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China, neighbors progress in
fishery agreements
By David
Rosenberg
(Republished with permission
from Japan Focus)
One
of the major underreported stories of China's
regional diplomacy is the slow but steady progress
it has made negotiating a network of bilateral
agreements with Japan, South Korea, and Vietnam to
manage their common fishery resources.
For
centuries, the China Seas have provided abundant
fisheries for food security and employment
opportunities for their coastal countries, China,
Japan, South Korea, and Vietnam. Flushed all year
round by several large rivers, the flat and
shallow seabeds of the Yellow Sea, the East China
Sea, and the South China Sea are among the world's
most productive fishing grounds. However, as
coastal urban populations have grown and as
fishing technology has improved, competition for
the shared fish stocks of the China Seas has
intensified considerably. Fish catch rates began
to decline in the 1970s with sharper declines
registered in the mid-1980s. After bottom trawlers
came into widespread use in the 1990s, many
species declined to the point where they are now
threatened with collapse. Given the migratory
pattern of many species and the common pool nature
of the China Seas, no single country would be able
to manage or conserve their common migratory fish
stocks. Despite historical conflicts and
territorial disputes, the coastal countries of the
China Seas have good reason to negotiate to avoid
a tragedy of the commons in their common waters.
The precipitating factor for the recent
negotiations was the enactment of the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)
in 1994. UNCLOS grants a coastal state the right
to declare sovereign rights and resource control
over an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) up to 200
nautical miles off its coastline. China, Japan,
South Korea, and Vietnam all quickly ratified
UNCLOS and declared their respective EEZs. In the
case of countries bordering semi-enclosed seas
such as the Yellow Sea, the East China Sea and the
South China Sea, where EEZ claims overlap, UNCLOS
calls for establishing joint resource management
areas and provides guidelines for doing so, even
where conflicting territorial claims are
unresolved. Hence, collective action became
imperative to avoid a collapse of regional
fisheries. UNCLOS provided a framework for
pursuing collective action between the coastal
states.
China signed an agreement with
Japan in 1997 for cooperative fisheries management
in the East China Sea; it took effect in 2000. The
Sino-South Korean agreement for cooperative
fisheries management in the Yellow Sea was signed
in 1998 and took effect in 2001. China signed two
agreements with Vietnam on fisheries management
and boundary delineation in the Beibu or Tonkin
Gulf that took effect in 2004. The Sino-Japanese
and Sino-South Korean agreements are both for 5
years; the Sino-Vietnamese agreement is for 15
years [1].
The agreements address three
key issues. First, they reaffirm each country's
exclusive rights over fishery resources and
fishing activities in its own EEZ. Second, they
establish general principles for reciprocal
fishing access in each other's EEZ. Third, the
agreements create a cooperative management regime
for their shared fishery resources.
Each
agreement established a Joint Fishery Committee
(JFC), including representatives from each country
appointed by each government, as well as several
commissioners. Although each JFC has somewhat
different scope and authority, they all have
several common functions, such as research on the
status of fisheries, consultation with fishing
industry interests, and recommendations to
fisheries management authorities on access to
fishing zones. They may make recommendations on
fishing quotas, types of species to be caught, and
other conditions for fishing.
Each JFC
establishes an area for joint fisheries management
in the common seas between the coastal countries.
In the Beibu/Tonkin Gulf, China and Vietnam have
designated a Common Fishery Zone, and Waters in
Transitional Arrangements (Map 1).
In
the East China Sea, China and Japan have
designated a "Provisional Waters Zone" (PMZ). In
the Yellow Sea, China and South Korea have
designated "Provisional Waters" and "Waters in
Transitional Arrangements" (Map 2). The "Waters in
Transitional Arrangements," located on each side
of the joint resource management area, provide
some flexibility for each country in restricting
fishing in formerly open waters. After four years,
each country has to phase out its fishing
activities in the "Transitional Zone" (TZ) of the
other country and gradually conform to the coastal
state's EEZ jurisdiction.
The
different types of management zones represent an
effort to preserve some traditional fishing
communities and to mitigate the impact of fishing
restrictions necessary to achieve sustainable
yields. For example, in addition to the Waters in
Transitional Arrangements mentioned above, the
Sino-Vietnamese agreement also includes a buffer
zone for small-sized fishing boats. Many
small-sized fishing boats near the China-Vietnam
shoreline have limited communications and
navigation equipment. Some are not even motorized.
Illegal entry by mistake is inevitable and
understandable. Hence, Chinese and Vietnamese
negotiators decided to establish this buffer zone
to avoid unnecessary disputes by unintentional
illegal entry.
The JFCs have the power to
decide on conservation and management measures,
including the allocation of fishing quotas and the
maintenance of fishing order. They all must ensure
that fisheries are not endangered through
over-exploitation. Recommendations and decisions
are made by consensus, according to the agreement.
JFC meetings are held at least once per year, with
additional ad hoc meetings as necessary.
The major work of each JFC is to determine
each year how many fishing vessels of each country
to permit in these joint resource management
areas. The JFC employs a "quantity control
approach" that quantifies the total allowable
catch (TAC) of several target species, the status
of each resource, the extent of traditional
fishing activities, modern fishing methods and
management, and then derives the allowable number
of vessels. For example, in 2001, the
Sino-Japanese JFC set the maximum number for
Chinese fishing vessels in the Japanese EEZ at
900, with no more than 600 operating at the same
time. A total of 317 Japanese trawlers, purse
seines, and hook fishing vessels were licensed to
enter China's EEZ. Japanese fishermen were allowed
to fish up to 78,000 tons in China's EEZ and China
was allowed 70,000 tons in Japan's EEZ. There were
20,612 fishing vessels allowed to operate in their
PMZ with a total allowable catch (TAC) of 2.136
million tons [2, page 208].
Fishing
vessels of one country need to apply for a license
to fish in the other country's EEZ. They have to
comply with the terms of the joint fisheries
agreement as well as the domestic laws and
regulations of that country. Any violation is
subject to legal procedures of the country
controlling the EEZ where the fishing takes place.
In the case of seizure or detention, the fishing
vessels and crew must be promptly released upon
posting a bond or other form of security.
The biggest difference among the
agreements is that the Sino-Vietnamese agreement
for the Beibu/Tonkin Gulf fisheries also
incorporates a permanent maritime boundary
delimitation. By contrast, there is no permanent
maritime boundary agreement between China and
Japan or between South Korea and China. The
boundaries used in the latter two agreements are
provisional, pending final delimitation of their
currently overlapping EEZ claims.
In the
Sino-Japanese and Sino-South Korean agreements,
enforcement in the joint resource management area
is to be carried out by the flag state of each
fishing boat. In the Sino-Vietnamese agreement,
enforcement is carried out by each coastal state
within its EEZ boundary delimitation. One notable
feature of the Sino-Korean agreement is that it
provides for joint Chinese and Korean monitors on
patrol vessels in a Transitional Zone on each side
of the Common Fishery Zone. They may board and
inspect fishing vessels of both parties. The flag
state of each vessel is responsible for compliance
with the terms of the JFC regulations.
The
Sino-Vietnamese Fisheries Agreement is the first
one in East Asia that establishes a cooperative
fisheries management program within demarcated
maritime zones. It has more management authority
than the other two agreements. The Joint Fishery
Committee for Beibu/Tonkin Gulf is the only JFC
entitled to make rules and regulations for the
Common Fishery Zone to enforce these limits. It is
a permanent body with full operational authority,
including a dispute settlement mechanism [2].
The agreements adopted by China, Vietnam,
and South Korea will greatly diminish their
traditional fishing grounds and reduce their
fishing industry. China has started a program to
scrap 30,000 fishing boats and relocate 300,000
fishermen by 2010. About one million households
have been seriously affected. Japan has set up a 6
billion yen (US$54 million) fund to support its
fishermen facing unemployment because of the
agreement [3, p. 195]. Each country has started to
take the painful steps necessary to shrink fishing
grounds, cut back fishing fleets, and recycle
redundant labor in order to conserve and manage a
vital resource.
From a resource management
perspective, the main limitation of these
agreements is that they focus on managing fishing
activity in designated areas that only comprise
part of the fishery ecosystem. Unregulated waters
still exist for unrestricted exploitation of fish
stocks. For example, the Sino-Japanese agreement
provides a Current Fishing Pattern Zone around the
disputed Diaoyu/Senkaku Island where traditional
fishing may continue unrestricted, thereby
avoiding the territorial dispute over the
ownership of the island. However, many fish stocks
migrate seasonally from the adjacent management
zone in the East China Sea to these unrestricted
fishing waters.
The contracting parties
have made an effort to carry out periodic joint
patrols to prevent illegal fishing. They have also
conducted monitoring, surveillance and control of
fishing vessels, including boarding and
inspection. However, no workable enforcement
mechanism has been established, except for the
joint enforcement arrangement in the China-South
Korea TZs. No contact points have been established
for the exchange of information about violations,
or a joint program to provide information to
fishermen about the laws and regulations of
contracting. Many fishermen find it difficult to
accept that they can no longer fish in waters
where they have fished for years. Hence,
monitoring and enforcement efforts need to be
strengthened to improve the effectiveness of the
agreements [3, page 196].
Another
limitation is that the JFCs have little
transparency or accountability. They make their
decisions behind closed doors with no public
participation or dispute settlement mechanisms for
redress of grievances. The JFCs generally do not
publish their deliberations or the data upon which
their decisions are based, or the results of
scientific findings. Hence, it is difficult to
fully understand the rationale for the
regulations.
Some important issues remain
unresolved. For example, South Korea does not
recognize the Sino-Japanese fisheries management
regime. It contends that its own EEZ includes part
of the northern end of the East China Sea, and
that it was not consulted in the negotiation of
the Sino-Japanese agreement. The migratory fish
stocks, unaware of these conflicting boundary
claims, are vulnerable to South Korean fishermen
in these contested waters.
Notwithstanding
these limitations, the agreements are important
pioneering efforts. This is the first maritime
boundary delimitation agreement China has reached
with any of its coastal neighbors. It is the
second maritime demarcation for Vietnam. The
Sino-Vietnamese agreements, in particular, are
models for cooperative fisheries conservation and
management [4, p. 20].
The major
significance of all these treaties is that they
were signed in accordance with UNCLOS and based on
two main objectives, namely, the peaceful
settlement of fishery disputes and the
establishment of a system for sustainable fishing
for the communities around the China Seas. They
are all the result of political compromise among
countries with strikingly different levels of
economic development, domestic political systems,
and foreign policy concerns.
Joint
fisheries conservation and management efforts have
been effective in some areas, for example the
North Pacific salmon fishery. They have been
notably ineffective in others, for example, the
North Atlantic cod fishery. There is still a long
way to go to fully achieve sustainable fisheries
in the China Seas. The efforts described here may
still be too little, too late to conserve the
remaining fish stocks. However, this evolving
network of bilateral agreements for cooperative
fisheries resource management is a constructive
step in the right direction.
Notes:
[1] Yu, Yunjun and Yongtong
Mu, "The new institutional arrangements for
fisheries management in Beibu Gulf," Marine
Policy, March 2005.
[2] Xue, Gui Fang,
"China's Response to International Fisheries Law
and Policy: National Action and Regional
Cooperation," Doctoral Dissertation, University of
Wollongong, Centre for Maritime Policy, October,
2004.
[3] Valencia, Mark J., and Yoshihisa
Amae, "Regime Building in the East China Sea,"
Ocean Development & International Law,
34:189-208, 2003.
[4] Zou Keyuan, "The
Sino-Vietnamese Agreement on Maritime Boundary
Delimitation in the Gulf of Tonkin," Ocean
Development & International Law, 36:13-24,
2005.
[5] Thao, Nguyen
Hong, "Maritime Delimitation and Fishery
Cooperation in the Tonkin Gulf," Ocean Development
& International Law, 36:25-44, 2005.
David Rosenberg
(rosenber@middlebury.edu) is a professor of
political science at Middlebury College, Vermont,
USA, and author of Dire Straits: Competing
Security Priorities in the South China Sea,
which appeared in Japan Focus.
(Republished with permission from Japan Focus)
(Copyright 2005 Asia Times Online Ltd. All
rights reserved. Please contact us for information
on sales, syndication and republishing.) |
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