Recent statements by Taiwanese President
Chen Shui-bian have given rise to another round of
criticism from Beijing and revived US mistrust
toward Chen. The proposals that he can carry out
would not take him across PRC (People's Republic
of China) red lines; those that would cross those
red lines he lacks the wherewithal to carry out.
So there is not likely to be a cross-strait
crisis. And the United States will not abandon
Taiwan. Still, the steps outlined by Chen
underscore that there will be no significant
progress in cross-strait relations during his
remaining two years in office.
Moreover, if promoted, those
steps could create a chill in US-Taiwan relations.
In statements on January 1 and 29, Chen
announced a new, more restrictive approach to
cross-strait economic relations; proposed a
"bottom up" approach to revising the Taiwanese
constitution with, as he indicated elsewhere, no
subjects barred from consideration; and suggested
it was appropriate to give "serious consideration"
both to abolishing the National Unification
Council and National Unification Guidelines (which
came into being in the early 1990s) and to
applying to the United Nations as "Taiwan".
Against the background of defeats suffered
by Chen's Democratic Progressive Party a year ago
in elections for the legislative yuan and the rout
experienced in December 2005 local elections, the
latest statements appear to stem from Chen's
desire to regain the initiative from the
opposition Kuomintang (KMT). He seeks to do this
by tightening his identification with
"Taiwan-consciousness", heightening the impression
of threat from the mainland, deepening the sense
of separateness, and tarring his political
opponents as capitulationist PRC toadies.
His call for a people-oriented approach to
fashioning a "new" constitution is unlikely to
bear fruit given the firm opposition by KMT
chairman (and Taipei Mayor) Ma Ying-jeou, whose
political coalition controls the legislature,
where a constitutional amendment needs to be
approved by a three-quarters vote. But even if
there were agreement on "good governance"
amendments (eg, changing the government from a
five-branch to a three-branch one, clarifying
roles of the various branches by moving either to
a true parliamentary or true presidential system,
etc), there is zero prospect of the legislature
passing changes that would touch on the so-called
"sensitive" issues of sovereignty, territory, and
unification/independence.
Moreover, at
least two decades of polling show that the people
of Taiwan do not want to take chances with their
security and well-being, and hence strongly (about
80%) opt for "maintaining the status quo". Thus
there is no prospect that amendments that would
clearly bring down tragedy on Taiwan would garner
the required affirmative vote of half of the
entire electorate even if they got beyond the
legislative yuan.
Perhaps Chen's most
controversial proposal is to "seriously consider"
abolishing the National Unification Council and
Guidelines. It is most controversial because it is
the one that he may have the legal authority to
bring off on his own.
In his inaugural
addresses in 2000 and 2004, Chen made various
pledges, including that there "will not be an
issue" about abolishing the council and
guidelines. But he now believes that the
"precondition" he laid down for observing those
pledges - that the PRC has no intention to use
military force against Taiwan - no longer exists.
In his judgment, the PRC now not only has the
intention but is actively planning to use force
against Taiwan - as seen in the buildup of
missiles across from Taiwan, the passage of the
Anti-Secession Law last March that provided for
use of "non-peaceful means" to block Taiwan
independence, and the report that the PRC has, and
is actively carrying out, a three-phase plan for
war against Taiwan by 2015.
Chen has not
publicly committed to moving ahead to eliminate
the council and guidelines, much less to take
action on any other proposal that would more
directly threaten to cross PRC "red lines" on de
jure independence. That said, one senses that
while he does not want a crisis with the United
States, Chen might like to move on the council and
guidelines to demonstrate that he understands
Beijing's limits better than Washington does and
that he does not need US approval for every step
he takes on cross-strait relations.
His
Lunar New Year proposal to consider applying to
the UN under the name "Taiwan" is obviously a
political ploy with no prospect of going anywhere.
It is designed to show that he is the true
protector of Taiwan's interests and that Ma
Ying-jeou, who has spoken favorably of some sort
of ultimate unification with a democratized
mainland, is not.
Perhaps all of the steps
President Chen proposes are also designed not only
to set the terms for the 2008 presidential
elections, when his successor will be chosen, but
also to box in future candidates from his own
party, where many members take a more patient
approach than he has shown when it comes to
pressing a separatist stance.
Beijing's
reaction has been somewhat detached and
dismissive. PRC officials take every private
opportunity to warn that Americans - and
especially the US government - should remain
vigilant. They caution that some clever move by
Chen might be seen by Americans as harmless but by
Beijing as triggering a harsh reaction, thus
splitting the US and PRC and leading to a crisis.
PRC analysts understand the limits on
Chen. Moreover, the level of outspoken confidence
in mainland China today regarding long-term trends
in cross-strait relations is noteworthy, and a
significant change from the anxious and militant
mood in late 2003 and early 2004. Indeed, Chen
seems to share their assessment that time is on
Beijing's side, which is one reason he calls for
altering trends by tightening up on cross-strait
economic relations and deepening Taiwanese
identity.
US government statements issued
after Chen's January 1 speech and January 29 Lunar
New Year remarks were measured but unmistakable in
their warnings to the Taiwanese leader (and their
assurances to Beijing) regarding US intolerance of
active steps toward Taiwanese independence.
Private messages from Washington to Taipei were
reportedly sterner.
The point from
Washington's perspective is not whether the
Unification Council and Guidelines matter
substantively - they are inactive and, moreover,
the US does not take a position for or against
unification. Rather, Chen's inaugural pledges are
important, and any effort to break them is not
justified, in Washington's view, by exaggerating
the threat from Beijing. Chen's moves are seen as
political mischief at best and perhaps more than
that. Significantly, they represent a potential
breach of faith with the US regarding commitments
made as part of the efforts to restore trust after
the boisterous 2003-04 Taiwan presidential
campaign.
The United States is not going
to walk away from Taiwan. But it could distance
itself from Taipei if Chen continues to act in
ways that not only surprise Washington but move in
directions seen as harmful to US national
interests. This is not something anyone should
wish for - not even in Beijing.
Chen
Shui-bian argues that his proposals are designed
to deepen democracy and, as such, merit US
support. But democracy is not a license for
irresponsible behavior, and while the US stands
behind the notion that any agreements between
Taiwan and the mainland should be peaceful and
meet the approval of the people of Taiwan, support
for this level of "self-determination" is not
support for independence.
The US strongly
supports Taiwan's democratic development. And it
respects Taiwan's right, as a democracy, to make
its own choices. But the US is not bound to
support such choices, and is free to react in ways
that serve its own interests.
Taiwan's
National Security Council will reportedly examine
the issue of abolishing the National Unification
Council and Guidelines and make recommendations to
President Chen in the next few weeks. One hopes
that throughout that process, both the NSC and
Chen will reflect on the harm that could be done
to Taiwan's interests if a chill develops between
the island and the United States.
Given
the stakes, it is hard to see how such a
development would serve Chen's political
interests, or the interests of the people of
Taiwan.
Alan D Romberg
(aromberg@earthlink.net) is senior
associate and director of the East Asia Program at
the Henry L Stimson Center, a non-partisan,
non-profit think-tank in Washington, DC. He is the
author of Rein In at the Brink of the
Precipice: American Policy Toward Taiwan and
US-PRC Relations (Washington: The Henry L
Stimson Center, 2003).
