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Much ado about China's
anti-secession law
By Ralph A
Cossa
(Used by permission of Pacific Forum CSIS)
It is not uncommon in America to condemn
movies we haven't seen or criticize books we
haven't read, based solely on their titles or our
worst fears regarding their presumed or rumored
contents. It seems our compatriots in Taiwan have
adopted this same trait.
I'm talking, of
course, about the critical reaction, in Taipei
(and in some circles in Washington), to Beijing's
proposed new anti-secession law, which will be
"debated" and inevitably passed by the Chinese
National Peoples' Congress (NPC), convening this
weekend. While the text has yet to be seen - it
may, in fact, still be a work in progress - this
has not prevented many observers in both capitals,
Washington and Taipei, from severely condemning
the proposed legislation.
It is difficult
to be too critical of this tendency, having been
guilty of it myself - during a recent trip to
Beijing I found myself expressing concerns over
the implications of the proposed new law,
regardless of its contents. The big question is
"why now?" At a time when there seems to finally
be some modest progress in cross-strait relations
- the unprecedented direct flights between Taiwan
and the mainland during the Chinese New Year
holiday period and the sending of two senior
Chinese representatives to Taiwan for the memorial
service for Koo Chen-fu, who conducted
breakthrough cross-Strait dialogue a decade ago
under the now disputed and frequently redefined
"1992 consensus" - why does Beijing feel it
necessary to pursue such potentially inflammatory
legislation?
The simple (and largely
unsatisfactory) answer seems to be that Beijing's
continuing deep distrust of Taiwan President Chen
Shui-bian (always referred to by Beijing as the
"so-called" president or more generically as the
"Taiwan authorities") lies at the root of the
legislation. It had its genesis in Chen's surprise
re-election in March 2004 and received added
impetus last fall when Beijing's experts - like
most Taiwan-watchers, not to mention President
Chen himself - were predicting victory for the
ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP)
"pan-green" (after the color of the DPP emblem)
coalition in the December 2004 Legislative Yuan
elections.
By the time the outcome
presented a more pleasant surprise (at least from
Beijing's perspective), the legislation had
already gained too much momentum to be abandoned.
Besides, Beijing interlocutors argued, the results
of the legislative election, while admittedly
making it harder for Chen to carry out his
"splittist" agenda, were not likely to persuade
him to alter his overall independence agenda. His
tactics might change, but not his objective.
The
main Chinese "concession" in response to the Taiwan Legislative Yuan
election outcome was to rename the bill. First
known as the "unification act" - a title that might
imply an aggressive, impatient outlook - it
later became anti-secession legislation aimed merely
at preserving the status quo. Since US President
George W Bush has repeatedly made it clear that
the US opposed any unilateral change in the status
quo, this new legislation puts Beijing's "one
China" principle squarely in line with
Washington's "one China policy", it was argued. It
also "underscores China's respect for the rule of
law" - another constant Washington admonition.
While neither of these arguments will prove
particularly convincing to Beijing's critics, they
do represent a growing sophistication (and
willingness to play along with the Bush
administration's logic back in Washington).
The counter-arguments - that the
legislation will incite and empower Beijing's
critics in Washington and Taipei and could breathe
new life into Chen's presumed "independence
agenda" by handing him an excuse for counter
legislation or even another referendum - failed to
impress Chinese officials. They sent a clear
signal about their ambiguous legislation: if you
want to make suggestions as to how we can word
this legislation more effectively (or make it less
inflammatory), we are all ears; if you are trying
to talk us out of introducing the new law, "save
your breath!" Once we actually saw the legislation
- and it would be made public immediately after it
was approved by the NPC - we would see that all
the furor had been "much ado about nothing".
Perhaps! But regardless of its content,
the certain to be enacted anti-secession law
presents a target of opportunity for President
Chen that he will find hard to resist shooting at.
If Chen sees his second term legacy as building a
bridge across the Taiwan Strait - something
Beijing now talks about doing literally but seems
hesitant to undertake figuratively - he might
indeed see this legislation as the "opportunity
for dialogue" that Beijing claims the legislation
will represent. China asserts the law will lay out
what is not allowed (ie, independence), thereby
opening the door, the Chinese logic goes, for
serious dialogue about improving cross-strait
relations as long as this independence "red line"
is not crossed. If President Chen is more intent
on solidifying Taiwan's separation from the
mainland, as many suspect, he will approach the
legislation like the trial lawyer he was,
exploiting loopholes and finding ways of turning
even the most passive and innocuous of statements
into justification in pursuit of this agenda.
Presuming that Beijing proceeds with this
legislation - and, regrettably, I see no reason to
presume otherwise - the ball, like it or not, will
be in President Chen's court once again. He would
be well-served to wait until seeing the
legislation before locking himself into any course
of action, as he currently seems to be doing:
earlier threats to introduce counter-legislation
or hold an anti-annexation referendum are now
wisely being described as "options", as opposed to
intended actions by the president's office, even
if certain ruling coalition members are demanding
harsher steps.
Locking Taipei into a
response in advance could also create new
divisions between Washington and Taipei if the
Bush administration's assessment of the
legislation coincides with China's "much ado about
nothing" assessment. After all, the legislation
"merely codifies current PRC [People's Republic of
China] policy," Beijing asserts, while supporting
President Bush's efforts to "preserve the status
quo".
In my own discussions with senior
Taiwan officials, I was reminded that Washington
had described the Chinese legislation as
"unnecessary" and a case of "bad timing". While
this is true, exactly the same reaction was heard
from Washington last year in response to President
Chen's plans to hold a "defensive" referendum in
conjunction with Taiwan's presidential election.
(China
is estimated to have at least 630 missiles aimed at
Taiwan; at the time of the election, reports had
placed the number at more than 500, with
at least 75 being added each year. The referendum failed
for lack of sufficient voter participation, but
most of those who did vote supported urging
Beijing to remove its missiles, and if
Beijing refused, to seek advanced anti-missile technology for
the island.)
Washington's protestations
over the referendum notwithstanding, political
imperatives in Taipei led Chen to conclude that a
referendum was politically necessary (even if
geopolitically unhelpful or unwise). Beijing
apparently has reached the same conclusion this
year.
Last year, the Bush administration
waited to see the wording of the referendum before
reacting (or overreacting), Chinese protestations
notwithstanding. It appears intent, wisely in my
view, on doing the same this time. One hopes that
Taiwan, and its friends in the US Congress, will
do the same. It would be much wiser, in the long
run, to examine how the legislation, once
revealed, might be turned to Taipei's geopolitical
advantage, rather than to merely exploit it for
domestic political purposes, as tempting as that
course of action might be.
Ralph A
Cossa is president of the Pacific Forum CSIS, which gave
permission for publication of this article. He can
be reached at pacforum@hawaii.rr.com |
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