Hong Kong democracy fire stoked
again By Janus Lam
HONG KONG
- Since Beijing's veto in April of early universal
suffrage in the elections for Hong Kong's chief
executive and Legislative Council (Legco) in 2007 and
2008, the issue had disappeared from the public eye. The
heat is on again, however, as legislator Cheung
Chiu-hung, one of the newly elected pro-democratic
members of the Legco, proposed that the method of both
chief executive and Legco elections should be decided by
a referendum by the people of Hong Kong.
Hong Kong's
Basic Law, or constitution, does not mention anything
about referendums,
and the Beijing leadership and Hong Kong legal
experts are divided in their interpretations over
the situation. The Beijing leadership insists the drafters of
the Basic Law had no intention
whatsoever to introduce such thing as a plebiscite, but Hong
Kong legal experts says what is not overtly
prohibited in law should be allowed, at least according to
the common-law tradition. Britain returned Hong Kong to China
in 1997; China says it is committed
to universal suffrage and it has 50 years from 1997 to
bring it about, but only Beijing can decide when
the time is right for Hong Kong to enjoy full democracy.
Simple as it appears, the referendum proposal - not formal legislation -
has nonetheless spurred a new round of political
controversies in the territory and irritated the central
government in Beijing. As expected, the relationship
between Hong Kong's democrats and Beijing - which had
been improving in the past few months when the central
government even invited some possibly pliant democrat
legislators to Beijing for direct dialogue - has gotten
tense again. China experts warn that Beijing must be
careful in dealing with these democrats because its
excessive and coercive tactics could backfire at any
time.
On October 18, Cheung, a social worker and
university lecturer (elected from a functional
constituency, not by popular vote), put forward his
referendum motion, which had been scheduled for further
discussion on Monday. The voting at the panel under the
Legco was postponed on Monday, however, because of a
procedural mistake. The date for the next meeting has
not yet been decided. However, it was widely believed
that the proposal would not go far, or even be fully
debated, because of the expected majority opposition
from pro-government legislators.
Three
"pan-democrats" returned from functional constituencies
(only a portion of legislators are directly elected) had
declared on Sunday that they would abstain during the
panel discussion on the referendum. That made the
prospects for a referendum very dim. It is widely
believed that Beijing's opposition toward the referendum
is related to the move by the three "pan-democrat"
legislators, although they have denied they were
pressured by Beijing.
Cheung's proposal was met
with Beijing's censure. Li Gang, deputy director of the
Central Government Liaison Office in Hong Kong,
denounced those who suggested holding a plebiscite as
"playing with fire". Li lashed out at the proposal as
flying in the teeth of the Basic Law and representing a
challenge to the central government, which theoretically
has a final say in Hong Kong's major affairs, including
constitutional development, which would cover any
referendum or plebiscite.
Beijing's intense
responses are understandable. In fact, it has some
traumatic experiences with plebiscites. On October 20,
1945, Outer Mongolia employed a referendum and passed a
motion declaring independence from China, thus becoming
today's independent nation of Mongolia, while Inner
Mongolia remains a Chinese-administered region. More
recently President Chen Shui-bian of Taiwan - which is
considered a renegade province by Beijing but an
independent or self-governing entity by many Taiwanese -
has also been playing the plebiscite card. Chen held
referendums on two sensitive questions - acquiring
better defensive capabilities against China and calling
for improved cross-strait relations - along with the
March presidential election, and he even planned to pass
an all-new constitution by 2008. Both referendum
measures failed for lack of voter participation.
For Beijing, Chen is a hardcore separatist who
has been promoting the island's independence with both
covert and open schemes, such as referendums. One might
even be about independence. As a result, the plebiscite
concept has almost become a political taboo on the
mainland for it could well give power to separatist
voices and undermine the country's territory integrity.
Political pundits believe that Beijing's stiff
opposition to proposed plebiscite in Hong Kong can be
attributed to the following reasons: 1) Given the
negative precedent in Taiwan, Beijing simply will not
allow Hong Kong to follow suit, which might further
encourage Chen to deploy referendums as a weapon to
fight Beijing. 2) As it has always stressed, Beijing
wants to lead, instead of sitting back and observing,
the constitutional development in Hong Kong. 3) The
results of a referendum, if it came to pass, could
culminate in a powerful public consensus that
jeopardizes Beijing's leading role in Hong Kong affairs.
Such a situation is the last thing the central
government wants.
On the other hand, what the
democrats in Hong Kong want most is the increasing
recognition of the validity of plebiscites and a
popular, universal vote in 2008 for chief executive,
which could put pressure on Beijing. After Beijing's
veto in April, the discussion for a genuine general
election in 2008 has almost died and the public has seen
an increase in different opinions that criticized the
suggestion from the pro-democratic camp as impractical.
Many more legislators call for a more protracted
strategy, proposing a popular vote in 2012 for the chief
executive, allowing more time for preparation and
consultation. As a result, the democrats brought forward
the issue in the Legco again, hoping to rekindle the
public's concern over the constitutional development and
raise the awareness of their work to bring about
authentic democracy and pluralism.
However, the
proposal is a two-edged sword for the democrats, because
both Beijing and the Hong Kong government already have
expressed opposition to any kind of plebiscite, while
the position of the middle class - the traditional vote
bank of the democrats - remains unclear. Analysts
caution that the pro-democratic camp should be careful
in proceeding with the proposal and any miscalculated
and excessive moves could backfire.
As a
fail-safe, alternative strategy, the democratic camp
proposes a civil plebiscite - instead of one funded by
public money - and it has managed to receive support
from Bishop Joseph Zen Zen-kin of the Catholic Diocese;
the cleric has been highly critical of Beijing's and the
Hong Kong government's rejection of early universal
suffrage. China experts are still concerned that the
democratic camp does not have enough resources to fund a
civil plebiscite. If badly organized and with a poor
turnout, it will leave the camp vulnerable to the
attacks of its rivals, mainly the pro-government and
pro-Beijing members of the Legco.
Most important
of all, the proposal has created conflicts even inside
the pro-democratic camp. Three members of the democratic
camp, including lawmakers Kwok Ka-kid, Joseph Lee and
Maundy Tam, said on Sunday that they would not vote for
the referendum if it was discussed at the Legco meeting.
Cheung Chiu-hung, the lawmaker who spearheaded the
referendum proposal, regretted their decisions and
explained that there existed some misunderstandings
about the plebiscite. He said it would not be legally
binding and only would serve as an indicator of public
opinion for the leaders in Hong Kong and Beijing. Yet
would it produce that powerful public consensus, which
could be used to pressure Beijing, that political
groundswell that the democratic camp has long been
striving for?
According to one informed source,
a few officials in the central government do hope that
Beijing will cut off the budding communication with Hong
Kong democrats once and for all - if the deadlock
between the two sides remains over the fundamental
political issue of universal suffrage, of which the
skirmish over referendums or plebiscites is only the
latest. Only a few months ago, the Beijing-Hong Kong
relationship began to improve when Beijing invited some
democrat legislators to Beijing for National Day
celebrations and exchanges between professional
associations. Although they were preliminary, these
visits implied a future dialogue and hoped-for
flexibility; these contacts already have meant a lot for
Beijing's relationship with Hong Kong democrats who have
long been denied visits to the mainland, for personal,
family or business matters.
Still, it appears
that most Beijing officials responsible for Hong Kong
and Macau affairs would rather distance themselves from
those democrats not deemed sufficiently compliant with
Beijing's go-slow approach to democracy and popular
participation in government.
Some figures in
Beijing go much further by suggesting that these
obdurate democrats in Hong Kong be labeled unpatriotic
separatists, a truly damning indictment that would ruin
many a political career. In fact, the support rates for
the democratic camp in Hong Kong have fallen to the
lowest level since it sought to improve communication
with Beijing. The people of Hong Kong may well be wary
that authentic democrats cannot get to cozy with
authentic authoritarians.
China experts warn
Beijing against any heavy-handed moves or crackdowns
because they might prove counterproductive and help
boost the popularity of the democrats, as witnessed by
Beijing's handling of Taiwanese pro-independence
officials. In previous Taiwanese presidential elections,
Beijing went beyond the boundaries in slamming some
pro-independence figures such as former president Lee
Ten-hui and exasperated the voters, who then pledged
overwhelming support to the figures accused by Beijing.
This is a mistake that Beijing cannot afford to make
again.
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