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COMMENTARY
China takes a
bow
By Jing-dong
Yuan
With the fourth round
of six-party talks finally under way in
Beijing after 13 months of hiatus, commentators
are attributing their resumption to the intensive
diplomatic maneuvering in the past few weeks in
which Washington recognized North Korea as a
sovereign country, Seoul offered supplies of
electricity to the North should nuclear
disarmament work out, and even Pyongyang showed
some signs of flexibility.
Yet China
deserves credit for the resumption of the talks to
end the nuclear stalemate on the Korean peninsula.
In particular, Beijing should be praised for its
persevering and calm diplomacy during a period of
uncertainty and difficulties; its counsel for
political and diplomatic solutions to the nuclear
issue; its behind-the-door efforts at persuading
Pyongyang to return to the talks; its resistance
to the threat of sanctions should the talks fail
as these would not guarantee success, and could be
highly counterproductive.
Over the past 13
months that the talks - involving North Korea,
South Korea, China, Japan, the US and Russia -
have been stalled, Chinese officials continued
working tirelessly with all the relevant parties
in an effort to work toward the eventual
denuclearization of the Korean peninsula.
China was fully cognizant of but not
deterred by the difficulties and the huge gap
between the North Korean and American positions.
Beijing repeatedly emphasized the importance of
seeking a political and diplomatic solution. It is
clear that the Libyan solution - in which that
country voluntarily gave up its weapons program -
would be wishful thinking, while the Iraqi
solution - invasion - would be too dangerous.
While there were suggestions, and indeed
preferences, for further isolating North Korea in
certain quarters, China has adopted a policy of
engaging Pyongyang and serving as intermediary in
good faith, relaying messages between North Korea
and the US and providing venues for limited
contacts between them. Indeed, the early July
announcement of North Korea's return to the talks
was made after a meeting in Beijing. In addition,
China also has sent envoys to and received
dignitaries from Pyongyang seeking clarification
and looking for opportunities.
China has
resisted pressure to apply coercive measures to
force North Korea to give up its nuclear weapons
programs. While maintaining a nuclear-free Korean
peninsula has always been and remains a goal,
Beijing is opposed to the threat of sanctions and
use of force. This is as much out of concern over
the consequences for China's security interests as
it is for regional peace and stability. Already
paranoid and feeling extremely isolated, North
Korea could react strongly and even irrationally
if pushed to the corner.
As the host of
the multilateral process and a former ally of
North Korea, China has been under the spotlight
since the nuclear crisis broke in October 2002.
There have been unrealistic expectations as well
as unfounded allegations regarding what Beijing
should and could do. It is time to dispel these
myths.
One such unrealistic expectation
was that since China provided most of the food aid
and energy supplies to Pyongyang, and because of
its long-standing special relationship with North
Korea, Beijing had special leverage over the Kim
Jong-il government, and its should make the
maximum of this leverage to bring it back to the
talks.
True, China now carries a large
portion of North Korea's total two-way trade and
provides large amounts of economic assistance. But
for these to translate into leverage requires
North Korea to completely change its own rationale
for developing nuclear weapons. As long as
Pyongyang considers nuclear weapons as critical
for its very survival, withholding economic
benefits for a country that has little external
economic interaction would not be effective, and
would earn China animosity. In this regard,
China's ability to use economic leverage would at
best be quite limited and at worst
counterproductive.
Another allegation was
that China cared more about the peninsula's peace
and stability than it did about nuclear
proliferation, as it would suffer massive refugee
flows, economic disruption, environmental
degradation, and perhaps even military
confrontation.
This is as unfounded as it
is ill-intended. The Korean peninsula could never
achieve long-term peace and stability with a
nuclear North Korea, which in turn could lead to a
nuclear-armed Japan and South Korea, gravely
complicating China's security environment in the
region. What Beijing seeks is both
denuclearization and peace and stability on the
peninsula; the two are inseparable.
China's security is possible only within
the broader context of a peaceful and stable
Northeast Asia. In this regard, Chinese interests
in resolving the North Korean nuclear issue are as
much driven by its own security interests as out
of concern over the implications for regional
security and the international nuclear
non-proliferation regime should the crisis be
allowed to escalate. All interested parties need
to make their contribution toward the ultimate
goal of a nuclear-free Korean peninsula; and each
party can play its role in the process. China
deserves credit for its role so far.
Dr Jing-dong Yuan is research
director, East Asia Non-Proliferation Program,
Center for Non-Proliferation Studies, and an
associate professor of international policy
studies at the Monterey Institute of International
Studies.
(Copyright 2005 Asia Times
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