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A little sunshine across the
strait
By David G Brown
(Used by permission of Pacific Forum CSIS)
After burnishing its hardline credentials
by announcing in December its intention to enact
an Anti-Secession Law (ASL), Beijing took some
significant steps toward improving cross-strait
relations in January by cooperating in New Year
charter flights, stopping propaganda criticism of
Taiwan President Chen Shui-bian, and sending ARATS
(Association for Relations Across the Taiwan
Strait) officials to Koo Chen-fu's funeral in
Taipei. For his part, Chen also took conciliatory
steps by reaffirming his inaugural pledges
concerning constitutional reform and appointing as
the new premier Hsieh Chang-ting, who quickly set
a more moderate tone on contentious domestic and
cross-strait issues.
Nevertheless, despite
widespread criticism from Taiwan and the United
States, Beijing's National People's Congress (NPC)
last month adopted the ASL, which emphasizes
China's pursuit of peaceful reunification but
mandates that unspecified "non-peaceful means" may
be used if Taiwan seeks to secede from China. When
the dust from the ASL controversy settles, the
question will be whether Beijing and Taipei are
able to follow up on the successful New Year
charter flights by arranging further steps toward
direct cross-strait cargo and/or passenger
flights.
2005 opens
felicitously
At
its regular weekly press conference on January 1,
Beijing's Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) announced
that China was prepared to arrange cross-strait
charter flights over the lunar New Year spring
festival holidays. This delayed response to an
earlier proposal
Three
months in
China-Taiwan
affairs
January
Jan 1: Taiwan
Affairs Office (TAO) says Beijing is willing to
arrange New Year charter flights.
Jan 3:
Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) chairman
Koo Chen-fu dies.
Jan 4: Mainland
Affairs Council (MAC) says Association for
Relations Across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS) chair
Wang Daohan welcome to attend Koo's funeral.
Jan 10: Kuomintang (KMT) delegation
meets TAO's Chen Yunlin; report agreement on
charter flights.
Jan 12: Beijing
civil aviation official invites counterpart for
talks on charter flights.
Jan 12:
Deputy US secretary of state Richard
Armitage holds frank talks with Taiwan emissary
Tsai Yng-wen.
Jan 16: Civil-aviation
officials meet in Macau; announce accord on
charter flights.
Jan 18: MAC chair
Joseph Wu in Washington attacks Anti-Secession
Law (ASL).
Jan 20: UK Foreign
Secretary Straw in Beijing urges end to EU arms
embargo.
Jan 21: Grenada resumes
diplomatic relations with Beijing.
Jan
24: TAO chair Chen meets Armitage in
Washington, DC, explains ASL.
Jan 25:
Frank Hsieh named Taiwan premier; calls for
reconciliation and cooperation.
Jan 26:
Taiwan President Chen Shui-bian departs on
tour to Solomon Islands, Palau and Guam.
Jan 28: Jia Qinglin gives talk on
Taiwan policy with conciliatory tone.
Jan
29: New Year charter flights begin; first
People's Republic of China (PRC) plane lands in
Taiwan.
Jan 30: Responding to Jia,
Chen Shui-bian reiterates no consensus in 1992.
February
Feb 1: ARATS officers
Sun Yafu and Li Yafei arrive Taipei for Koo
funeral.
Feb 2: At Koo funeral, Chen
invites Wang to visit Taiwan.
Feb 9:
Japanese Diet approves special visa waver
program for Taiwan tourists.
Feb 16:
President Chen expresses hope for agreement
on cargo charter flights.
Feb 16: US
Central Intelligence Agency director Porter Goss
says cross-strait military balance shifting in
Beijing's favor.
Feb 16: Beijing
civil-aviation official speaks positively of
further charter flights.
Feb 19:
US-Japan joint statement calls peaceful
settlement of cross-strait issues common
strategic objective.
Feb 20: New Year
charter flights end.
Feb 22: Taipei
civil aviation delegation meets counterparts in
Beijing.
Feb 22: US President George
W Bush at North Atlantic Treaty Organization
summit calls for continued EU arms embargo
against China.
Feb 23: Amendments to
International Health Regulations agreed in
Geneva.
Feb 24: President Chen and
James Soong sign 10-point statement.
Feb
24: TAO says Beijing ready to arrange more
flights and open agricultural markets.
Feb 27: Former US president Bill
Clinton in Taipei; supports "one China".
March
Mar 1: Chen tells
Newsweek he has thought about a plan to keep the
cross-strait relationship with China as is.
Mar 2: Presidential advisers resign
to protest 10-point statement.
Mar 4:
Chinese President Hu Jintao makes four
points concerning Taiwan; Hu urges Chen to
adhere to his "five nos" pledge.
Mar
4: MAC welcomes Hu's statement.
Mar
6: Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao's work report
to National People's Congress (NPC).
Mar
8: NPC releases explanation of ASL.
Mar 8: Taiwan Vice Foreign Minister
Kau in Washington for consultations.
Mar
10: Hong Kong chief executive Tung Chee-hwa
submits resignation.
Mar 10: Premier
Hsieh say initiatives on hold pending NPC action
on ASL.
Mar 14: NPC adopts ASL,
releases text.
Mar 16: President Chen
releases five-point statement on ASL.
Mar
16: US House of Representatives passes
resolution criticizing ASL.
Mar 17:
US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice
commends Taiwan's democratization.
Mar
20: President Hu receives Secretary Rice in
Beijing.
Mar 22: Premier Hsieh tells
Legislative Yuan Taiwan must pursue
reconciliation with China.
Mar 26:
Anti-ASL demonstration in Taipei.
Mar
28: Hsu Wen-lung's open letter in Economic
Times to reaffirm "one China".
Mar 28:
KMT delegation leaves for Guangzhou, Nanjing
and Beijing.
Mar 29: President Chen
criticizes KMT delegation.
Mar 30:
KMT delegation and TAO reach 10-point
consensus.
Mar 31: KMT delegation
leader Chiang Ping-kun meets Tang Jiaxuan and
Jia Qinglin.
This chronology is used
by permission of Pacific Forum
CSIS .
| from Taipei led to a
hectic series of cross-strait contacts,
culminating in a meeting in Macau on January 16
when civil air officials from each side
participated in their unofficial capacities. The
meeting produced agreement on a series of 48
charter flights by airlines of both sides over the
New Year period. On January 29, the first
mainland-airline flight since 1949 arrived at
Taipei's international airport. When the flights
concluded on February 20, both sides expressed
their satisfaction and indicated a desire to see
further progress on cross-strait transportation
issues.
The successful New Year charter
flights were one of a series of developments that
significantly improved the atmosphere of
cross-strait relations in the opening weeks of
2005. When the highly respected chairman of
Taipei's Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF), Koo
Chen-fu, passed away on January 3, Taipei quickly
extended an invitation to his counterpart, Wang
Daohan, the chairman of ARATS, to attend Koo's
memorial service. Wang subsequently announced
that, as he was too ill to attend himself, three
ARATS officers, including vice chairman Sun Yafu
and secretary general Li Yafei, would represent
him. Although these ARATS officers traveled to
Taipei in their private capacities and did not
have any meetings with SEF, Sun Yafu did have
brief discussions with the SEF officials who
escorted him at the memorial hall. Speaking at the
memorial service, President Chen again extended an
invitation for Wang to visit. Modest as this visit
was, it was the first significant exchange between
SEF and ARATS since Beijing broke off contact with
SEF in 1999 after former president Lee Teng-hui
characterized cross-strait relations as a form of
special state-to-state relations.
After
the December legislative elections, President Chen
stopped talking about a new constitution. On
several occasions in January, Chen returned to his
second inaugural commitments that constitutional
reform would be accomplished through the
Legislative Yuan and that controversial
sovereignty issues would not be addressed. On
January 25, Frank Hsieh Chang-ting was appointed
premier. Hsieh wasted no time in setting a new
tone, saying that reconciliation and cooperation
would be his hallmarks both in dealing with the
opposition at home and in handling cross-strait
relations. One of Hsieh's first acts was to put
the rectification/name-change issue on the back
burner.
On January 28, Politburo Standing
Committee member Jia Qinglin gave the speech
commemorating the 10th anniversary of former
Chinese president Jiang Zemin's eight points on
reunification, exchanges and the "one China"
principle. While his speech stuck closely to
well-known Chinese positions, the tone of his
remarks was remarkably moderate. Jia said that
Beijing would be willing to talk with leaders in
Taiwan, regardless of what statements they had
made earlier, provided they could accept the 1992
consensus on "one China". After his speech, the
drumbeat of personal attacks on Chen in the
official Chinese media ceased. President Chen,
however, subsequently reiterated his view that no
consensus had been reached in 1992.
On
February 24, Chen and People's First Party (PFP)
chairman James Soong Chu-yu issued a 10-point
statement. While each man was motivated primarily
by his domestic political interests, the statement
contained significant points for cross-strait
relations. Chen reiterated the "five nos" pledge
not to seek independence from his 2000 inaugural
address and his commitments on limited
constitutional revision from his 2004 inaugural
speech. While there was nothing new in any of the
points attributed to Chen in the 10-point
statement, what was significant was what Chen
omitted - no mention of the rectification of names
(changing "Republic of China" to "Taiwan", for
example), of a new constitution, or of one country
on each side of the strait. Consequently, former
president Lee Teng-hui harshly attacked the
10-point statement, and several of Chen's
fundamentalist advisers announced they would
resign their posts because Chen had sold out his
principles.
On March 4, the eve of China's
NPC, President Hu Jintao issued a four-point
guideline on cross-strait relations. In short, his
guidelines were to adhere to the "one China"
principle, strive for peaceful reunification, rely
on the Taiwan people, and never compromise in
opposing Taiwan independence. The tone of Hu's
statement reinforced the moderation expressed
earlier by Jia. In comments clearly addressed to
Chen's governing Democratic Progressive Party
(DPP), Hu said China would welcome any steps by
parties on Taiwan to move in the direction of
accepting the 1992 consensus on "one China". He
expressed China's willingness to seek new ways for
contacts and communications. In listing the issues
China was ready to discuss once Taipei accepted
the 1992 consensus on "one China", Hu included
points that President Chen had mentioned in his
National Day address in 2004, including military
confidence-building measures and a framework for
peace and stability in cross-strait relations. At
one point, Hu addressed Chen directly, if not by
name, expressing the hope that the leader of the
Taiwan authorities would show through his actions
that he adheres to his "five nos" pledge and his
commitment not to legalize Taiwan independence
through constitutional reform.
And
then, the Anti-Secession Law
Through this
whole period when steps were being taken by both
sides that significantly lowered tensions and
hinted at possibilities for further progress in
cross-strait relations, China was proceeding with
preparations for the NPC to adopt its
Anti-Secession Law. For its part Taipei, led by
Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) chairman Joseph Wu
Jauhsieh, unleashed a relentless campaign against
the proposed law, alleging it would contain a host
of negative or damaging provisions. Beijing sent
TAO chairman Chen Yunlin to Washington twice to
explain the law, and Washington used visits by its
senior officials to convey its concerns about the
ASL. Numerous American visitors reinforced these
concerns in private visits to Beijing.
The
ASL was adopted on March 14. When the text was
published, it turned out to be a short document of
10 articles that emphasized desires of the
People's Republic of China (PRC) to achieve
unification through peaceful means, but reserved
the right to use "non-peaceful means" to preserve
China's territorial integrity and sovereignty. The
ASL does not include many of the features that
Americans had been expressing concern about,
including a timetable for unification, specific
red lines under which China would use force, or
mention of Beijing's "one country, two systems"
proposal. As such it preserves considerable
flexibility for Beijing. Similarly, the ASL does
not include the many features Taipei had been
warning against. Substantively, it puts into law a
few core elements of PRC policy that have existed
for years if not decades and, as such, does not
significantly change the challenges that Taiwan
has long faced.
Many in Taipei recognized
that the ASL was far less than feared. However,
former president Lee Teng-hui's Taiwan Solidarity
Union (TSU) and fundamentalists in the governing
DPP called for Taipei to pass an anti-annexation
law or to conduct a referendum on unification to
counter the ASL. For its part, Washington urged
the Chen administration not to overreact. In the
end, Chen opted for a combination of public
statements against the ASL, an international
campaign against the law, and a demonstration in
Taipei to allow the public to express (and vent)
its opposition to unification. Premier Hsieh made
clear in the Legislative Yuan that Taipei remained
committed to reconciliation and would continue to
promote cross-strait transportation. MAC chairman
Wu said it was now Beijing's responsibility to
take concrete steps to repair cross-strait
relations and commented that transportation issues
probably would not be addressed for some time.
The US government response was to
criticize the ASL as unwelcome and unhelpful. When
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice visited
Beijing in mid-March, she said publicly that the
ASL had exacerbated tensions and urged both sides
to find ways to resume dialogue.
The
ASL: Why now?
Why did Beijing go through
with the ASL after the December legislative
elections had changed the political climate in
Taipei and when both sides were taking steps to
reduce tensions? Chinese scholars have offered a
number of explanations. One is that from Beijing's
perspective the Legislative Yuan election did not
change things significantly. The slim opposition
control of the Legislative Yuan had not blocked
Chen's separatist activities in the past and could
not be counted on to do so in the future. Chen is
still seen as a diehard separatist who cannot be
trusted. Another explanation was that the momentum
that had gone into drafting the law since the fall
of 2003 and the domestic consensus behind the ASL
could not be reversed after the NPC Standing
Committee's adoption of the draft in December. The
domestic political impulse behind the law was
clearly strong. It seems significant that Hu
Jintao had the ASL announced in December before
any of the PRC positive overtures on cross-strait
relations were initiated in January. It appears
that Hu felt he had to demonstrate the hard side
of his policy toward Taiwan before moving ahead
with the more moderate elements. In other words,
without the ASL, the more conciliatory steps
toward Taipei would not have been possible or
enjoyed domestic support in China.
Was the
ASL text changed between its drafting in
preparation for the Standing Committee meeting in
December and its adoption by the NPC in March?
What impact did criticisms from Taipei and
concerns from Americans have? Chinese sources say
that only a few wording changes were made before
final adoption by the NPC. They state that the ASL
had emerged from a long period of internal
consultation, that its content was fixed before
the December 17 announcement, and that substantive
changes were not made thereafter.
EU
arms embargo
Whether the European Union
should lift its arms embargo on China has remained
a contentious issue. China has pressed repeatedly
for an end to the embargo, and it appeared early
this year that the embargo would be scrapped in
the near future despite appeals by US President
George W Bush during his February visit to Europe.
However, the adoption of the ASL changed the tenor
of the European debate. British Foreign Secretary
Jack Straw, who had supported lifting the ban,
commented in March that the adoption of the ASL
had created a complicated political environment.
The ASL's provisions on the use of non-peaceful
means have given opponents of lifting the embargo
a new argument. It now appears that a decision on
lifting the ban is likely to be delayed for a
considerable period.
Kuomintang
delegation to China
In the final days of
March, Kuomintang vice chairman Chiang Ping-kun
led the first official KMT delegation on a visit
to China since 1949. After its
stronger-than-expected showing in the Legislative
Yuan elections, the KMT felt confident that it
could fend off the predictable charges from the
DPP that it was selling out Taiwan's interests by
visiting the mainland. The PRC gave the delegation
a warm welcome and arranged meetings with TAO
chairman Chen Yunlin, Vice Premier Tang Jiaxuan,
and Jia Qinglin. Chiang and Chen released a
10-point consensus statement on steps that could
be taken to strengthen economic and cultural ties.
Significantly, Beijing did not require the KMT
delegation to address the "one China" issue
publicly. Chiang reported that Tang Jiaxuan had
made a comment about China's willingness to agree
to technical contacts between Taiwan and the World
Health Organization. The implications of this were
not clear. The first official reaction in Taipei
was to condemn the KMT delegation for encroaching
on governmental prerogatives.
Economic
ties continue to expand
As has been the
case in the past, the increased political tensions
during 2004 did not stand in the way of the
continued rapid expansion of cross-strait economic
ties. According to Beijing's Ministry of Commerce,
cross-strait trade rose 34.1% in 2004 to reach
US$78.3 billion. Taipei's Board of Foreign Trade
(BOFT) recorded 2004 cross-strait trade at $61.6
billion, up 33.1%. According to the BOFT, Taiwan
exports to the mainland grew 25.8% and reached
$44.96 billion in 2004. Taiwan's export dependence
on the China market continued to increase,
reaching 25.8% in 2004 and 27% in January 2005.
Growing export dependence produced expressions of
concern in Taiwan, particularly in the opposition
pan-green camp, but concern did not translate into
a response beyond rhetorical urgings that
businesses diversify their export markets.
Taipei's Investment Commission reported
that approvals for investments in the PRC reached
$6.94 billion in 2004, an increase of 51% over
2003. These approvals for China accounted for a
staggering 67% of Taiwan's total approved
investments worldwide and reflected the magnetic
effect of China as a manufacturing platform. The
percentage would be even higher if investments
funneled through Caribbean tax havens to the PRC
could be identified and included.
On March
28, Hsu Wen-lung, the founder of Chi Mei
Optelectronics Corp, a major investor in China,
published a statement in the Taipei press
announcing his support for "one China". Hsu
explained that while he had been a supporter of
President Chen he did not support independence for
Taiwan. This article sent shock waves around
Taiwan and was widely interpreted as a sign that
China was putting increasing pressure on Taiwanese
businesses to oppose independence.
Comments and implications
During
2004, the challenge represented by Chen
Shui-bian's promotion of Taiwanese identity,
referendums, constitutional reform, and name
rectification presented Hu Jintao with one of the
early tests of his leadership. While Hu has
adhered to the Taiwan policies laid down by his
predecessors, the handling of Chen's challenge has
begun to define Hu's own approach. That approach
is reflected in the May 17, 2004, statement, the
Anti-Secession Law, the conciliatory steps taken
early this year, and Hu's four-point statement at
the NPC. The catch phrase Chinese academics used
to characterize the May 17 statement - that the
hard aspects became harder and the soft aspects
softer - seems an apt way to characterize the
adjustments Hu is beginning to make in the
policies he inherited.
What will come
next? The answer to this will not be known until
the dust stirred up by the passage of the ASL has
settled. That may take a few months. For the time
being, the signals from both sides provide some
reason for optimism. Beijing has said it wishes to
arrange regular charter flights during other
holidays as a next step to expand direct
transportation. Beijing has also said it will
encourage increased agricultural imports from
Taiwan. For its part, Premier Hsieh has made clear
several times that Taipei will continue its
commitment to reconciliation and in time resume
its effort to promote direct cargo charters. The
negotiation of the New Year charter flights shows
that the two sides are capable of reaching
agreements when political conditions are ripe.
Just when they will ripen again remains to be
seen.
David G Brown is associate
director of the Asian Studies Department at the
Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International
Studies. This article is used by permission of
the Pacific Forum CSIS.
E-mail: pacforum@hawaii.rr.com. |
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