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Beijing seizes the
initiative
By Francesco
Sisci
BEIJING - One can read it as a story
of blunders and bullying on the two sides of the
Taiwan Strait, and there was an abundance of both
follies in the lead-up to passage of the
anti-secession law by China's National People's
Congress. Yet the law adopted Monday served a
higher purpose for Beijing: it got the Chinese
Communist Party (CCP) out of the slough of
passivity into which Taiwan had thrust it for the
past decade.
The law, as Bruce Klingner
(The Dragon squeezes
Taiwan, Mar 15) noted this week, "is
neither as inflammatory as many had feared nor as
bombastic as Beijing's previous statements on
cross-strait issues", but it authorizes "China to
use military force if Taiwan moves decisively
toward or declares formal independence".
The law now puts the onus of marching
towards war squarely on Taiwan President Chen
Shui-bian, who is sternly warned against pursuing
the island's independence "under any name or by
any means". The law also cautions any party, be it
the United States or Japan, which jointly
proclaimed Taiwan to be a regional security issue,
against interfering in "China's internal affairs".
The law appears at least ill-timed. It was
announced last December, shortly after Chen had
failed to win crucial parliamentary elections,
which were supposed to give him the majority
necessary to move toward amending the constitution
in 2006. It was Chen's second setback. In the
summer he also failed to win a referendum that
would spin the constitutional changes leading to
the formal independence of the island.
Before announcing the law, China was thus
gaining ground, both in the international
community and in Taiwan, where Chen appeared to be
the one who was pushing the envelope with
uncalled-for initiatives against Beijing.
The announced anti-secession bill
immediately switched the focus. Taipei was no
longer the one introducing new elements that could
change the status quo - it was Beijing. Formally,
Beijing can claim that the law merely states a
long-standing fact: that the Chinese leadership
could not survive politically if it were to allow
Taiwan to become independent.
But this
fact, left hanging uncomfortably but not
enunciated in Beijing, had thus far remained
unclear. Every time Chen, or his predecessor Lee
Teng-hui, pushed the envelope with trips to Japan
or the US, or tried to pass a new resolution, make
a passport change, or discuss changing the
Republic of China flag, Beijing had to react in a
frustrating and passive tit-for-tat.
Every
time the world's public had to judge the ferocity
or mildness of Beijing's latest reaction, and
Beijing had to swallow these public opinion
reactions that followed Chen's actions; this
deprived Beijing of the satisfaction of
humiliating Chen. The issue each time, in
Beijing's view, became what Beijing said, not what
Taipei had done to make Beijing say what it said.
Beijing felt "led by the nose" without the
possibility of taking the initiative, and it would
only hope that Taiwan did not come up with some
new concoctions to make the motherland look bad.
Even Chen's two electoral defeats in Taiwan
occurred without Beijing's active participation.
Beijing could only threaten war and hope for
peace, and it had been so for about a decade,
since president Lee Teng-hui decided to move
towards formal independence.
China had to
break this deadlock, which was also very vexing
internally, because rising domestic public opinion
was blaming Beijing for not having the spine to
act against Taiwan. Chen would come up with other
ideas after his electoral defeats, and then what
could Beijing do? Repeat the same bombastic
threats that sounded empty and portrayed the
Middle Kingdom as a paper tiger; or worse, start a
war, and thus forfeit 25 years of reform. Both
options would endanger the rule of the Communist
Party. With the first (of Chen's electoral
setbacks) the party looked internally unable to
take decisive action against a perceived national
threat, Chen pushing the envelope towards
independence; with the second, the party would not
survive the economic slump that would follow even
a limited war on Taiwan.
The way out would
have been to win the hearts and minds of the
Taiwanese people, but the Communist Party never
took part in a democratic election and feared that
if it tried some public relations initiatives they
could be wrong and backfire. Furthermore, besides
giving economic opportunities to Taiwan investors
and underwriting a huge and growing trade deficit
with Taiwan, Beijing was afraid that any stronger
political initiative, such as a political campaign
against the Taiwan media, could backfire. Chen
could simply proclaim to the world that Beijing
was already interfering in and messing with
self-governing Taiwan's political life.
The anti-secession law cuts to the chase,
it draws a line in the sand and dares Taiwan to
move towards independence. Now the ball is in
Taiwan's court and Chen or his successors, if they
move toward independence, then must expect
Beijing's reactions, which are already announced
as legally binding and are not discretionary or
decided in a closed party meeting. If what you
want is a rhetorical game - exchanging a
traditional political decision taken behind closed
doors for a real law enacted in public session -
then this is the game of the West, just as the US
has also played up or down Washington's own Taiwan
Relations Act in order to explain US support for
the island.
Moreover, Beijing did make a
belated effort, half-hearted and unsuccessful, to
win the hearts and minds of the Taiwanese people:
China's leadership removed the media-shy,
unpopular and, many said, the incompetent Tung
Chee-hwa as Hong Kong's chief executive and
replaced him with more worldly, sophisticated and
sympathetic David Tsang, Tung's chief of
administration. It was a signal to the people of
the territory and those of Taiwan - who look at
Hong Kong to size up how Beijing would behave if
reunification with Taiwan ever began to take
shape. Beijing's intended message: we care for the
people, we understand Hong Kong people do not like
Tung's rule, we are trading him in for someone
better. Of course the message is faint and really
does not resonate, since even Tsang, like Tung,
was not chosen by the Hong Kong people, but by
Beijing. Still Zhongnanhai, Beijing's seat of
power, hopes the Hong Kong people will like Tsang
better than his predecessor Tung.
Also the
cross-strait game and all its moves embodied in
the anti-secession law is very domestic and
China-specific, too subtle to be grasped by most
of the outside world, which reacted almost with
horror at a law that many thought made war a duty,
if only some conditions were met. Beijing arguably
could have waited longer, to let Chen simmer in
his two electoral setbacks - a razor-thin
presidential "victory" and an electoral
disappointment. This would certainly have avoided
US and Japan proclaiming Taiwan as a joint
security issue, infuriating Beijing, and it would
have given time to Beijing's new leadership to
cozy up to Washington and prepare the groundwork
for the new anti-secession law.
In fact,
Taiwan's mood changed again. It had cooled and was
disaffected with Chen last year in the two
elections, presidential and legislative - but now
the overwhelming majority of the people on the
island are said to dislike China's anti-secession
law so intensely that many took to the streets to
protest what they called China's latest bullying.
It was a God-send for Chen. Taiwanese
pro-independence forces now had the proof, in
black and white, of China's perceived bellicose
intentions. No matter that Premier Wen Jiabao had
tried to smooth Taiwan's ruffled feathers and put
a benevolent, pacific spin on the law during a
press conference on Monday - the fact remained
that there was still this law authorizing war if
necessary. It was almost too good to be true.
Taiwan could have played this up to underscore
China's threat, without moving a step closer to
the line drawn by Beijing. Taiwan could, and can,
actually whip up global public opinion against the
law and push Beijing to draw back, forced to
explain more and more that the law was really not
as fearsome or threatening as Taiwan claimed.
But this Taiwan strategy would have taken
time, and still Beijing would ultimately stick to
its law. Perhaps in its enthusiasm for having a
great issue to play up, or perhaps in its haste to
cash in now on an opportunity without waiting for
future developments, Taiwan's administration went
too far. It called for an international
condemnation of the law. This might be hard to
achieve, and it could backfire with Taiwan.
Although the law smells bad, the whole
Taiwan affair is a sticky issue, one that most
countries would like to avoid. Therefore, even if
some countries, even major nations like the United
States, were to condemn China (a move that is
unlikely - "regret" might be the preferred
diplomatic euphemism), most countries would stop
short of outright condemnation. The international
community's predicament - disliking the law but
not wanting to offend China - could work in
Beijing's favor: The world has been called on to
condemn the law authorizing war, it doesn't do so,
and therefore Beijing can claim the world
acquiesces. Score 1 for Beijing.
If this
works, then Chen Shui-bian might have saved
Beijing in one of its darkest days when the Asian
power seemed like a paper tiger. Something for
which Beijing ought to be grateful.
Francesco Sisci is the director
of the Institute of Italian Culture in Beijing.
This article represents his views alone and not
those of the institute.
(Copyright
2005 Asia Times Online Ltd. All rights reserved.
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