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Blame enough to go around in Northeast
Asia
By Brad Glosserman and
Scott Snyder
(Used by permission of Pacific
Forum CSIS)
Deteriorating
relations among Japan, South Korea and China
underscore the failure of leadership in all three
countries. Recent events have triggered the
downward spiral in relations, but this shift
hasn't occurred in a vacuum. All three governments
share the primary burden of setting a strategic
vision that promotes cooperation over conflict;
the United States could contribute by providing
reassurance to all three. They have been playing
to domestic constituencies and ignoring
international implications.
The
proximate cause of rising tensions in Asia is
history: disputes over territory (the
Takeshima/Tokdo/Dokto islands claimed by Japan and South Korea;
the Senkaku/Daiyotais claimed by Japan and China)
and the natural-resource rights that are attached to
them; visits by Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi
Junichiro to the Yasukuni Shrine honoring war dead
and war criminals; approval of Japanese history
textbooks that gloss over ugly and brutal
incidents in Asian history.
Dig deeper and
it quickly becomes evident that these incidents
have triggered deep-rooted emotions. The
leadership in each of the three countries is
exploiting these situations for short-term
political gain rather than demonstrating the
leadership they all acknowledge is needed - and
demand from their partners. All three are quick to
point fingers, but have been reluctant to look in
the mirror.
Japan has apologized for the
past - by one count 17 times - but each statement
has been qualified or subsequently undermined by
comments or actions of other officials. Tokyo
persists in creating artificial distinctions among
issues, arguing most recently that the decision to
proceed with drilling in the East China Sea is
somehow distinct from its problems with China. The
current leadership pleads powerlessness when
challenged by foreign critics: the textbook issue
is really a domestic issue related to freedom of
speech, the territorial claim is merely a
prefectural government act, visits to Yasukuni are
domestic politics. All are true, but it is
disingenuous to ignore the larger context.
In Beijing, the government continues to
demand Japanese concessions without providing any
of its own. It has been quick to point out
Japanese misbehavior, although similar problems
exist at home: its textbooks have also been
sanitized, it "whitewashes" history, and it has
taken unilateral and provocative actions, too:
natural resource exploration in the East China
Sea, surveying the sea bed, sending research
vessels and submarines into disputed waters; it
has facilitated demonstrations within China and
failed to stop them when they become violent.
Chinese counter that the protests are spontaneous,
but they come from deep-rooted emotions that have
been nurtured by patriotic education and ignorance
about Japanese behavior over the past 60 years.
South Korean President Roh Moh-hyun
reversed the position of his predecessor and
played to the crowd, launching a "diplomatic war"
against Japanese claims to the islands. In an open
letter to the South Korean people titled "With
Regard to Recent Korea-Japan Relations", Roh
concluded, "These moves nullify all the past
reflection and apologies made by Japan." Roh’s
domestic political agenda has been cast as a fight
with former ruling elites over collaboration with
the prewar Japanese imperial government in South
Korea. His sudden, over-the-top escalation of
rhetoric on Tokdo/Takeshima only makes sense in
this context.
In each case, the government
has played to domestic constituencies and ignored
the international implications of its actions. The
Koizumi government is appeasing the right,
President Roh is playing to the progressive left,
and Beijing is venting the frustrations of the
masses.
This focus must change
before it is allowed to spin out of control.
Each government must take steps to alter the
domestic political calculus that emphasizes national identity
at the expense of external "enemies", for
instance by emphasizing joint development of
resources in disputed territories or promoting
the joint examination of history texts that was
critical to European reconciliation efforts. It is
only a matter of time before the "economics
hot, politics cold" characterization of Japan's
relations with its neighbors is attacked and
eroded, as demonstrated by the suspension
of Japan-South Korea free-trade-agreement negotiations or Chinese
riots and physical damage to Japanese economic
interests in several Chinese cities. It is
impossible to be sure that political tensions can
be isolated from economic relations or that they
will not lead to unintended military conflict,
even between democracies.
All
three nations
have insecurities. China fears US-led containment;
Japan fears abandonment by its ally and
isolation within the region if the United States
reconsiders who its preeminent partner in Asia is;
South Korea worries that the recent strengthening
of the US-Japan alliance will leave it once again
at the mercy of great powers. Those fears are
compounded by increasing friction between Seoul
and Washington and uncertainty about the fate of
their alliance. US efforts to contain bilateral
tensions are essential to preserving multilateral
cooperation on threats to regional stability,
including the North Korean nuclear issue.
The United States has a direct interest in
the effective management of Northeast Asian
tensions. The US military role as stabilizer in
Asia is challenged by the further degradation of
relations among the three countries. The US should
undertake quiet efforts to contain the island
disputes, to ameliorate emerging strategic
distrust between Japan and South Korea, and to
encourage Japan to settle the issue of historical
reconciliation in East Asia.
Brad
Glosserman is director of research at Pacific
Forum CSIS and Scott Snyder is a senior
associate at Pacific Forum CSIS and The Asia
Foundation. These opinions are their personal
views. They can be reached at
bradgpf@hawaii.rr.com
and
SnyderSA@aol.com.
This article was used with CSIS permission.
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