-, and long-range ballistic missiles capable of striking Taiwan, according to Taiwan's Ministry of National Defense. That number is expected to increase by 50 to 75 missiles per year over the next five years.

A number of analysts question the effectiveness of the US Patriot system, and most agree that it would take hundreds of Patriot anti-missile batteries to make any difference if China launched a saturation attack. But Taiwanese strategists are operating under the assumption that any defense, even one that doesn't work in all situations, is better than nothing at all.

"The primary rationale behind the acquisition of the Pac-III batteries is to undercut and limit China's coercive options," said one US defense source. In other words, the deployment of the Patriots limits China from attempting small, surgical strikes against some targets, thereby forcing China to commit to a massive strike, with all the ensuing consequences.

A question of cash
The opponents of the arms budget decry its cost - a concern that cannot be ignored by the ruling party. Taiwan has a projected budget shortfall of approximately NT$292.9 billion (US$8.64 billion) for 2005, according to the Executive Yuan, not including the special budget for arms procurement.

However, most analysts say that Taiwan must substantially increase its military spending if it is to be able to counter the threat from China. According to a statement issued by Taiwan's Defense Ministry, China "already has the ability to pose an immediate threat" to Taiwan.

"Although the PRC [People's Republic of China] continually reiterates non-military methods, it has never ruled out using military force to resolve the ROC [Republic of China] question. The People's Liberation Army, PLA, is aggressively developing itself militarily under the guidance of the policy, 'Winning Quick Victory Through Long-range Battle, Deciding War in the First Battle,'" the statement said.

The Ministry of National Defense offers three rationales for the purchase of weapons systems from the US: "to effectively raise our anti-missile defensive capability, to counter-control the enemy's naval blockade and cross-strait combat, and to increase our flexibility in using our forces in defensive combat. This will allow us to realize effective deterrence."

But would the purchases really provide an effective deterrent to Chinese military attack?

"We need to buy a number of things, not just the equipment included in the special arms purchase," said Major General Chang Shao-kang, the commander of the Nanhsiung Armored Brigade in Kinmen, speaking to Asia Times Online. Taiwan could not, of course, purchase everything it wanted, the general said. But it had to start somewhere.

"As a professional armor man, I would like to see Taiwan purchase M1A1 Abrams tanks from the US," the general said. "But that will have to wait until after [the special arms purchase] is completed."

"Taiwan counts on the US to come to its aid in the event of a conflict," the general said. This is not so much a political issue, he added, as a strategic one.

Taiwan Strait a strategic waterway
"It doesn't matter who controls Taiwan," he said. "The point is that it is vital to American and Japanese interests in the Pacific. The US and Japan must ensure the security of their SLOCs [Sea Lanes of Communication, ie, strategic waterways through which ships must pass to reach their various destinations. Examples include the Malacca Strait, the Strait of Gibraltar, and of course, the Taiwan Strait and the East China Sea] in the region."

The US, especially, does not want to see China control Taiwan, because it would give Beijing a staging point in the Western Pacific from which it could challenge the US dominance of the region," Major General Chang said. Therefore, Taiwan was the key to the US regional hegemony, he added.

For this reason, the US has a vested interest in ensuring the "status quo" in the Taiwan Strait. Many people in Taiwan believe that since their country (China calls Taiwan a province) is so vital to the US strategic interests, it will have no choice but to come to Taiwan's aid should China attack.

And if US assistance is virtually guaranteed, they ask, why does Taiwan need to purchase advanced weapons systems at all?

Political fallout
This is the rationale behind the pan-blues' recent opposition to the arms purchase deal. The fact that the pan-blues have co-opted the anti-arms-deal platform is a sign of just how close the upcoming legislative elections will be.

The DPP and its pan-green allies say that a number of pan-blue politicians, such as Chinese Nationalist Party, KMT, chairman Lien Chan and People First Party legislator Nelson Ku were originally supporters of some parts of the deal. Lien was Taiwan's vice president when the procurement deal was initiated, and Ku is a retired admiral who was one of the key backers of the procurement effort in his role as the chief of naval operations in the late 1990s.

Now, however, Lien, Ku and their parties criticize the deal as overpriced and unnecessary. "We support the arms procurement plan, but it has to be transparent and affordable, said KMT legislator Tseng Yuan-chuan.

In addition, the pan-blues have received support from numerous social groups and peace activists, including staunch pan-green supporters, who are ideologically opposed to all arms purchases.

This rather bewildering coalition of representatives from both ends of Taiwan's political spectrum has proved to be surprisingly effective in opposing the arms deal, and has put the governing DPP and its pan-green camp allies on the defensive.

In a recent article in the Chinese-language daily Liberty Times, Vice Minister of Defense Tsai Ming-hsien wrote that "Taiwan is reacting to the continuous pressure from China ... the Ministry of National Defense has acted with great caution, always purchasing a minimum of armaments to counter China's buildup."

Invoking St Augustine
The vice minister invoked the words of St Augustine: "'All men desire peace, the problem is they all want peace on their own terms' ... China's primary objective ... is to force Taiwan into accepting 'one country, two systems'."

"Unless we want our children to enjoy the 'peace' of 'one country, two systems', rather than the peace we currently enjoy, then there is a price to be paid," Tsai wrote.

It now seems unlikely that the bill approving the arms procurement deal will make any progress in this legislative term. Only two weeks remain in the current session, and already pan-green and pan-blue legislators have come to blows over the bill, although by Taiwan's standards, it was a rather tame scuffle that was quickly broken up.

But the political brawl has been much more bruising for Taiwan.

Likely outcome
On Monday, the pan-green and pan-blue legislative caucuses hammered out an agreement to discuss two versions of the Special Arms Budget Statute this week. The DPP's version of the statute would allow the government to allocate the funds for the purchase over a 15-year period, and the money would not be included in the regular budget - hence the "special" designation of the bill.

The People First Party (PFP), however, submitted a draft statute that would include the entire NT$610.8 billion in the budget for next year. This appears to have been a bluff designed to guarantee that the statute would fail if it ever came to a vote, while allowing the pan-blues to say that they were serious about trying to make the deal work. The PFP proposed that the money for the special arms purchase could be taken out of the budgets for the Presidential Office, the Ministry of National Defense and other ministries - in effect, bankrupting the executive branch of the government.

However, on Tuesday the pan-blue caucus reneged on its agreement to consider the draft versions of the bill and push it through to legislative committee, where the caucuses could tweak the statute until a consensus was reached and it could be placed on the legislative agenda for a vote.

Claiming that they still supported the arms purchase in theory, the pan-blues said that their problem was with the deal's price, and that it violated Taiwan's Budget Law, an accusation they have not explained and which seems counterintuitive, as none of the details of the statute have been worked out or agreed to as yet.

It now seems very unlikely that the arms-purchase budget will be approved before the end of the current legislative session in late December - after the legislative elections scheduled for December 11. All 225 seats in the Legislative Yuan are up for grabs, and if the pan-greens gain control of both the presidency and the legislature, that would make for easier, if not smoother sailing for President Chen.

A pan-green win would bolster US ties
Should the pan-green camp win a legislative majority, the deal will be approved to bolster the DPP's standing with the US and to placate the pan-green base, which wants President Chen to take a more cautious approach to engaging with China and beefing up Taiwan's defenses.

Furthermore, if the opposition pan-blue camp retains the legislature, it will probably stop opposing the deal as soon as the last election ballot has been tallied. Even the most pro-unificationist of the pan-blues recognizes the political utility of adding to Taiwan's defenses and securing a favorable relationship with the US.

For its part, the US - impatient with Taiwan for taking so long to release the necessary funds - is already pushing Taipei to commit to another major arms purchase agreed to by the Bush administration: Aegis-equipped destroyers that would substantially increase Taiwan's battlefield command and control capabilities.

Yet despite the difficulties with the special arms purchase deal, the US has not been willing to back down from its promise to sell the systems to Taiwan, even in the face of strenuous objections from the mainland Chinese.

Next week, Secretary of State Colin Powell will be in Beijing as part of a whirlwind East Asia tour. The Chinese will likely express their extreme displeasure once again over US arms sales to Taiwan, and Powell will probably reiterate his nation's commitment to the "one China" policy and the Taiwan Relations Act, which requires the United States to provide for Taiwan's defense.

But the question now is whether Taiwan wants to pay for its own defense.

Mac William Bishop is a journalist based in Taipei. Comments or queries may be sent to mwbtaiwan@hotmail.com.

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