China's environment is edging closer to a
condition of crisis. Pollution and environmental
degradation have already left scars and will
continue to create problems as the situation
worsens. While it may be possible for China to
mitigate the impact of environmental damage
through coordinated policies, effective spending
and sound future planning, Beijing is unable or
unwilling to prescribe such measures.
As
an undeniable fact on the ground, it is imperative
for prudent policymakers to consider the
geostrategic implications of not just a
superpower, but of an environmentally ravaged
China as well.
There is little disagreement
that China's environment is a mounting problem for
Beijing. The country is one of the
world's leaders in sulfur emissions, but with only a
fraction of the vehicles of most countries; China is
home to 16 of the world's 20 most polluted cities;
water pollution affects as much as 70% of the
country; air pollution is blamed for the premature
death of some 400,000 Chinese annually; crop
returns are steadily decreasing in quantity and
quality because of polluted land and water; and
solid-waste production is expected to more than
double over the next decade, pushing China far
ahead of the United States as the largest
producer. [1]
While the general
accessibility of this information is creating
greater awareness, trends indicate that pollution
and environmental degradation will worsen. Chinese
consumers are expected to purchase hundreds of
millions of automobiles, adding to air-pollution
problems. Despite pledges to put the environment
first, national planners still aim to double per
capita gross domestic product (GDP) by 2010.
Urban populations are expected to continue
expanding, leading to the creation of slums and
stressing urban sanitation and delivery systems.
Steadily richer Chinese will be able to purchase
more goods and consume more resources.
China lacks a powerful national body able
to coordinate, monitor and enforce environmental
legislation: the State Environmental Protection
Agency (SEPA) is understaffed, has few resources
and must compete with other bureaucracies for
attention.
The devolution of
decision-making to local levels has placed
environmental stewardship in the hands of
officials who are more concerned with economic
growth than the environment. Finally, the
deficiency of capital and the lack of will to
promote massive spending on environmental repair
necessary to reverse more than two decades of
destruction are perhaps most indicative of the
fact that environmental restoration will not
occur: estimates on the final cost of
environmental repair range into the tens of
billions of US dollars. [2]
From the
examples above, it is clear that China's
environmental crisis will only worsen before it
gets better. SEPA's impotence, Beijing's
contradictory policy statements, expanding
consumption and a lack of funds to reverse already
serious problems all suggest that pollution and
degradation will most likely worsen in the decades
to come.
Pollution, unrest and social
mobilization As the impact of pollution on
human health becomes more obvious and widespread,
it is leading to greater political mobilization
and social unrest from those citizens who suffer
the most. A statement from the October 2005
Central Committee meeting in Shanghai illustrates
Beijing's increasing concern regarding the
correlation between unrest and pollution issues.
More than 74,000 incidents of protest and
unrest were recorded in China in 2004, up from
58,000 the year before. While there are no clear
statistics linking this number of protests, riots
and unrest specifically to pollution issues, the
fact that pollution was one of four social
problems linked to disharmony by the Central
Committee implies that there is at least the
perception of a strong correlation.
For
the Communist Party and neighboring states, social
unrest must be viewed as a primary security
concern for three reasons: it is creating greater
political mobilization, it threatens to forge
linkages with democracy movements, and
demonstrations are proving more difficult to
contain. These three factors have the potential to
challenge the party's total political control,
thus potentially destabilizing a state with a huge
military arsenal and a history of violent,
internal conflict that cannot be played down or
ignored.
Protests are uniting a variety of
actors throughout local communities. Pollution
issues are indiscriminate. The effects, though not
equally felt by each person within a community,
impact rich and poor, farmers and businessmen,
families and individuals alike. As local
communities respond to pollution issues through
united opposition, it is leaving Beijing with no
easy target on which to blame unrest, and no
simple option for how to quell whole communities
with a common grievance.
Moreover,
protests serve as a venue for the politically
disaffected who are unhappy with the current state
of governance, and may be open to considering
alternative forms of political rule.
Environmental experts such as Elizabeth
Economy note that protests afford an opportunity
for the environmental movement to forge linkages
with democracy advocates. She notes in her book
The River Runs Black that several
environmentalists argue that change is only
possible through greater democratization and notes
that the environmental and democracy movements
united in Eastern Europe prior to the end of the
Cold War.
It is conceivable that in this
way, environmentally motivated protests might help
to spread democracy and undermine communist rule.
A further key challenge is to contain
protests once they begin. The steady introduction
of new media such as mobile phones, e-mail and
text messaging are preventing China's authorities
from silencing and hiding unrest. Moreover, the
ability to send and receive information ensures
that domestic and international observers will be
made aware of unrest, making it far more difficult
for local authorities to employ state-sanctioned
force.
The security ramifications of
greater social unrest cannot be overlooked.
Linkages between environmental and democracy
advocates potentially challenge the party's
monolithic control of power.
In the past,
similar challenges by Falungong and the Tiananmen
protesters have been met by force and detainment.
In an extreme situation, such as national water
shortages, social unrest could generate
widespread, coordinated action and political
mobilization that would serve as a midwife to
anti-party political challenges, create divisions
within the party over how to deal with the
environment, or lead to a massive show of force.
Any of these outcomes would mark an
erosion or alteration to the Communist Party's
current power dynamic. And while many would treat
political change in China, especially the
implosion of the party, as a welcome development,
it must be noted that any slippage of the party's
dominance would most likely be accompanied by a
period of transitional violence.
Though
most violence would be directed toward dissident
Chinese, a ripple effect would be felt in
neighboring states through migration, impediments
to trade and an increased military presence along
the Chinese border. All of these situations would
alter security assumptions in the region.
Other security concerns While
unrest presents the most obvious example of a
security threat related to pollution, several
other key concerns are worth noting. The cost of
environmental destruction could, for example,
begin to reverse the blistering rate of economic
growth in China that is the foundation of the
Communist Party's legitimacy.
Estimates
maintain that 7% annual growth is required to
preserve social stability. Yet the costs of
pollution are already taxing the economy between
8% and 12% of GDP per year. [3] As environmental
problems mount, this percentage will increase, in
turn reducing annual growth. As a result, the
party could be seriously challenged to legitimize
its continued control if economic growth
stagnates.
Nationalists in surrounding
states could use pollution as a rallying point to
muster support for anti-Chinese causes. For
example, attacks on China's environmental
management for its impact on surrounding states,
such as Japan, could be used to argue against
further investment in the country or be
highlighted during territorial disputes in the
East China Sea to agitate anti-Chinese sentiment.
While nationalism does not imply conflict, it
could reduce patterns of cooperation in the region
and hopes for balanced and effective multilateral
institutions and dialogues.
Finally,
China's seemingly insatiable appetite for timber
and other resources such as fish is fueling
illegal exports from such nations as Myanmar and
Indonesia. As these states continue to deplete key
resources, they too will face problems, and hence
the impact on third nations must be considered.
Territorial expansion or newfound
alliances In addition to the concerns
already mentioned, pollution, if linked to a
specific issue such as water shortage, could have
important geopolitical ramifications. China's
northern plains, home to hundreds of millions of
people, face acute water shortages. Growing
demand, a decade of drought, inefficient delivery
methods and increasing water pollution have
reduced per capita water holdings to critical
levels.
Although Beijing hopes to relieve
some of the pressures via the North-South Water
Diversion project, it requires tens of billions of
dollars and its completion is, at best, still
several years away and, at worst, impossible. Yet
just to the north lies one of the most
underpopulated areas in Asia, the Russian far
east.
While there is little agreement
among scholars about whether resource shortages
lead to greater cooperation or conflict, either
scenario encompasses security considerations.
Russian politicians already allege possible
Chinese territorial designs on the region. They
note Russia's falling population in the far east,
currently estimated at some 6 million to 7
million, and argue that the growing Chinese
population along the border, more than 80 million,
may soon take over.
While these concerns
smack of inflated nationalism and scare tactics,
there could be some truth to them. The method by
which China might annex the territory can only be
speculated upon, but would surely result in
full-scale war between two powerful,
nuclear-equipped nations.
While a
significant concern, the larger and more realistic
implication for Western security analysts must be
greater cooperation and a possible alliance with
Moscow. It should be assumed that China will court
Russia or even pursue an alliance with its
northern neighbor to gain access to water, oil and
other natural resources.
Indicative of
growing strategic cooperation are a number of
recent developments between the two countries,
including a joint military exercise and continued
investment and work on an oil pipeline. Such
warming relations between Moscow and Beijing could
threaten Western interests in the region and
beyond.
Conclusion Pollution
and environmental degradation, not traditionally
considered security concerns, should be accounted
for in security assessments of China and the
region. Social unrest, the potential for
large-scale political mobilization, and
democratization are increasingly challenging the
Communist Party's power and legitimacy. These
trends, when linked to political change, could
lead to outbreaks of violence, possible
large-scale emigration, economic instability and
other concerns.
In facing such a serious
problem, China would benefit from further foreign
assistance and expertise. As the health of China
and its economy is inextricably linked to all of
the world's most developed economies, wealthy
states and non-governmental organizations should
consider additional courses of action to help
China form a credible environmental movement
supported by legal experts, academics and party
officials sympathetic to change.
Although
not a complete solution, increased foreign
assistance may be a step in the right direction.
Alternatively, and if left untreated, China's
environment will worsen and threaten stability in
one of the most populated and dynamic areas on
Earth.
Notes 1. The
Economist, August 19, 2004.
2. Canadian
Security Intelligence Services Division; The
Economist, October 20, 2005.
Nathan Nankivell is senior
researcher at the office of the Special Adviser
Policy, Maritime Forces Pacific Headquarters,
Canadian Department of National Defense. The views
expressed are those of the author and do not
necessarily reflect the official policy of the
Department of National Defense.
