Hu brought down to
earth By a Special
Correspondent
BEIJING - While most Chinese
hearts soared with the launch on Wednesday morning
of the spacecraft Shenzhou VI, which took two
Chinese "taikonauts" into orbit, China's leader
was in no mood to celebrate.
President Hu
Jintao was conspicuous by his absence from the
launch site to watch the liftoff from the heavily
guarded Jiuquan Satellite Launch Center in the
Gobi Desert. And it is telling that as chairman of
the Central Military Commission (CMC), Hu should
have missed this important day for China's
military.
One of Hu's deputies, Cao
Gangchuan, the CMC second vice chairman, was
present at the launch, and while Hu did show up at
the
aerospace office at Beijing, he had a long face
before the cameras.
Prime Minister Wen
Jiabao led the throng of top cadre well-wishers on
behalf of everything - the Chinese Communist Party
(CCP) central committee, the state council and the
CMC.
However, neither Wen nor any of the
affiliates of the two principal officials,
propaganda chief Li Changchun, and law-and-order
chief Luo Gan, hold military office.
China's aerospace program, although it
includes civilian participation, is a special task
under the command of the General Armament
Department of the CMC.
Hu's absence, and
presumably his ill-humor, bear out rumors
circulating in the higher reaches of power in
China: he suffered a major setback at the 5th
plenary session of the central committee of the
CCP, which ended after four days of closed-door
meetings in Beijing on Tuesday.
Hu, the
nominal military chief, is believed to be
particularly unhappy with his top brass.
None of the political objectives Hu had
aimed for before the session were endorsed by the
354-member central committee in its 11th Five-Year
Plan (2006 to 2010).
Hu's list had
included speeding up political reforms, a pledge
by all local authorities to submit to the
macro-controls instituted by central CCP
officials, and support from all cadres for the
state leadership to attain a more prominent role
in international affairs.
Instead, the
communique issued at the close of the plenary
session concentrated on economic reforms. There
was no endorsement at all of macro-control nor the
enhancement of China's stance on the international
stage.
Political reform did get some space
in the final plan. It was cited with the
qualification of "proactively and stably" and
placed among a list of miscellaneous issues, such
as building a spiritual civilization,
strengthening defense, maintaining the prosperity
and stability of Hong Kong and Macau, and the
betterment of relations with Taiwan. These issues
were all mentioned only briefly, meaning that
while they might not be trivial, they were not a
focus of the plenary session. This means,
therefore, a slap in the face for Hu rather than a
face-saving.
The plenary session also
served to negate Hu's desire for "building a
harmonious society". When Hu threw the idea out in
February, he made no bones that it would be a
cornerstone of his philosophies. Indeed, it was to
replace the "Three Represent" theories of his
predecessor, Jiang Zemin. Now, the notion of
"building a harmonious society" has been scaled
down to bread-and-butter matters such as medical
benefits and food hygiene.
The only mark
of Hu that remained intact was his rhetoric, such
as "establishing the party for the public and
ruling for the general populace". These slogans,
as any educated person in China knows, are subject
to interpretation, and therefore could mean
everything - or nothing.
Throughout the
history of the CCP since 1949, plenary sessions
have served for the party's central committee to
reaffirm its authority over all members and
cadres. Well before this session, the major
problem between central and local cadres was the
issue of macro-control, especially on how to
tackle the growing real-estate bubble. The lack of
any endorsement of this key policy at the plenary
session revealed total disregard by the mainstream
of the central committee, which is usually
crystallized as the Hu-Wen duo.
With
benefit of hindsight, the setback of the Hu-Wen
duo was in the cards.
In September, Wen
delivered an important message to Shenzhen, saying
that the Special Economic Zone adjacent to the
financial hub of Hong Kong should develop a
special status on the political front. Wen stated
unequivocally that Shenzhen was being requested to
become a pioneer in political reform. Li
Hongzhong, the city's party boss, however,
responded to the request by completely ignoring
it.
Political observers in Beijing agree
that there now appears to be two party centrals in
China. On the table, and for the public to see,
there is the Hu-Wen combine. Behind the curtains,
there is a special "train" in which the "retired"
party chief, Jiang, rides, free to roam the
country. Only a few top leaders are allowed a
special train, and it is a symbol of exclusive
personal status.
Hu replaced Jiang as
party chief in 2002, state president in 2003, and
military chief last year.
Another
indication of a schism at the top can be found on
the website of the People's Liberation Army Daily,
the official organ of the military. Among the list
of special topics in the latest archive, half
still bear Jiang's name, while Hu is almost
invisible. The military paper also devoted little
space to promoting the plenary session.
The events at the plenum do not
necessarily mean that Hu and Wen will head a
lame-duck government. Indeed, most of the central
committee members of the current session are not
the duo's choice. Whether Hu and Wen will have the
upper hand in choosing central committee members
for future sessions depends more on the support of
retired party elders than serving committee
members.
And the loss of face the two have
experienced this week may help them gain sympathy
from the elders, most of whom are known to support
Hu and Wen from behind the scenes.
In this
regard, the plenary session may not be as
definitive a setback as it would be in a political
party in the West.
(Copyright 2005 Asia
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