Paying China for pressuring
Pyongyang By Ehsan Ahrari
The
use of pressure tactics is one of the ancient principles
of diplomacy. Not many nations practice it as
effectively as the United States, the lone superpower.
The focus of Washington's pressure tactics this time is
North Korea, and the recipient is none other the
People's Republic of China, itself an ancient master of
the subtle and not-so-subtle arts of diplomacy of all
sorts, as well as deception.
In Washington's
official circles, there has been a growing feeling that
about the only effective way of getting Pyongyang to
cooperate with the US on the nuclear-weapons-related
conflict is to use the "China card". That means
persuading Beijing to put pressure on Pyongyang to make
reasonable offers to the United States, concerning
dismantling of its nuclear-weapons program in return for
aid, energy and security guarantees, in order to break
the current impasse. A related feeling in Washington is
that Beijing is serving as an interlocutor only
halfheartedly. The US is not wrong in its overall
assessment of China's role in these negotiations. In the
world of international diplomacy, the effectiveness or
limitations of the "China card" will only be determined
by China - no one else.
True, China does have
influence on North Korea, an old socialist ally; it
provides oil, humanitarian assistance and other aid to
Pyongyang. It tries to persuade North Korea to open up,
join the world community and enjoy the fruits of
prosperity. Even so, China's influence is limited.
Wrinkles in the conflict, some old, some
new As a precondition to rejoining the six-nation
forum, involving North and South Korea, China, Japan,
Russia and the United States, and continuing
negotiations, North Korea wants the US "to contribute to
a compensation package". In return, it claims it would
agree to freeze its nuclear-weapons programs. In
addition, North Korean leader Kim Jong-il wants US
President George W Bush to abandon what he call
America's "hostile policy" toward Pyongyang and accept
its suggestion for a discussion of South Korea's
recently disclosed and unauthorized experiments with
nuclear materials in the past.
The Bush
administration envisages North Korea's preference for
receiving up-front compensation as being aimed at
driving a wedge between the United States and its other
four allies in the discussion. In view of the fact that
Japan and South Korea have already made commitments to
supply fuel oil if North Korea commits itself to end its
nuclear program, the US is under pressure to make
similar gestures. However, Washington refuses to budge
from its insistence that it will offer a security
guarantee to Kim Jong-il's regime only after it
"discloses and allows the verification of the full
extent of its programs". US Secretary of State Colin
Powell reiterated this position during his trip to East
Asia.
What is also complicating the US-North
Korea conflict is a naval exercise, or Proliferation
Security Initiative (PSI), involving the United States,
Japan and several other East Asian countries. The
purpose of this exercise in Japan's Sagami Bay is to
stem weapons proliferation and send a strong warning.
North Korea knows full well that it is the intended
target of such a measure. The fact that US Under
Secretary of State John Bolton was there as an observer
does not make Kim Jong-il very happy, since in the past
Bolton has called Kim "human scum" and a "bloodsucker".
Besides, Bolton recently referred to such an exercise as
"a useful deterrent to companies that otherwise might be
tempted to do business with proliferators like North
Korea". Powell attempted to put the best face on the
exercise by noting that "it is not a hostile act toward
North Korea". But Kim Jong-il remains utterly
unimpressed.
What should China make of this
public good-cop-bad-cop show? It appears that Beijing
will stay engaged in the six-nation dialogue solely as a
continuation of a ritual leading up to the US
presidential election next Tuesday. China also knows
that it can put ample pressure on North Korea, but not
without significant payoffs from the US for China
itself. Such a payoff must come in several ways:
First, a clear enunciation of US-China relations
must be made in the first part of next year in
Washington. Even if Bush is re-elected, the United
States must make discernable concessions regarding the
Taiwan reunification conflict.
Second, the United States must also back off from
selling sophisticated weapons platforms to Taiwan, an
issue that has consistently annoyed leaders in Beijing.
The most complicating aspect of these two expectations
is that the US Congress is very much involved, and may
not budge when it comes to abandoning a democratic ally,
Taiwan.
Third, from the Chinese point of view, Washington
and China must arrive at some new understanding in
negotiations over weapons sales to People's Republic of
China. Here again,the role of the US Congress remains
vital.
Fourth, if George W Bush is re-elected, then China
must see the framework of his administration's
engagement in East Asia early next year in order to
determine whether it adopts a strident posture or a
friendly one toward China. On this issue, the White
House has considerable leeway, especially if the
neo-conservatives were to be consistently sidelined in
the White House in a second Bush administration. The
likelihood of such an occurrence - sidelining the
neo-cons - appears terribly remote.
If Senator
John F Kerry wins the White House, China knows that it
must get serious about putting pressure on Kim Jong-il
to unravel its nuclear-weapons program. However, a
president Kerry must also assure North Korea first that
he will not continue to take the United States down the
road to hostility toward the Kim Jong-il regime.
Conclusions These pressure and
counter-pressure games involving the United States,
China and North Korea will become quite intriguing if
Kerry is elected. The start of a new game is almost
always more interesting than the continuation of an old
one, where the participants' moves are pretty much
anticipated. China will let the US play the "China card"
as long Beijing gets fulfilled some of the cherished
goals of its own strategic affairs, especially
concerning Taiwan. Kerry, with no previous ideological
baggage from the White House, might be more prone to
deal with China and North Korea on the basis of
pragmatism and national interests than Bush, whose
ideological preoccupation has been seen as a major
obstacle for the past four years by friends and foes
alike.
Ehsan Ahrari is an independent
strategic analyst in Alexandria, Virginia.
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