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SPEAKING
FREELY
Chen could be Taiwan's
Nixon
By Jianwei Wang
Speaking Freely is an Asia Times
Online feature that allows guest writers to have
their say. Please click here
if you are interested in
contributing.
With Taiwan's top
opposition leaders Lien Chan and James Soong
embarking on separate historical visits to the
mainland China, President Chen Shui-bian is facing
probably the most serious political crisis since
he was elected in 2000. The mainland visits
indicate that the negative fallout of the China's
recently adopted Anti-Secession Law did not
completely reverse the emerging "mainland fever"
on the island. And Chen and his governing
Democratic Progressive Party's (DPP's) attempt to
exploit the ill-timed law to retake the initiative
on cross-strait relations did not succeed.
Chen is indeed caught between a rock and a
hard place. On the one hand, he is reluctant to
let the opposition parties control the direction
and pace of cross-strait relations. Therefore he
does not want just to rubber-stamp the deals made
by the opposition parties with Beijing. On the
other hand, with "mainland fever" rising, if Chen
still remains passive and in the mode of
self-denial, he runs the risk of becoming
irrelevant in cross-strait relations.
The
DPP government's initial reaction to the new
reality in the cross-strait relations did not show
signs of a well-thought-out and farsighted
strategy. The Taiwan authorities tried to put the
brakes on the "mainland fever" by sidelining the
cross-strait exchanges. The DPP government even
contemplated using public power and legal means to
forestall Lien's and Soong's visits. Lien is
chairman of the Kuomintang (KMT) and Soong heads
the People First Party (PFP). Only after these
efforts were unsuccessful did Chen suspend his
criticism of the KMT's mainland diplomacy and
bestow his reluctant "blessing" on Lien's historic
visit.
Like any political leader in his
second term, President Chen needs to think of his
political legacy after he steps down. People have
reason to believe that initially he might want to
create a "Republic of Taiwan" as his political
legacy. He did make some headway in nurturing the
consciousness of the Taiwan identity and pursuing
"de-sinicization". But the recent sea changes in
both domestic and international political
landscapes apparently convinced Chen that he would
be unable to deliver Taiwan independence during
his term and he publicly admitted so. If that is
the case, then Chen has to rethink his strategy
for the remainder of his term.
Domestically Chen so far has accomplished
very little. With the opposition parties
continuing to control the majority of the
legislature, it will be difficult, if not
impossible, for him to get most of the legislation
he seeks. The constitutional reform he desires is
also unlikely to be fully achieved. To the
contrary, a more stable and peaceful cross-strait
relationship is more likely to be within his
grasp. For one thing, this probably is the only
issue on which he could count on the strong
support from the pan-blue (so called after the
color of the KMT emblem) opposition parties, the
KMT and the PFP. Indeed if Chen Shui-bian could
adapt his thinking to the new political reality,
he might be in a stronger position politically to
deal with the other side across the strait.
In this regard Chen could turn to the late
US president Richard Nixon for inspiration. Just
as the zealous anti-communist Nixon turned out to
be the US leader to open the door to communist
China, Chen also has the historic opportunity to
become Taiwan's Nixon in the 21st century to
"normalize" relations with the mainland China.
Compared with the pan-blue leaders, Chen does not
have the historical baggage related to the
mainland - the KMT lost the Chinese civil war to
the communists and fled to Taiwan - and therefore
is much less vulnerable to the accusation of
"selling out" Taiwan's interest to the Chinese
communists.
But whether Chen has the
courage to use this advantage is still unclear.
His recent words and deeds regarding cross-strait
relations generate more confusion than confidence
in the people. Chen could complain that the
opposition parties did not consult with him before
visiting the mainland. He could also complain that
Beijing takes the advantage of the political
disunity within Taiwan. But in the final analysis,
he has himself to blame for lacking a clear,
consistent and imaginative mainland policy. The
way for Chen to retake the driver's seat in the
cross-strait relations is not to deny and
delegitimize whatever the opposition parties
obtain from the mainland, not to push back the
existing cross-strait exchange programs, and not
once again to agitate anti-China populism. Rather,
he should ride on the new mainstream of public
opinion in Taiwan and develop an integrated
strategy jointly with the opposition parties to
strengthen Taiwan's bargaining position vis-a-vis
the mainland.
Clearly, without Mao
Zedong's and Zhou Enlai's vision and courage,
Richard Nixon could not have accomplished one of
the most important diplomatic breakthroughs in the
20th century. By the same token, for Chen
Shui-bian to become Taiwan's Nixon, he also needs
a hand from the other side of the strait. Beijing
should realize that granting high-profile visits
to opposition party leaders, while making the DPP
government look bad, cannot substitute for policy
decision-making in Taiwan. After all, only the
ruling DPP party has the executive power to turn
whatever "consensus" reached between Beijing and
Taiwan opposition leaders into reality. Therefore
Beijing still has to figure out a way to deal with
Chen and his government no matter how
uncomfortable the situation. Here Beijing could
also learn from Mao and Zhou.
When Mao
made the strategic choice to shake hands with
Richard Nixon, the United States still recognized
Taiwan as the sole legitimate government of China.
Even in the Shanghai Communique, the United States
did not explicitly recognize the one-China
principle. That, however, did not prevent Beijing
talking and negotiating with Washington. If Mao
had insisted that China would not deal with Nixon
unless the United States first recognized the
one-China principle, probably there would not have
been a normalization of Sino-US relations. Even
after Nixon's visit, the US still maintained
diplomatic relations with Taiwan. But Beijing had
no problem in setting up a semi-official liaison
office with the United States. In other words, the
formulation of the US one-China policy was a long
process. During that process Beijing was willing
to take some parallel steps to establish relations
with Washington.
Chinese leaders have
often claimed that the Taiwan people are "our
flesh-and-blood brothers". If so, why then could
Beijing - as US Congressman James Leach said - not
be more "magnanimous" to its Taiwan compatriots
than to foreigners? If Beijing truly regards Chen
Shui-bian's "five nos" pledges in the Chen-Soong
10-point statement as a positive development
toward recognizing the one-China principle, then
to encourage him to go even further, there is no
reason Beijing and Taipei could not reassume the
contact and dialogue between China's semi-official
Association for Relations Across the Taiwan
Straits (ARATS) and the Taiwan's Straits Exchange
Foundation (SEF), similar to the liaison office
approach in China's dealing with the United
States.
Of course I am not suggesting that
the relationship between the mainland and Taiwan
is the same state-to-state relationship as exists
between China and the United States. But the
logistics involved in these relationships do share
some similarities. With all the caveats, we are
talking about the relations between two separate
political entities within the framework of one
China. Lien's and Soong's courageous decisions to
visit the mainland pave the way for a new era of
cross-strait relations. But it is up to Chinese
President Hu Jintao and Taiwan President Chen to
realize substantive cross-strait reconciliation.
If both leaders can draw proper lessons from
history and develop some "new thinking" for the
well-being of the Chinese on both sides of the
Taiwan Strait, a more peaceful and prosperous
relationship could well be on horizon.
Jianwei Wang is a professor and
chair of the Political Science Department,
University of Wisconsin at Stevens Point. He is
also a senior research associate at the Shanghai
Institute of American Studies and Shanghai Center
for RimPac Strategic and International Studies. He
can be reached at j2wang@uwsp.edu.
Speaking Freely is an Asia Times
Online feature that allows guest writers to have
their say. Please click here
if you are interested in
contributing. |
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