China's power hunger trumps Japan
diplomacy By Jeffrey
Robertson
China recently resolved its
long-festering territorial border disputes with Russia
and made progress in border talks with India,
reinforcing a trend toward responsibility and
pragmatism, consistent with the great power status to
which it aspires. But when it comes to Japan, will
China's hunger for energy resources trump this trend
toward resolving thorny territorial disputes? It seems
so, for now.
On October 14 China and Russia
signed the Supplementary Agreement on the Eastern
Section of the China-Russia Boundary Line, which
effectively concluded agreements on their
4,300-kilometer land border, opening up more favorable
conditions for resource and economic development.
In another dispute that had long been placed on
the "too difficult" pile, China has advanced talks that
soon could result in a landmark agreement with India.
Both sides have expressed a strong desire to swiftly
resolve the border issue. Chinese State Councilor Tang
Jiaxuan on a visit to India last week boldly stated that
China and India must "take forward their cooperation in
various fields to face questions, including those left
over by history, in a flexible and practical manner".
The level of cooperation and understanding in
the China-India relationship has even extended to
Chinese support of India's bid for a permanent seat on
the United Nations Security Council. "India is a major
country in Asia ... China fully understands India's
position and endorses its aspirations ... We also hope
to see that India plays a greater and constructive role
in the UN Security Council," Tang stated.
Canberra-based South Asia analyst Dr Ravi Tomar
told Asia Times Online: "The relationship between India
and China has matured beyond the regional rivalry that
once dominated the relationship." In resolving what has
been a problematic relationship marked by rivalry and
even spoiled by border clashes, Chinese diplomacy has
achieved a new level. Although China's appetite for
energy resources threatens to outweigh the trend toward
great power responsibility epitomized by its dealings
with Russia and India.
Recent talks with Japan,
however, were a dismal failure in even approaching the
resolution of a maritime dispute. On October 26, Kyodo
News service reported that Mitoji Yabunaka, director
general of the Japanese Foreign Ministry's Asian and
Oceanian Affairs Bureau, and Nobuyori Kodaira, head of
the Agency for Natural Resources and Energy, represented
Japan in talks with Cui Tiankai, director general of the
Chinese Foreign Ministry's Asian Affairs Department.
They were attempting to tackle the troublesome maritime
boundary issue at a time when Sino-Japanese relations
already are plagued by other concerns.
The talks
did not achieve any meaningful progress, and Japanese
Trade and Industry Minister Shoichi Nakagawa later told
reporters in Tokyo that he didn't plan to get involved
in any further talks that end without resolution. "I
don't even know why these talks were even held,"
Nakagawa said, emphasizing their failure.
On a
slightly calmer note, a day after the talks, Chinese
foreign ministry spokesperson Zhang Qiyu, stated,
"China's gas exploration is conducted in our coastal
waters where Japan does not have disputes with us. It is
a normal activity of exercising sovereignty ...
consultation and dialogue are the only correct choice
for resolving the questions related to the East China
Sea."
The issue centers upon the exploitation of
gas reserves in the East China Sea. Both sides claim the
disputed zone as an exclusive economic zone (EEZ), which
under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea can be drawn 200 nautical miles from a state's
shoreline. But with significantly less than 400 miles
between the two states, both sides have fortified
themselves behind the most advantageous alternate
definition. China supports a demarcation line drawn
where the continental shelf ends, close to the Japanese
shoreline of Okinawa, while Japan supports the median
line.
The Australian Bureau of Agricultural and
Research Economics notes that the Chinese government has
prioritized the use of liquefied natural gas (LNG) as an
alternative to the use of coal with its associated
environmental risks and problems. "China's tenth
Five-Year Plan for National Social and Economic
Development makes it clear that natural gas will play an
expanded role in meeting the country's energy demand,"
the bureau said.
"LNG offers flexibility of
supply and can be a more cost effective source of supply
than pipelines in the early stages of gas demand
buildup," it said. For China this will alleviate
medium-term energy security challenges until longer-term
projects, such as international gas pipelines and
nuclear-based electricity generation, are
realized.
In October 2003, China started
developing the Chunxiao gas field, which lies just
within the Chinese side of the Japanese-recognized
median line, and well within the Chinese recognized
continental shelf limits. The development of the
Chunxiao field has continued despite the pullout in
September 2004 of two major Western oil companies, Unoco
and Shell. They reportedly were wary of both the
questionable commercial value of the project and the
potential Sino-Japanese diplomatic fallout that could
obstruct development.
If China continues to
develop the Chunxiao gas field on schedule, production
will commence by mid-2005. Japan fears that when this
occurs, the Chunxiao field may eventually siphon off
what little natural energy resources exist under
Japanese territory.
The greatest difference
between China's relationship with India and that with
Japan is not the obvious historical animosity - it is
the very real contemporary rivalry over readily
exploitable energy resources.
China's hunger for
energy is threatening a similar diplomatic challenge in
the South China Sea, ironically, one in which China
fears its own resources may be siphoned off, just as
Japan fears it will lose its own resources to Chinese
development of the Chunxiao field.
In all
aspects, the East China Sea dispute is remarkably
similar to the more than a handful of maritime disputes
China has had with Malaysia, Brunei, Vietnam and the
Philippines over the Spratly Islands and with Indonesia
over the Natuna Islands in the South China Sea. Disputes
with Vietnam over South China Sea claims have even
resulted in armed conflict on no less than four separate
occasions.
A pragmatic solution that resolved
the immediate threat of further conflict in the South
China Sea was achieved in 2002. The Code of Conduct in
the South China Sea signed by China and the Association
of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) on November 2, 2002,
committed the parties to the principle of peaceful
coexistence and to refraining from actions that could
complicate or escalate disputes. Chinese Vice Foreign
Minister Wang Yi described the agreement at the time as
a move to build "mutual trust in the resolution of
problems on the issue of sovereignty".
However,
on October 21, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson
Zhang Qiyue expressed concern that Vietnam, in her
words, had not lived up to the code of conduct, by
inviting public bidding for oil and gas exploration in
disputed areas of the South China Sea. "It [Vietnam]
should cease to adopt any unilateral action that would
complicate or give further rise to expand the disputes,
and work together with countries concerned in the area
to maintain the peace and stability of the South China
Sea," Zhang said.
The Code of Conduct in the
South China Sea is a remarkable piece of modern
diplomacy, bringing the "ASEAN way" of non-interference,
coexistence and understanding, built through informal
relationships, into inter-state relations.
Unfortunately, it is also an agreement that has the
potential to crumble in the face of the precise legal
challenges of resource economics.
Despite
China's proven great power responsibility, it may be its
ever-increasing hunger for limited energy resources that
bucks the trend toward dispute resolution, as has been
the case with another great power in Iraq.
Jeffrey Robertson is a political
affairs analyst focusing on Australian relations with
Northeast Asia, currently residing in Canberra,
Australia.
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