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    Greater China
     Jan 6, 2006
China's threatening environment
By Nathan Nankivell

(Republished with permission from Japan Focus)

China's environment is edging closer to a condition of crisis. Pollution and environmental degradation have already left scars and will continue to create problems as the situation worsens. While it may be possible for China to mitigate the impact of environmental damage through coordinated policies, effective spending and sound future planning, Beijing is unable or unwilling to prescribe such measures.

As an undeniable fact on the ground, it is imperative for prudent policymakers to consider the geostrategic implications of not just a superpower, but of an environmentally ravaged China as well.



There is little disagreement that China's environment is a mounting problem for Beijing. The country is one of the world's leaders in sulfur emissions, but with only a fraction of the vehicles of most countries; China is home to 16 of the world's 20 most polluted cities; water pollution affects as much as 70% of the country; air pollution is blamed for the premature death of some 400,000 Chinese annually; crop returns are steadily decreasing in quantity and quality because of polluted land and water; and solid-waste production is expected to more than double over the next decade, pushing China far ahead of the United States as the largest producer. [1]

While the general accessibility of this information is creating greater awareness, trends indicate that pollution and environmental degradation will worsen. Chinese consumers are expected to purchase hundreds of millions of automobiles, adding to air-pollution problems. Despite pledges to put the environment first, national planners still aim to double per capita gross domestic product (GDP) by 2010.

Urban populations are expected to continue expanding, leading to the creation of slums and stressing urban sanitation and delivery systems. Steadily richer Chinese will be able to purchase more goods and consume more resources.

China lacks a powerful national body able to coordinate, monitor and enforce environmental legislation: the State Environmental Protection Agency (SEPA) is understaffed, has few resources and must compete with other bureaucracies for attention.

The devolution of decision-making to local levels has placed environmental stewardship in the hands of officials who are more concerned with economic growth than the environment. Finally, the deficiency of capital and the lack of will to promote massive spending on environmental repair necessary to reverse more than two decades of destruction are perhaps most indicative of the fact that environmental restoration will not occur: estimates on the final cost of environmental repair range into the tens of billions of US dollars. [2]

From the examples above, it is clear that China's environmental crisis will only worsen before it gets better. SEPA's impotence, Beijing's contradictory policy statements, expanding consumption and a lack of funds to reverse already serious problems all suggest that pollution and degradation will most likely worsen in the decades to come.

Pollution, unrest and social mobilization
As the impact of pollution on human health becomes more obvious and widespread, it is leading to greater political mobilization and social unrest from those citizens who suffer the most. A statement from the October 2005 Central Committee meeting in Shanghai illustrates Beijing's increasing concern regarding the correlation between unrest and pollution issues.

More than 74,000 incidents of protest and unrest were recorded in China in 2004, up from 58,000 the year before. While there are no clear statistics linking this number of protests, riots and unrest specifically to pollution issues, the fact that pollution was one of four social problems linked to disharmony by the Central Committee implies that there is at least the perception of a strong correlation.

For the Communist Party and neighboring states, social unrest must be viewed as a primary security concern for three reasons: it is creating greater political mobilization, it threatens to forge linkages with democracy movements, and demonstrations are proving more difficult to contain. These three factors have the potential to challenge the party's total political control, thus potentially destabilizing a state with a huge military arsenal and a history of violent, internal conflict that cannot be played down or ignored.

Protests are uniting a variety of actors throughout local communities. Pollution issues are indiscriminate. The effects, though not equally felt by each person within a community, impact rich and poor, farmers and businessmen, families and individuals alike. As local communities respond to pollution issues through united opposition, it is leaving Beijing with no easy target on which to blame unrest, and no simple option for how to quell whole communities with a common grievance.

Moreover, protests serve as a venue for the politically disaffected who are unhappy with the current state of governance, and may be open to considering alternative forms of political rule.

Environmental experts such as Elizabeth Economy note that protests afford an opportunity for the environmental movement to forge linkages with democracy advocates. She notes in her book The River Runs Black that several environmentalists argue that change is only possible through greater democratization and notes that the environmental and democracy movements united in Eastern Europe prior to the end of the Cold War.

It is conceivable that in this way, environmentally motivated protests might help to spread democracy and undermine communist rule.

A further key challenge is to contain protests once they begin. The steady introduction of new media such as mobile phones, e-mail and text messaging are preventing China's authorities from silencing and hiding unrest. Moreover, the ability to send and receive information ensures that domestic and international observers will be made aware of unrest, making it far more difficult for local authorities to employ state-sanctioned force.

The security ramifications of greater social unrest cannot be overlooked. Linkages between environmental and democracy advocates potentially challenge the party's monolithic control of power.

In the past, similar challenges by Falungong and the Tiananmen protesters have been met by force and detainment. In an extreme situation, such as national water shortages, social unrest could generate widespread, coordinated action and political mobilization that would serve as a midwife to anti-party political challenges, create divisions within the party over how to deal with the environment, or lead to a massive show of force.

Any of these outcomes would mark an erosion or alteration to the Communist Party's current power dynamic. And while many would treat political change in China, especially the implosion of the party, as a welcome development, it must be noted that any slippage of the party's dominance would most likely be accompanied by a period of transitional violence.

Though most violence would be directed toward dissident Chinese, a ripple effect would be felt in neighboring states through migration, impediments to trade and an increased military presence along the Chinese border. All of these situations would alter security assumptions in the region.

Other security concerns
While unrest presents the most obvious example of a security threat related to pollution, several other key concerns are worth noting. The cost of environmental destruction could, for example, begin to reverse the blistering rate of economic growth in China that is the foundation of the Communist Party's legitimacy.

Estimates maintain that 7% annual growth is required to preserve social stability. Yet the costs of pollution are already taxing the economy between 8% and 12% of GDP per year. [3] As environmental problems mount, this percentage will increase, in turn reducing annual growth. As a result, the party could be seriously challenged to legitimize its continued control if economic growth stagnates.

Nationalists in surrounding states could use pollution as a rallying point to muster support for anti-Chinese causes. For example, attacks on China's environmental management for its impact on surrounding states, such as Japan, could be used to argue against further investment in the country or be highlighted during territorial disputes in the East China Sea to agitate anti-Chinese sentiment. While nationalism does not imply conflict, it could reduce patterns of cooperation in the region and hopes for balanced and effective multilateral institutions and dialogues.

Finally, China's seemingly insatiable appetite for timber and other resources such as fish is fueling illegal exports from such nations as Myanmar and Indonesia. As these states continue to deplete key resources, they too will face problems, and hence the impact on third nations must be considered.

Territorial expansion or newfound alliances
In addition to the concerns already mentioned, pollution, if linked to a specific issue such as water shortage, could have important geopolitical ramifications. China's northern plains, home to hundreds of millions of people, face acute water shortages. Growing demand, a decade of drought, inefficient delivery methods and increasing water pollution have reduced per capita water holdings to critical levels.

Although Beijing hopes to relieve some of the pressures via the North-South Water Diversion project, it requires tens of billions of dollars and its completion is, at best, still several years away and, at worst, impossible. Yet just to the north lies one of the most underpopulated areas in Asia, the Russian far east.

While there is little agreement among scholars about whether resource shortages lead to greater cooperation or conflict, either scenario encompasses security considerations. Russian politicians already allege possible Chinese territorial designs on the region. They note Russia's falling population in the far east, currently estimated at some 6 million to 7 million, and argue that the growing Chinese population along the border, more than 80 million, may soon take over.

While these concerns smack of inflated nationalism and scare tactics, there could be some truth to them. The method by which China might annex the territory can only be speculated upon, but would surely result in full-scale war between two powerful, nuclear-equipped nations.

While a significant concern, the larger and more realistic implication for Western security analysts must be greater cooperation and a possible alliance with Moscow. It should be assumed that China will court Russia or even pursue an alliance with its northern neighbor to gain access to water, oil and other natural resources.

Indicative of growing strategic cooperation are a number of recent developments between the two countries, including a joint military exercise and continued investment and work on an oil pipeline. Such warming relations between Moscow and Beijing could threaten Western interests in the region and beyond.

Conclusion
Pollution and environmental degradation, not traditionally considered security concerns, should be accounted for in security assessments of China and the region. Social unrest, the potential for large-scale political mobilization, and democratization are increasingly challenging the Communist Party's power and legitimacy. These trends, when linked to political change, could lead to outbreaks of violence, possible large-scale emigration, economic instability and other concerns.

In facing such a serious problem, China would benefit from further foreign assistance and expertise. As the health of China and its economy is inextricably linked to all of the world's most developed economies, wealthy states and non-governmental organizations should consider additional courses of action to help China form a credible environmental movement supported by legal experts, academics and party officials sympathetic to change.

Although not a complete solution, increased foreign assistance may be a step in the right direction. Alternatively, and if left untreated, China's environment will worsen and threaten stability in one of the most populated and dynamic areas on Earth.

Notes
1. The Economist, August 19, 2004.

2. Canadian Security Intelligence Services Division; The Economist, October 20, 2005.

3. China's internal challenges and their implications for regional stability, APCSS, February 25, 2000.

Nathan Nankivell is senior researcher at the office of the Special Adviser Policy, Maritime Forces Pacific Headquarters, Canadian Department of National Defense. The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy of the Department of National Defense.

(Republished with permission from Japan Focus )


China battles rich-poor gap
(Jan 5, '06)

China: We're just big, warm and cuddly (Dec 23, '05)

'Green GDP' reflects shifting priorities (Nov 3, '05)

 
 



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