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China's 'helpful' Anti-Secession
Law
By Ralph A Cossa
(Used by permission of Pacific Forum
CSIS)
"Unhelpful." That's how
Washington described China's new Anti-Secession
Law (ASL), authorizing the use of "non-peaceful
means" in the event that the opportunity for
peaceful reunification with Taiwan is "completely
exhausted". I beg to differ. As it turns out, the
Anti-Secession Law has proven to be very helpful -
to everyone but Beijing, that is.
The ASL
has turned a potential diplomatic embarrassment
for United States President George W Bush into a
diplomatic victory. Earlier this year, the
European Union seemed intent on lifting its arms
embargo against China (in place since the 1989
Tiananmen violence), despite - or perhaps because
of - strong vocal pressure from the White House
and US Congress. The Anti-Secession Law gave the
Europeans a face-saving way out. It "created quite
a difficult political environment", lamented one
proponent of lifting the ban; others acknowledged
that "the timeline has become more difficult". As
a result, the lifting of the EU embargo, which
seemed a sure bet in December, in all likelihood
will now be "postponed" until 2006. By passing the
Anti-Secession Law, Beijing snatched defeat from
the jaws of victory in its diplomatic contest with
Washington, while boosting - or at least
preventing a further deterioration of -
Washington's relations with Brussels.
Helpful as the new Chinese law was to
Trans-Atlantic relations, it was even more helpful
to its intended target, Taiwan President Chen
Shui-bian. Chinese officials have argued that the
new law was necessary to check Chen's "splittist"
ambitions. But his ruling coalition experienced a
major setback in December when it failed, despite
Chen's own brash predictions, to win a majority in
the Legislative Yuan (LY) elections. Chen's
"in-your-face" policies toward Beijing were seen
as a major contributing factor in the defeat and
his post-election tone had become far more
conciliatory.
Why then did Beijing feel
compelled to proceed with the ASL? Apparently, by
the time Beijing realized that Chen's coalition
would not prevail in the LY elections, the
political momentum (read: high-level leadership
support) for the ASL was too great to turn off.
Besides, Beijing interlocutors argued, the
election setback had not caused Chen to change his
objectives, only his tactics. The counter-argument
- that the ASL would breathe new life into the
pro-independence movement - fell on deaf ears in
Beijing. But even the hard of hearing could not
miss the collective voices of half a million or
more Taiwanese, who took to the streets this past
weekend to voice their displeasure over the ASL,
in a demonstration smoothly orchestrated by the
Chen government. As many had warned, Beijing's
heavy-handed action revitalized Chen's coalition
and put the opposition once again on the
defensive.
The big question is, "what
happens next?" Does the ASL make further progress
in cross-strait relations unlikely (if not
impossible), as its critics argue, or does it, as
Beijing contends, open the door for further
progress as long as Taiwan does not take
irreversible steps toward independence? After all,
the refusal to rule out the use of force is
nothing new; this has always been a major element
of Beijing's cross-strait policy. Passing a law -
in a country where the rule of law is, at best,
applied selectively - hardly makes an attack any
more (or less) likely.
Of more relevance,
and considerably more promising, than Article
Eight - the "non-peaceful means" clause - is
Article Seven, which affirms that "the state
stands for the achievement of peaceful
reunification through consultations and
negotiations on an equal footing between the two
sides of the Taiwan Straits". Even more intriguing
is the acknowledgment that "these consultations
and negotiations may be conducted in steps and
phases and with flexible and varied modalities".
While an earlier article notes that "upholding the
principle of one China is the basis of peaceful
reunification", there is no specified requirement
in the ASL for Taipei to accept the one China
principle as a precondition for starting the
process of consultations and negotiations.
Does this mean that Beijing is prepared,
finally, to be more flexible on this point? Who
knows, but it would be irresponsible of Taipei to
overlook this possibility, since it could just
hold the key to an eventual resumption of
cross-strait dialogue.
As I read the ASL,
China is not demanding that Taipei accept the "one
China" principle, only that it not take any action
that "completely exhausted" or foreclosed the
possibility. It remains unclear what "flexible and
varied modalities" are acceptable to Beijing. An
acknowledgment by Taipei that "an agreement to
agree to disagree" over the interpretation of one
China had previously existed - the so-called "1992
consensus" that allowed earlier direct
cross-strait dialogue to occur - might suffice.
President Chen himself hinted at such an agreement
when, in his National Day speech last October, he
proposed that "both sides use the basis of the
1992 meeting in Hong Kong ... as preparation of a
step forward in the resumption of dialogue and
consultation."
If the leadership in Taiwan
is prepared to move beyond the emotion of the new
law and creatively test its possibilities, and the
leadership in Beijing is serious when it asserts
that the ASL opens rather than closes the door for
meaningful dialogue, then the Anti-Secession Law
might yet prove helpful to both Taipei and
Beijing.
Ralph A Cossa is president
of the Pacific Forum
CSIS, which made this article
available. He can be reached at pacforum@hawaii.rr.com |
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