KUNMING, China - Predicting election results in
Taiwan can be embarrassing for politicians and pundits
alike. In March the polls predicted that incumbent
President Chen Shui-bian would be soundly defeated; he
won (albeit by the slimmest of margins). Last week, all
signs pointed to a victory by President Chen's pan-green
coalition of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP),
plus its ally, former president Lee Teng-hui's even more
independence-oriented Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU), in
the Legislative Yuan elections on Saturday. This time it
was the pan-blues' turn to squeak through; the
Kuomintang/People First Party coalition won 114 seats in
the 225-seat legislature - its first victory in the past
four major elections.
Parties rarely lose (or
win) elections based on a single issue or factor, but it
seems clear that President Chen's brand of
"in-your-face" politics, which in the past successfully
fueled nationalistic sentiments (and votes), backfired
this time. While claiming still to honor his pledge not
to change the Republic of China's (ROC's) name formally
(a de facto declaration of independence and deliberate
crossing of a presumed Chinese red line), he has
continued to push this envelop, by "informally"
substituting "Taiwan" for "the ROC" every chance he gets -
he even pledged that next year's quixotic quest to join
the United Nations would be under the name "Taiwan".
Swing voters reportedly saw his recent directive
that "Taiwan" would henceforth be used instead of
"China" in the title of state-owned firms (such as China
Airlines) as unnecessarily antagonistic; many feared
serious economic and political repercussions from
Beijing. Meanwhile, Chen's pledge to change the name of
Taiwan's overseas missions caught Washington by
surprise, causing another public rebuke condemning this
"unilateral change in the status quo" (thereby offering
the administration of US President George W Bush a rare
opportunity to call someone else a unilateralist).
But will President Chen see the election as a
warning to scale back his confrontational approach? If
he chooses not to, the results are pretty easy to
predict: an increase in cross-strait tensions, a
continued deterioration in Taipei's relations with
Washington, and continued political deadlock at home.
What's harder to predict are the consequences
if Chen decides that a kinder, gentler approach
is in order. Will Beijing accept the olive branches or
dismiss them as "insincere" (its favorite retort)? Will
Washington let bygones be bygones? And will the
pan-blues (after the color of the Kuomintang, or KMT,
emblem) decide to put the interests of Taiwan ahead of
its own desire to get even with the governing pan-greens
(after the color of the DPP emblem)? There is little
cause for optimism in all three instances.
The
new leadership in Beijing has demonstrated remarkable
flexibility and creativity in its approach to many other
issues, but it seems locked into its previously
unsuccessful "just say no" policy regarding any overture
coming from Chen Shui-bian. The DPP election setback
opens a window of opportunity to move forward, now that
Beijing can rest somewhat easier that no major
constitutional change is likely during the remainder of
Chen's term in office. But whether or not Chinese
President Hu Jintao will be bold enough to put forth a
new initiative remains to be seen, as is Chen's
willingness to accept such an offer if it were made.
While it remains easy to find staunch Taiwan
supporters in Washington, President Bush seems
increasingly fed up with Chen's antics; witness his
public rebuke last December (during Chinese Premier Wen
Jiabao's visit), and the most recent pointed criticism
against Chen's name-change initiatives. (Taipei's
assertion that it was merely trying to "avoid creating
confusion in the international community" insults the
intelligence of even its most ardent supporters.) The
Bush administration came to power convinced that, in
cross-strait matters, Beijing was the main problem. As
its second term begins, this is no longer the case;
positive steps, not lame excuses, will be required to
restore Washington's confidence.
As regards
domestic politics, one would hope that the pan-blue and
pan-green leaders would see the upcoming three-year
break in major elections as an opportunity to develop a
more cooperative approach to governing - don't bet on
it. The impending vote on the US$18 billion arms package
will be a test case; will the pan-blues put national
security first and support an arms package that it would
no doubt have pursued had it been in power? Just as the
DPP has found it difficult to make the transition from
being in the opposition to actually governing (even
after five years of practice), the KMT, after 50 years
in power, still hasn't figured out how to act as a
responsible opposition.
In all three instances,
it will be up to President Chen to make the first move,
by extending olive branches in multiple directions.
Those who feared that a DPP election victory would
result in a further deterioration in cross-strait and
trans-Pacific relations and/or the demise of the KMT are
no doubt breathing easier today. But those who hoped
that the election results would open the door for
improved cross-strait relations, renewed trust between
Taipei and Washington, and more cooperative, predictable
domestic politics on Taiwan, remain to be convinced.
Ralph A Cossa is president of
thePacific Forum CSIS, a
Honolulu-based non-profit research institute affiliated
with the Center for Strategic and International Studies
in Washington, which made this article available.
