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US's $5 billion nuclear gamble with
China By Kaushik
Kapisthalam
On the surface, it's the
biggest deal in the history of the Export-Import
Bank of the United States - US$5 billion to
finance the building of Chinese nuclear power
plants by US firms in the energy-starved economic
giant. But there's much more to it than big
business: closer scrutiny and interviews with
experts reveal a weak, inconsistent and ultimately
dangerous US policy with regard to China and its
past (some say present) weapons proliferation, as
well as China's own efforts to acquire nuclear
reactors and other Western high technology that
could be passed on to less-than-responsible
states.
In effect, in the interests of big
business, the US is turning a blind eye to past
proliferation by Chinese entities with which it
deals.
China says it's clean - no more
proliferation and unauthorized exports of nuclear
materials and equipment to states that should not
have them. Not everyone is so sure.
America's sometimes serious, sometimes
blase non-proliferation policy with respect to
China hit a new low when the conservative magazine
Human Events revealed that the US Export-Import
Bank (Ex-Im Bank), an independent federal agency
that finances exports by US firms, approved a
preliminary commitment for $5 billion in loans and
loan guarantees to the China National Nuclear Corp
(CNNC) to finance the building of nuclear power
plants by US firms.
The Ex-Im loans and
guarantees are part of aggressive efforts by US
officials and diplomats, including former energy
secretary Spencer Abraham and current Vice
President Dick Cheney, to lobby the Chinese
government to sign a deal with Monroeville,
Pennsylvania-based power giant Westinghouse
Electric Co. Westinghouse had previously lobbied
hard to obtain clearance for the sale from the US
Nuclear Regulatory Commission last September.
Facing skyrocketing demand and significant
electricity shortfalls, as well as numerous
constraints based on the Kyoto Accord to reduce
coal-burning emissions, China has emphasized the
importance of new energy projects and declared a
plan to invite bids for four more nuclear plants
at two sites, Sanmen in Zhejiang province and Ling
Ao in Guangdong province, adding to its nine
operating reactors with a combined capacity of
6,500 megawatts, which is less than 2% of China's
electricity demand today. In addition, Russian
firms are building two 1,000MW pressurized water
reactors (PWRs, known as VVERs in Russia) in
Tianwan, on China's east coast. Chinese officials
foresee the need for as many as 32 nuclear power
plants by 2020 at an estimated cost of more than
$35 billion.
Westinghouse, though
considered a front-runner for the new PWR tender,
is reportedly facing stiff competition from French
major Framatome ANP, Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd
(AECL) and the Russian firm AtomStroyExport. Such
reactors are usually contracted in pairs and
Westinghouse is pitching its state-of-the-art
AP1,000 PWRs at $2.2 billion to $2.7 billion a
pair. China formally accepted bids on February 28
and should it choose Westinghouse, the American
taxpayer would be underwriting the reactor sale
through Ex-Im and assuming the risk in case the
Chinese buyer defaults.
At face value,
this would seem to be just another example of US
statecraft used to promote US companies abroad.
After all, Westinghouse is unlikely to get too
many new contracts to build nuclear power plants
in the United States, due to the public
ambivalence about and opposition to nuclear
energy, and getting deals abroad could result in
thousands of new US jobs.
What makes this
deal different is the entity at the Chinese end -
CNNC. Along with its wholly owned subsidiary,
China Nuclear Energy Industry Corp (CNEIC), CNNC
is known for numerous nuclear proliferation
activities over many years.
Despite this,
US sanctions policy for punishing proliferation is
weak and contradictory. It does not sanction
company B if company A is caught proliferating,
even if companies B and A are owned by the same
entity. That is why there is a perversely ironic
situation in the Ex-Im Bank's funding of CNNC,
when officially the US blames the CNEIC for
proliferation - even though CNEIC is owned by
CNNC.
The real story is more than the
mammoth business transaction - it's the
proliferation links of the Ex-Im's beneficiary
(CNNC) and the series of broken promises and
sanctions shell game Beijing has been able to play
with Washington.
The Non-Proliferation
Treaty (NPT) and other multilateral regimes have
one basic premise - if a country sticks to the
treaty guidelines concerning non-weaponization, it
can partake in the peaceful use of nuclear
technology. That's the reward for
non-proliferation. For a country like Iran, the
NPT commitments are to foreswear permanently the
development of nuclear weapons. For China, which
is one of the five allowed nuclear-weapons states
(along with the United Kingdom, France, Russia and
the United States), the bargain means forswearing
the spreading of nuclear-weapons technology.
For decades, China had been seeking to
gain access to advanced Western nuclear energy
technology but was denied the chance by the
Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and other cartels
precisely because of Beijing's perceived poor
nuclear-weapons proliferation record, especially
with regard to Iran and Pakistan. For its part,
China initially was openly hostile to such cartels
and the need for export controls and restraint in
sales to troublesome countries. As a result, China
was denied access to advanced reactors despite its
nuclear-weapons-state status in the NPT.
In the 1990s, however, China had a change
of heart. Chinese leaders agreed to formulate
Western-style export-control laws to prevent
unauthorized weapons-technology sales in return
for a US promise of gradual entry of China into
these cartels with their promise of access to
technology. From the US perspective, this was a
case of dangling NSG and other memberships as
carrots to induce China to end proliferation, and
the US backed China's membership in the Nuclear
Suppliers Group.
Some well-placed sources,
however, say they believe China probably has made
promises not to proliferate, in order to gain
entry into the cartels, while trying to evade some
of its non-proliferation commitments. China denies
this. The fundamental idea is that China is
rewarded with Western reactor technology as long
as it makes a commitment not to proliferate
nuclear weapons technology or authorize any
nuclear sale to facilities not under safeguards of
the United Nations International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA). It has made that commitment, though
some doubt Beijing's sincerity.
In
February 1996, the Washington Times, quoting
intelligence sources, reported that the US had
evidence that CNNC sold 5,000 ring magnets to the
A Q Khan Research Laboratory in Pakistan, named
after the putative "father" of Pakistan's nuclear
bomb who was pardoned in February 2004 after
confessing to nuclear-weapons deals with Iran,
Libya and North Korea. Ring magnets are critical
parts of high-speed centrifuges used to enrich
uranium to weapons grade. After equivocating for a
while, the US State Department officially
confirmed the report. Chinese vice foreign
minister Li Zhaoxing (now foreign minister) did
not deny the sale but argued that it was "peaceful
nuclear cooperation". Many experts, however,
called the sale a clear breach of Article III (2)
of the NPT. Since China had formally become a
signatory to the NPT by that time,
non-proliferation advocates and US lawmakers
called for stringent sanctions on China.
However, it soon became clear that tough
sanctions were never in the cards. A broad-based
sanctions regime would have resulted in the
cancellation or blocking of massive deals
involving US corporate giants such as Boeing
Aircraft Co and Westinghouse (which had pending
deals with CNNC at that time). There was intense
debate within the administration of US president
Bill Clinton. After a few more months of waffling,
the State Department finally announced on May 10,
1996, that the US had been unable to "make a
determination" that China violated the NPT with
this ring-magnet deal. As a result, the Clinton
administration declared that it would not seek to
impose sanctions on China or Pakistan, and Ex-Im's
considerations of loans for US exporters to China
were returned to normal.
Ring magnets are
old news but the entities that authorized the sale
are still powerful. Chinese leaders insisted they
were not aware of the magnet transfer and stated
that there is no evidence that the Chinese
government had "willfully aided or abetted"
Pakistan's nuclear-weapons program through the
ring-magnet sale. They also touted an apparent
"concession" by China when a Chinese Foreign
Ministry spokesman made a statement that "China
will not provide assistance to unsafeguarded
nuclear facilities".
The US Congress
passed a law closing the apparent loophole of
requiring proof of willful government involvement
and also requiring a presidential report on
China's transfers of "technology, equipment, or
materials important to the production of nuclear
weapons and their means of delivery" to Pakistan.
What is new is the expected financing of a
Chinese entity, CNNC, owner of CNEIC, which is
known to have passed nuclear technology on to
states that should not possess it.
China
did not wait too long to violate its May 1996
pledge. In October 1996, the Washington Times
quoted a report by the US Central Intelligence
Agency stating that China sold a "special
industrial furnace" and "high-tech diagnostic
equipment" to unsafeguarded nuclear facilities in
Pakistan. In addition, Chinese technicians in
Pakistan reportedly prepared to install the
dual-use equipment in September 1996. The firm
involved in the deal was the CNEIC. The Washington
Post reported that the CNEIC equipment was
intended for a nuclear reactor being built by
Pakistan at Khushab. The Khushab facility is not
under IAEA safeguards, thereby making the Chinese
sale a clear violation of May 1996 pledge, US laws
and possibly the NPT. It later became known that
the Khushab facility was the site of a heavy-water
research reactor - a central element of Pakistan's
program for production of plutonium and tritium
for advanced compact nuclear warheads meant for
ballistic missiles.
Still, the State
Department did not conclude that China had
violated its non-proliferation pledges of 1996 in
the case of Pakistan and did not call for
sanctions.
The Khushab reactor now
provides Pakistan the ability to produce enough
plutonium to fabricate as many as three to five
bombs every year. CNNC and CNEIC have also been
implicated in nuclear weapons-related sales to
Iran since then. Not long after the Khushab
revelation, Ex-Im approved two loans to help CNNC
build nuclear power plants at the Qinshan nuclear
facility near Shanghai. US major Bechtel was the
primary beneficiary of that deal.
To the
defenders of US nuclear trade with China, the
potential Westinghouse deal is just a natural step
in the Chinese re-engagement with the multilateral
nuclear regimes led by Western nations. Some would
point to their view that China has moved greatly
along the path of non-proliferation, from a policy
of open contempt and hostility in the 1970s and
1980s to accession to various treaties and
informal agreements in the 1990s and the current
decade. The State Department extols what it sees
as great advances in China's export-control laws,
which are now deemed comparable to Western
standards. In fact, the State Department lobbied
hard for China's 2004 entry into the NSG, a cartel
of nuclear-reactor technology producers. The NSG
entry directly led to China being able to buy
advanced nuclear reactors from Western nations.
Another popular theory is that many such
proliferation deals are not approved by the
Chinese government and can be stopped by working
with the Chinese government to improve and enforce
its export-control laws. China's recent issuing of
a White Paper on non-proliferation is cited as
progress in this regard. But this theory too fails
to stand up to scrutiny. Other than the simple
fact that Chinese firms are state-controlled and
common sense dictates that major sales cannot
happen without approval at the highest levels,
there is a preponderance of evidence that there is
government approval for proliferation activities.
The US-China Economic and Security Review
Commission notes in its 2004 report that Chinese
firms involved in proliferation have links to high
government and Communist Party officials. Former
US secretary of state James A Baker made similar
observations in his memoirs - he should know
because he was involved in discussions with the
Chinese regarding their pattern of broken pledges
with regard to nuclear and missile proliferation.
It therefore seems clear that the
engagement advocates have based their China policy
more on how they hope China will behave than how
China actually behaves. It is quite clear that
China has joined multilateral regimes to gain
prestige and derive benefits like access to
advanced nuclear technology, while violating its
sovereign commitments and hiding behind plausible
deniability. It can be argued that China thwarts
challenges to its behavior, knowing that its
commercial strength can be used to stymie any
moves to punish its proliferation activities.
For its part, the US government, through
the outgoing Under Secretary of State John Bolton
and others, has argued that Washington has taken
tough action on Chinese entities engaging in
proliferation, through the imposition of sanctions
and other moves. But as non-proliferation expert
Gary Milhollin wrote in the New York Times
recently, these sanctions are part of a "shell
game" wherein the US knows its effects don't sting
the Chinese regime as much as it appears.
For instance, after discovering that
certain subsidiaries of Sinopec, China's
state-owned oil and natural-gas conglomerate, was
transferring chemical-weapons-related technology
to Iran, the State Department repeatedly slapped
sanctions on the subsidiaries. But loopholes in
the US laws allow the punishment of individual
entities within a corporation while shielding
others. In this case, the Sinopec subsidiaries
that were sanctioned did little or no business
with US firms and the sanctions therefore were
meaningless.
Had the US really wanted to
send a message to China, it should have hit the
parent entity, Sinopec, argued Milhollin. He said
further that in 2000, Sinopec raised about $3.5
billion by selling shares on the New York Stock
Exchange, with ExxonMobil buying a large stake. In
addition, the US firm Halliburton has since
provided Sinopec a design for a new chemical
plant; Bechtel has helped it build a petrochemical
complex in China; and oil giant ConocoPhillips has
aided it in oil and gas exploration. In 2002,
Sinopec actually received a grant worth $429,000
from the US Trade and Development Agency. Clearly,
by employing the logic of the left hand not
knowing what the right hand does, US policy in
effect winks at blatant Chinese proliferation and
indeed seeks to reward violators with huge
deals.
At the end of the day, America's
current pusillanimous policy on Chinese
proliferation has left it in a veritable no-man's
land. By in effect placing trade over security,
the US is playing into China's hands. For
instance, once the US stymied internal objections
and pushed through China's entry into the Nuclear
Suppliers Group, it handed China a big club and
China wasted no time in using it. Until its entry
into the NSG, China listened politely to US
demands that it needed to provide iron-clad
guarantees that any foreign-origin nuclear-reactor
technology would not be transferred, before China
would be allowed to procure reactors from NSG
cartel members.
But as the journal Nuclear
Fuel reported in 2004, even before the ink dried
on China's NSG entry papers, China blatantly told
the US that it "sees no basis'' for committing
itself to a deal to buy a US power reactor should
the US impose any additional requirements for
re-transfer assurances simply because the French
and Canadians were offering the same technology to
China sans any meddlesome preconditions,
thanks to its newly minted NSG-member status. As a
consequence, the US and other nuclear powers are
now tripping over themselves to offer nuclear
reactors to China with generous financial and
other incentives.
It must be noted that
just before China joined the NSG, it hurriedly
signed a deal with Pakistan for building a 300MW
unsafeguarded nuclear reactor at Chasma, near
Karachi. Such a deal would be a violation had
China signed it after its NSG membership became
formal. Is it hard to imagine the state-of-the-art
Framatome or Westinghouse PWR nuclear technology
soon being sold by China to Pakistan or Iran? And
should it happen, is it likely that the US would
suddenly get the will to lower the boom on Chinese
proliferators? US acquiescence to China's
proliferation also undercuts Washington's policy
on problem states such as Iran and North Korea.
How can the US expect to send a tough message to
China on nuclear/missile trade with Iran when it
ends up financing the parent firms of the same
entities that proliferate?
If the US is
really concerned about nuclear proliferation, it
should take muscular steps to confront China's
proliferation, rather than offering rewards in big
business deals to build nuclear reactors.
Kaushik Kapisthalam
is a freelance defense and
strategic affairs analyst based in the United
States. He can be reached at contact@kapisthalam.com
.
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